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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the financial returns to higher education 
in Australia from both the private and social points of view. While 
some of the issues have been explored in other studies, several 
substantial contributions are made in this thesis in the areas of 
both methodology and policy analysis. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. In Part I, the analysis 
is based on the comparison of the mean earnings outcomes of degree-
holders and high-school leavers. Private and social gains to 
investing in higher education are quantified using conventional 
techniques of Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return. The 
effect of alternative fee-regimes on individuals' incentives to 
invest in higher education is analysed, with particular attention 
given to the recently introduced Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(RECS). Our results suggest that higher education appears to be an 
attractive private investment, and that the imposition of RECS has 
little effect on its profitability. 
One of the problems in estimating the social profitability of 
higher education is that there is little agreement as to the size of 
externalities. A novel approach adopted in the thesis is to infer the 
marginal value of the externalities from the fee-structure of RECS, 
assuming that in setting the charge, the Government is concerned only 
with allocative efficiency. It is estimated that for HECS to 
represent an optimal charge, the marginal graduate is expected to 
deliver between $1,400 and $1,500 (1985-86 dollars) in spillovers per 
year. The analysis is extended further to consider the consistency of 
the level of charge in RECS with the Government's commitment to 
expand higher education from the efficiency point of view. It is 
(iv) 
found that at some discount rates, the two policies are internally 
inconsistent. 
Part II of the thesis examines the implications of the large 
dispersion in individual incomes around the mean on the profitability 
of higher education. Treating the dispersion as being the result of 
luck suggests that there are considerable risks attached to investing 
in higher education. A model is developed which enables risks to be 
formally incorporated into conventional measures of educational 
profitability. The adjustment for risk is found to reduce the 
attractiveness of higher education as an investment. 
An alternative interpretation of the dispersion in individual 
incomes is that it reflects differences in individuals' unmeasured 
characteristics, such as ability. The implications of differences in 
ability across individuals on the profitability of higher education 
are explored. Our results suggest that self-selection by individuals 
may lead to serious biases in estimates of the rate of return based 
on the comparison of mean income profiles. 
The attractiveness of HECS vis-a-vis other fee-schemes, such as 
that proposed by the Liberal-National Parties (LIB) is also 
investigated in the light of this dispersion. It is found that if 
individuals are uncertain of their abilities and are risk averse, the 
income-contingent nature of HECS makes it relatively more attractive 
compared to LIB. However, if they are aware of their abilities, the 
more able individuals may be better off under the LIB scheme. 
In Part III of the thesis, the issue of how the value of a 
degree has changed over the last ten years is analysed. An important 
methodological point made is that a simple comparison of cross-
(v) 
sectional rates of return over time may lead to misleading 
conclusions. It is argued that it is praferable to examine how the 
labour market experiences of successive cohorts of new graduates have 
changed over time. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For several years now, criticism on the Australian higher 
education system has been mounting. The criticisms have come from 
both within and outside the academic community, and have included 
such wide-ranging issues as the quality of teaching and research, the 
ability of institutions to adapt to changing demands, the way in 
which institutions are- funded, and the equity effects of the publ i c 
subsidy in higher education. Faced with these criticisms, the 
Government has responded with the appointment of several review 
committees, and finally, with the institution of the far-reaching 
reforms outlined in the Green Paper on Higher Education1 and the Wran 
Report on Higher Education Funding. 2 
One of the basic tenets of the Green Paper is the Government's 
commitment to an expansion of the number of places in higher 
education. The question of how to fund this expansion under the 
current and likely future tight budgetary conditions is the subject 
of the Wran Report. It is somewhat surprising, given the fact that so 
much of the Green Paper rests on the premise that an expansion in the 
higher education system is "desirable", that such basic questions as 
what is the marginal social rate of return to higher education and 
how has it changed over time, have not been addressed in the Green 
Paper. Moreover, with the emphasis given to funding sources involving 
the main beneficiaries of higher education, namely, the students 
themselves, it is important to quantify the financial gains to 
1. Department of Employment, Education, and Training (1987b). The 
Green Paper, which is a discussion paper, has since become a White 
Paper, which has the status of a policy paper. 
2. Department of Employment, Education, and Training (1988). 
2 
individuals from higher education, and to estimate how these gains 
are affected when fees are levied. These are some of the important 
policy questions which provide the motivation · for this thesis. 
The thesis also seeks to remedy a number of short-comings in 
the educational rate of return literature. Estimations of the returns 
to education have tended to focus almost exclusively on the 
comparison of mean earnings profiles across different educational 
groups. The fact that there exists a sizeable dispersion in 
individual earnings around each of these mean earnings profiles has 
largely been ignored. One of the major concerns in this thesis is 
with the implications of this dispersion. One interpretation is that 
the dispersion represents the influence of luck and other unforeseen 
events. This suggests that there may be considerable risks associated 
with investing in education. The treatment of risk in conventional 
estimates of the returns to education can, at best, be described as 
ad hoc. An important contribution of this thesis is the development 
of a simple procedure whereby risks can be incorporated into 
conventional measures of educational profitability. 
An alternative interpretation of the dispersion in individual 
earnings around the mean is that it represents differences in 
individual-specific characteristics, such as innate ability. The 
profitability of education may, therefore, differ across individuals 
depending on their respective endowments of these characteristics. A 
fairly novel approach adopted in this thesis is to calculate the 
rates of r~turn implied by matching different parts of the high-
school leavers' and degree-holders' income distributions. In so 
doing, we obtain a sense of how individual rates of return may differ 
from the average return to the group. As well, we gain some 
3 
interesting ins~ghts into how the profitability of educational 
investments may differ across individuals of different abilities. 
Finally, an issue which has not been sufficiently investigated, 
at least in the Australian literature, is the possibility of students 
dropping out, or taking longer than the minimum time to complete 
their courses. This, in our view, is a serious oversight, 
particularly in the case of Australian higher education where, 
according to the William's Cornrnittee, 3 more than 40% of students fail 
to complete their courses in the minimum time required. We shall 
endeavour to shed some light on how failure and drop-out rates affect 
both the private and social rates of return to higher education. 
This thesis is divided into three parts. In Part I of the 
thesis, the private and social profitability of higher education in 
Australia are addressed using data from the 1985-86 Income and 
Housing Survey. The focus in Part I is on the aggregate figures. The 
analysis is based on the comparison of the mean earnings outcomes 
among different schooling groups. There, we follow the conventional 
treatment of ignoring the variance around the mean profiles. The 
"Internal Rate of Return" (IRR) and "Net Present Value" (NPV) 
techniques, both of which have been widely used since education was 
first recognized as an investment, are employed to quantify the 
private and social gains to higher education. Part I of the thesis 
contains three chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the IRR and NPV 
methodologies, and the complications involved in applying these 
techniques . to data. A review of previous Australian research on the 
profitability of education is also provided. Chapter 3 examines the 
private returns from higher education. Simulations under alternative 
3. Committee of Inquiry into Education and Training (1979). 
4 
fee-paying regimes are performed in that chapter to determine the 
effect on individuals' incentive to invest in highe~ education. The 
returns to higher education from the social point of view is the 
subject of Chapter 4. 
Part II of the thesis is concerned with the variance around the 
mean earnings profiles, and its implications on the estimates in Part 
I of the thesis. Part II contains three chapters. In Chapter 5, we 
treat the variance as arising entirely from the random effects of 
luck. A model of how to deal with uncertainty in quantifying the ex 
ante returns to higher education is developed, and applied. In 
Chapter 6, we make the opposite assumption with respect to the source 
of the variation in individual incomes. There, we assume that it is 
the result of differences in permanent individual-specific 
characteristics. The effect on individuals' ex-post and ex-ante 
profitability of higher education is addressed. Chapter 7 brings 
together both the luck (stochastic) and permanent individual-specific 
components of the variation in individual incomes, and examines some 
policy implications arising from the variability in individual 
incomes. 
Part III of the thesis contains Chapter 8 which addresses the 
question of how the value of the degree has changed over the last ten 
years. An important methodological point made there is how cross-
sectional comparisons over time can lead to misleading conclusions. 
It is argued that it may be preferable to compare the performances of 
different 9ohorts of new graduates over time in terms of their 
starting salaries, and the types of jobs that they obtain in order to 
ascertain the changes in the profitability of higher education. 
5 
Chapter 9 surnrnarises the major findings of the thesis and 
suggests areas of further research. 
PART I 
AGGREGATE ANALYSIS 
7 
Part I of the thesis quan~ifies the returns to investing in 
higher education by comparing the mean earnings profiles of degree-
holders and high-school leavers. The techniques used here are the 
"Internal Rate of Return Approach" and the "Net Present Value 
Approach", both of which have been widely _utilised in studies of this 
kind. Research into the profitability of education from both the 
private and social points of view is not at all new, as the 
literature review in Chapter 2 will show. Although research in 
Australia clearly lags behind that in the United States, there has 
been, nevertheless, a number of studies which have addressed this 
issue. So, why another study? There are several reasons. 
First, in the light of the recent releases of the White Paper 
on Higher Education and the Wran Report, there is a need for 
estimates of the private and social rates of return to higher 
education based on the latest data available. 
Second, the analysis in Part I of the thesis which is based on 
the comparison of the mean outcomes across schooling groups, provides 
a useful bench-mark with which the results in Part II which considers 
the variance around the means, can be compared. 
Finally, although neither the research area nor the techniques 
used here are novel, we find that by asking different questions, or 
asking the same questions differently we can gain some additional 
insight into the returns to higher education. For instance, the 
problem of placing a monetary value on the externalities associated 
with higher education is well-known. Although there have been 
attempts to estimate the value of specific types of externalities 
8 
associated with education, such as the lowering of crime rates, 1 we 
are a long way from having a comprehensive measure of the value of 
externalities associated with particular levels and types of 
education. Yet the answer is clearly crucial to the debate of how 
much (if at all) the Government should sub_sidise each level and type 
of education. Here, instead of asking what is the magnitude of these 
externalities, we turn the question around and ask: Given the size of 
the public subsidy in higher education, what is the Government's 
implicit judgment with respect to the value of the externalities 
assuming that the Government aims to maximize efficiency? Further, is 
this judgement consistent with its resolve to expand the capacity of 
the higher education system? 
As another example, economists have always conceded that there 
are private consumption benefits to higher education. Yet these are 
rarely, if ever, included in estimates of the returns to higher 
education. Again, the problem of measurement appears insurmountable. 
Here, we turn the question around and ask: Given that students can 
obtain their degrees very much more profitably on a part-time basis, 
what does their choosing to pursue higher education on a full-time 
basis imply about the size of the consumption benefits? 
Obviously, there are limitations to these approaches. 
Nevertheless, they provide us with useful insights into the returns 
to higher education which are heretofore unavailable. 
Part I of the thesis contains three chapters. Chapter 2 begins 
by briefly tracing the historical roots of the treatment of education 
as an investment. It then proceeds with a discussion of some of the 
1. See, for instance, Haveman and Wolfe (1984). 
9 
conceptual and empirical issues related to the estimation of 
educational profitability. Finally a survey of previous Australian 
research on educational profitability is provided. 
In Chapter 3, we use data from the 1985-86 Australian Income 
and Housing Survey to answer: How profitable is higher education as a 
private investment? A number of complications, such as which income 
concept to use and how to account for differences in the number of 
hours worked, are addressed. As well, we compare the private 
profitability between males and females, and between the part-time 
and full-time modes of study. A highlight of the chapter is the 
comparison of the profitability of higher education under alternative 
fee-paying regimes. Particular attention is paid to the effect of the 
recently introduced Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) on 
the private returns to higher education. 
In Chapter 4, the focus is on the social profitability of 
higher education as an investment. Some of the important questions 
addressed in this chapter are: From society's point of view, is there 
an over- or under-investment in higher education? Should the subsidy 
given to students be raised or lowered? Is the government's policy of 
taxing students to fund additional ~laces consistent with maximising 
allocative efficiency? It is clear that the answers to these 
questions hinges, to a large extent, on the value placed on the 
externalities associated with higher education. Under the assumption 
that the Government acts to maximise efficiency, we estimate the 
value it i~plicitly places on the value of these externalities from 
the charge it levies on students under HECS. This implied value is 
then used in social NPV calculations to check on the consistency with 
the Government's commitment to expand higher education. 
CH.APTER 2 
PROFITABILITY OF EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS: A SURVEY OF THE ISSUES 
The aim of this chapter is to review some of the conceptual and 
empirical issues related to the estimation of the profitability of 
education as an investment, and to provide a survey of previous 
Australian studies. This chapter contains 5 sections. We begin, in 
Section 2.1, with a brief history of the concept of human capital 
focussing, in particular, on the treatment of education as an 
investment. This is followed, in Section 2.2, by a discussion of the 
benefits of education. The costs of education are dealt with in 
Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, the two most widely-used techniques in 
comparing the costs and benefits of education -- the Net Present 
Value (NPV) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) techniques -- are 
discussed. Some of the difficulties associated with the application 
of these techniques in practice are examined in Section 2.5. Section 
2.6 provides a survey of the studies on the profitability of 
education in Australia. 
2.1 Historical Roots of The Concept of Human Capital 
The concept of human capital, as Blaug (1976, p.829) puts it, 
is simply "the idea that people spend on themselves in diverse ways, 
not for the sake of present enjoyments, but for the sake of future 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns". Examples of such expenses 
include those incurred in pursuing education and training, in 
prolonging the period of job search, and in migration to other parts 
of the country (or to other countries), with the aim of improving 
one's career opportunities. Although the concept was only formalised 
and systematically investigated towards the end of 1950s and early 
1960s, its historical roots can be traced back to as early as the 
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17th century in the work of Sir Wil_iam Petty. 1 Kiker notes that 
other economists who subscribed to the view that human beings and/or 
their acquired skills and abilities can be treated as capital 
included such well-known names as Adam Smith, Jean Baptise Say, John 
Stuart Mill, Friedrich List, Nassau Senior, Ernst Engel, Leon Walras 
and Irving Fisher. The concept of human capital was, therefore, 
prominent in economic thinking all through the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. According to Kiker, this prominence came to an 
end in the first half of the twentieth century when Alfred Marshall 
and his followers rejected this idea of applying the concept of 
capital to man. They opted instead for a narrower definition of 
capital, which included only that portion of the nonhuman, material, 
man-made stock of wealth which is utilised directly in future 
production. 2 
.. 
Since then, economists who adopted the all-inclusive concept of 
capital have been relegated to the minority ranks of the profession. 
In spite of the "majority opinion",· however, there continued to be 
sporadic contributions to the literature which treated huma~ beings 
(or the skills acquired) as capital and valued them in money terms. 3 
In the area of education, analyses within what would later be called 
"the human capital framework" can be found, for instance, in the work 
of Strumilin (1929), Walsh (1935) and Friedman and Kuznets (1945). 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that prior to the work of Schultz and 
1. See Kiker (1966). 
2. This interpretation of Marshall's view on human capital is not 
undisputed. Blandy (1967), for instance, argues that the problem was 
merely one of definition, and that Marshall basically accepted the 
"Smithian position that an educated man may be compared to an 
expensive machine" (p.874). 
3. See Walsh (1935) for a bibliography of such work in the first 
three decades of the twentieth century. 
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Becker in the late fifties and early sixties, it was uncommon to 
think of education as anything more than a consumption item like food 
and clothing. 
The importance of treating education and training (and in 
general, all activities which improve the quality and productivity of 
human resources) explicitly as a form of investment, in the same way 
as expenditures on physical capital such as buildings, factories and 
machines was emphasized by Schultz (1961a). In his 1960 presidential 
address to the American Economic Association, he argued forcefully 
that: 
" economists have not stressed ... the simple truth 
that people invest in themselves and that these 
investments are very large." 
and that: 
"The failure to treat human resourc.es explicitly as a 
form of capital, as a means of production, as a product 
of investment, has fostered the retention of the 
classical notion of labor as a capacity to do manual work 
requiring little knowledge and skill ... This notion of 
labor was wrong in the classical period and it is 
patently wrong now . 
... knowledge and skill are in great part the 
product of investment and, combined with other human 
investment, predominantly account the productive 
superiority of the technically advanced countries. To 
omit them in studying economic growth is like trying to 
explain Soviet ideology without Marx." 4 
Schultz's address can be said to have sparked off what one 
author has called "the human investment revolution in economic 
thought". 5 - rn addition to education and training, human capital 
concepts have been applied in such diverse areas as health care, 
4. Schultz (1961a) pp.2-3. 
5. Bowman (1966). 
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migration, job search, occupational choice, marriage, family 
planning, and child care. Human Capital Theory has proven to be more 
than just a passing fad which sweeps through the economics profession 
from time to time. Writing in the mid-1970s, Blaug (1976, p.827) 
observed that " ... the theory of human capital has been with us for 
more than a decade, during which time the flood of literature in the 
field has never abated ... ". This observation appears no less true 
today. 
2.2 The Benefits of Education 
In treating education as a form of investment, one of the first 
questions to be posed was: Is it profitable to the individual, and to 
society as a whole? To answer these questions, it is first necessary 
to identify (and hopefully also measure) the benefits of education. 
Following Weisbrod (1962), we define a "benefit" as anything that 
pushes the utility possibility frontier outwards. In the discussion 
that follows, it is important to distinguish between "private" and 
"social" benefits. What may be regarded as a benefit from the point 
of individuals investing in education need not necessarily also be a 
benefit to society (in the sense of pushing society's utility 
possibility frontier outwards), and vice versa. 
2.2.1 Income Increment 
Unquestionably, the most widely studied of the benefits 
associated with education is the effect on individuals' labour market 
incomes. The fact that more highly educated individuals tend to have 
higher earnings than less educated ones is well-established. Figures 
from the 1985-86 Income and Housing Survey, for instance, show that 
the mean annual gross income of individuals with degrees is $30,580, 
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compared to $18,540 for those with no post-school qualification. 6 
This is fairly typical of the finding in almost every country for 
which data on average earnings and level of educational attainment 
are available. 7 Blaug (1972, p.54) has noted that: 
"The universality of this positive association between 
education and earnings is one of the most striking 
findings of modern social science. It is indeed one of 
the few safe generalizations that one can make about 
labour markets in all countries whether capitalist or 
communist." 
In spite of this, the relationship between education and 
earnings has remained controversial. One of the major sources of 
contention is the extent to which the higher earnings of the more 
educated are due to additional schooling rather than factors which 
are correlated with schooling (such as ability, motivation and family 
background). Related to this is the fundamental question of what 
schooling actually does. Some researchers have argued that schooling 
raises individuals' productivity by imparting knowledge and skills 
which make them more efficient, and thus more valuable in the 
production process. Others believe that it serves simply as a 
screening device which enables employers to identify the more able 
individuals.a 
The problem of multiple correlations among income-determining 
variables has been well recognized. In one of the early applications 
of the investment approach to education, Houthakker (1959, p.28) 
warned that" ... we cannot even be sure that the apparent effect of 
6. A.B.S., 1986 Income Distribution Su rvey, Persons with Earned 
Income, Cat. No. 6546.0, Table 11. 
7. See Psacharopoulos (1973, 1981, 1985). 
8. This screening view of education will be discussed in greater 
detail in Section 2.5.1. 
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education on income is not completely explicable in terms of 
intelligence and parents' income, so that the specific effect of 
education could be zero or even negative". Since then, numerous 
attempts have been made by economists to disentangle the effects of 
education and other factors on earnings using multi-variate 
regression techniques. 9 The consensus seems to be that even after 
controlling for other factors, education and age remain the two most 
powerful explanators of earnings. Morgan and David (1963, pp.436-
437), for instance, have concluded from their study that 
" ... objections to the use of simple average earnings of different age 
and education groups· on the grounds of spurious correlation are 
correct but quantitatively not terribly important". Similarly, in a 
review of more than 20 American studies, Psacharopoulos (1975, p.55) 
has found that overall, education is responsible for more than three-
quarters (0.77) of the observed earnings differentials between 
educational groups. He has concluded, therefore, that (p.58): 
" ... the greatest part of the observed earnings 
differentials by educational level is due to education. 
When all available studies are taken into account, this 
part is greater than it was thought before." 
Another point of disagreement among economists with regard to 
the education-earnings relationship is whether the higher earnings of 
the more educated reflect their higher marginal productivities, or 
whether they merely reflect "societal norms". From the individuals' 
point of view, as long as the acquisition of schooling entitles them 
to higher earnings (for whatever reasons), the higher earnings will 
be regarded as one of the benefits of schooling. How, and why 
9. This literature is discussed in greater detail in Part II of the 
thesis. 
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education leads to higher earnings is irrelevant· to them. From 
society's point of view, however, these questions matter greatly. 
Clearly, if markets were perfectly competitive, wages would be 
equal to the value of workers' marginal product. 10 Earnings would 
then reflect productivity differences, and the extra earnings of 
educated workers would, therefore, measure their additional 
contribution to society's output. In this case, the earnings 
increment to schooling is both a private and a social benefit. 
If we believe, however, that earnings reflect social 
conventions and historical and other non-economic factors rather than 
productivity differences, then the earnings increment to schooling 
may not represent an addition to national output. Consequently, what 
is clearly a private benefit may not also be a social benefit. 11 
Blaug (1965, pp. 227-229) argues that the issue is not whether 
there are imperfections in the labour market, but whether they are so 
serious as to invalidate the use of earnings differentials as 
measures of productivity differences. He points out that even if the 
wage system is "a system of administered prices" as Vaizey (1962, 
p.45) suggests, market forces may, nevertheless, still impinge on the 
level of wages and salaries. 12 Hence, earnings would still be brought 
into line with relative productivities. He argues, further, that: 
10. This should be interpreted in the life-cycle sense, since, wages 
need not necessarily equal the marginal product of workers in each 
and every period if, for instance, there are firm-specific training. 
See, Becker (1975). Other explanations for the divergence between 
wages and marginal product in a particular period include the 
shirking-discipline explanation of Lazear (1979) and implicit 
contracts. 
11. Such a view is expounded by Vaizey (1962), for instance. 
12. Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985, pp. 50-52) make the same 
point. 
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" ... if relative earnings reflect, not relative 
productivities, but family connections, traditional 
conventions, the snob-value of a university degree, 
nepotism, entry restrictions in trade unions and 
professional organisations, politically determined wage 
administrations or any other market imperfections one 
might care to mention, how is it that more than 60 per 
cent of gross earnings differentials_ are directly 
attributable to education alone?" 
Income tax may also result in a divergence between the private 
and social benefits of the earnings increment associated with 
education. Individuals, generally, do not get to keep the entire 
earnings increment. A part of it is paid to the government in the 
form of tax. Although it may be argued that the individual may 
receive some satisfaction from paying tax, 13 the general consensus is 
that it is only the increment in after-tax income which is regarded 
as a private benefit. 
2.2.2. Other Benefits Accruing to Individuals 
A number of other benefits associated with schooling have been 
identified. Psacharopoulos (1975, pp.134-161) has investigated the 
extent to which the higher earnings enjoyed by more educated workers 
carry over to fringe benefits as well. These include superior pension 
or superannuation plans, stock option schemes, better working 
conditions, generous expense accounts, and so on. He concludes that 
fringe benefits tend to increase with the level of education, and 
that money-wage differentials may, therefore, significantly 
understate the benefit of education. A similar conclusion is reached 
by Duncan (1976). 
13. Cohn (1972, pp.1~1-142) suggests that individuals may derive 
utility in paying taxes because i) they believe in supporting the 
government; and ii) government revenues are spent on collective goods 
which benefit them. 
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Other work-related advantages enjoyed by the more educated 
include the higher social prestige of their occupations [Blau and 
Duncan (1967), Miller (1982b), Richardson (1986)], their lower 
vulnerability to unemployment [Bloch and Smith (1977), Nickell 
(1979) J, wider job choices and the flexibi_lity to adjust to changing 
job opportunities [Weisbrod (1962)] . 14 
Some researchers have argued that the education experience 
itself, rather than being enjoyable and stimulating, may in fact have 
negative utility for the average student [Blaug (1965) Fane (1984a)]. 
In other words, instead of being a benefit, the consumption aspect of 
education may in fact be a cost! Of course, the same individual who 
finds schooling unpleasant while studying may in later years 
recognize the value of the skills acquired which enables him or her 
to enjoy a novel, or appreciate a piece of artwork or music. 15 
Moreover, there are ''outside-the-classroom" activities associated 
with schooling which may yield positive consumption benefits. Salmon 
(1987), for instance, has suggested that the enjoyment of various 
sporting activities and the opportunity for individuals to identify a 
spouse during college years should be counted as part of the benefits 
of schooling. It has also been argued that students generally enjoy a 
more leisurely life-style compared to someone working full-time in 
the "real world". To the extent that this claim is justified, this 
more desirable life-style will count as a consumption benefit of 
education as well. 
14. Some authors have argued that higher occupational prestige and 
lower unemployment vulnerability are not social benefits. See Blaug 
(1965 p.221) and Cohn (1972, p.142) for a discussion. 
15. Blaug (1965, p.219) argues that these cannot be considered as 
benefits since they are a result of a change in taste. 
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Recent developments in the literature on nNew Horne Economics" 
have shed considerable light on othe~ non-marketed benefits of 
education. 16 Several studies have suggested that education leads to 
improved sorting in the marriage market and arguably, to greater 
happiness in marriage as a result [Becker _(1981), Michael (1982), 
McMahon (1984)]. Schooling has been shown to increase the ability of 
families to avoid unplanned babies through more efficient use of 
contraceptives [Michael (1973), Michael and Willis (1976)]. It 
contributes to better health and increases the life-span of the 
individual [Grossman (1975), Fuchs (1974), Lee (1982)]. The children 
and spouse of more educated individuals tend to be healthier as well 
[Auster et al. (1969), Rosenweig and Schultz (1982)]. Parents with 
more education tend, also, to contribute to the intellectual 
development of their children [Leibowitz (1974)]. It has been argued 
that education improves an individual's ability to achieve greater 
efficiency in consumption [Michael (1975),. Hettich (1972)] and in 
managing their savings portfolio [Salmon (1975)]. It has been argued, 
as well, that those who are more educated tend to be more effective 
in adapting to the "technological revolution within the home" in the 
use of dishwashers, automatic washing machines, tele-shopping for 
groceries, tele-banking, and so on [McMahon {1987a)J . 17 
16. See Michael (1972) for a survey. 
17. For a more detailed discussion, see Michael (1982), Haveman and 
Wolfe (1984), McMahon (1987a). 
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2.2.3 External Benefits 
External benefits of education are those benefits accruing· to 
persons other than the individual investing in education. 
Consideration of these benefits is of great importance in policy 
discussions of the appropriate level of fees to be charged (or the 
appropriate level of subsidy to be given) for education. 18 As Chapman 
and Chia (1989, p.213) have pointed out in their discussion of 
tertiary charges, " ... ultimately, if only allocative efficiency 
prevails, this question is concerned with the relative size of social 
spillovers from higher education''. 
A fairly comprehensive list of externalities in education is 
provided by McMahon (1987b). Among the external benefits which accrue 
to society at large is the role which education plays in preserving 
democratic freedom, in transmitting cultural values, and in promoting 
. 
a greater consciousness towards a national identity. Several authors 
have claimed, in addition, that education leads to more intelligent 
voting behaviour [for example, Brennan (1971)]. 
It has been suggested that education lowers crime rates 
[Ehrlich (1975), Webb (1977)]. This, in turn, translates into cost 
savings to society in terms of the resources used in criminal 
apprehension, and in maintaining the judicial and penal system. 
Those who are more educated are alleged to be less likely to 
require welfare assistance. Their better health condition will tend 
to reduce the cost to the public health system. There is also some 
evidence which suggests that the more educated are more likely to 
participate in voluntary community service activities. 
18. See, Brennan (1988), and the discussion in Chapter 4. 
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In the work-area, Weisbrod (1962) has suggested that education 
may not only improve the productivity of the individual, but the 
productivity of others working with him or her as well. It is 
important, however, that we do not 'double-count'. Brennan (1971) has 
pointed out that there is no reason why the individual will not be 
paid by the firm for this 'service' to fellow workers. To that 
extent, the benefits would have already been accounted for by his or 
her higher income. The spill-overs to workers in other firms, on the 
other hand, may not have been captured. Chapman and Chia (1989, p.16) 
have argued that highly educated individuals are more able to 
initiate, develop, and adopt technological change in the workplace. 
To the extent that the technology, once implemented, can be easily 
copied by other firms without cost, externalities will still exist. 
Summing up, a wide range of benefits associated with education 
have been identified in the literature. The empirical importance of 
many of these, however, remain largely unknown. Researchers have 
tended to restrict themselves to estimating only the marketed, 
earnings-based effects of education because of the inherent 
difficulties in measuring non-marketed effects. 
Haveman and Wolfe (1984) have recently developed a technique 
whereby the value of non-market effects (including external effects) 
can be estimated. They demonstrated the feasibility of this technique 
by estimating the value of a handful of non-marketed effects 
(cognitive development of children, contraceptive use, consumption 
efficiency,· criminal apprehension, improvement in own health). The 
results from their study suggest the total annual value of the non-
marketed effects of schooling may be as large as the marketed ones. 
This, as they have pointed out, " ... suggests that the annual 
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incremental schooling reported in standard human capital estimates 
may capture only about one-half of the total value of an additional 
year of schooling". Haveman and Wolfe are the first to admit that 
their conclusion is "highly tentative". Still, it is clear from their 
work that the non-marketed benefits of education cannot be ignored. 
In this thesis, however, our focus will continue to be mainly 
on the earnings increment associated with education. This is simply a 
reflection of the data which are available. Our results, therefore, 
need to be interpreted in the light of the omission of the (possibly 
large) non-marketed effects of education. 
2.3 The Costs of Education 
The costs of education can be divided into direct and indirect 
costs. From the individual's point of view, direct costs include the 
fees and other charges levied by the institution, as well as the cost 
of books and stationery, and any other out-of-pocket expenses which 
the individual would not have incurred if he or she were not 
studying. Off-setting these costs are the various forms of financial · 
support the individual may be in receipt of, such as, scholarships, 
bursaries, Austudy allowances. 1 9 
From the social point of view, financial support from the 
various sources are merely transfer payments. They do not lessen the 
resources used in the provision of education, and as such, they are 
not subtracted from the direct costs. Similarly, the fees and other 
19. These exclude the financia_ support from family if we consider 
the family to be the decision unit. If, however, the individual is 
regarded to be the decision unit (so that a dollar from his or her 
family is treated no differently to a dollar from, say, the 
government) then financial support from the fami y need to be 
subtracted from direct costs as well. 
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charges levied on students may be regarded also as transfer 
payments. 20 The direct costs to society comprise of the opportunity 
costs of all the resources necessary to provide the educational 
service -- wages of teachers and other support staff, books, sporting 
equipment, other goods and services such as heating and lighting, the 
imputed rent of buildings and grounds, and so on. To these, the 
direct costs incurred by individuals which involve the use of real 
resources must also be added. 
The indirect costs of education are the earnings foregone by 
individuals as a result of their schooling. This is usually estimated 
by the earnings of individuals with the same observed characteristics 
who are not in school. The assumption implicit in this procedure is 
that students have zero earnings while studying. In higher education 
at least, many students do, however, engage in part-time work. Their 
foregone earnings would, therefore, be reduced by the amount received 
from these jobs. 21 As with earnings increment associated with 
education, it is the after-tax magnitude of foregone earnings which 
individuals are concerned with. In the calculation of the indirect 
social cost of education, on the other hand, pre-tax foregone 
earnings are the relevant figures. 
20. Strictly speaking, these are not transfer payments. For 
accounting purposes, however, it is simpler to treat them as such. 
21. A difficulty which arises is that full-time students who are also 
engaged in part-time employment may have less leisure hours compared 
to a full-time worker (who is not studying). Failure to account for 
this loss of leisure time will, therefore, lead to an understatement 
of the cost of education. 
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2.4 The Profitability of Education -- Cost-Benefit ,Analysis 
The profitability of education depends on the relative 
magnitudes of its costs and benefits. Education is considered 
profitable from the individual's point of view if it leads to a 
higher level of utility for the individual when both the costs and 
benefits are considered. Similarly, education is considered socially 
profitable if its net result is to push society's utility possibility 
frontier outwards. In the latter case, a complication arises in that 
there are costs and benefits which accrue to persons other than the 
individual being educated. A simplifying assumption which is usually 
made in cost-benefit analyses is that a dollar's worth of benefits 
(costs) to individual A increases (decreases) social welfare to the 
same extent as a dollar's worth of benefits (costs) to individual B. 
This allows the social desirability of an investment to be assessed 
by simply comparing the sum of its costs and the sum of its 
benefits. 22 
It should be clear from the discussion in the last two sections 
that the costs and benefits of education, especially the latter, do 
not accrue in a single period, but are drawn out over time. Since 
individuals are not necessarily indifferent between a dollar today 
and a dollar in the future, the time patterns of the costs and 
benefits matter. 
As an illustration, consider the investment decision of an 18 
year-old individual who has just finished Year 12, and is choosing 
whether to pursue a three-year university degree. For simplicity, we 
consider only the pecuniary costs and benefits of education. Suppose 
22. See the discussion in Cohn (1972) pp. 163-166. 
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that if the individual enters the workforce immediately, she can 
expect to earn $Xi per annum, where i is the nt:.rnber of years of 
labour force experience. Alternatively, if she joins the workforce 
after completing her degree, she can expect to earn $Yi per annum. It 
is assumed that the individual plans to re.tire at the age of 60 
regardless of her educational decision. The out-of-pocket expenses of 
attending university (direct costs less scholarships/allowances and 
part-time earnings) are assumed to be $Z per year. This individual 
is, therefore, faced with a choice of two alternative income streams: 
Age Income Stream A Income Stream B 
19 X1 -z 
20 X2 -z 
21 X3 -z 
22 X4 Y1 
23 X5 Y2 
60 
Income stream A is associated with the choice of not going to 
university and income stream Bis associated with the choice of 
going. Let the present value associated with the two income streams 
be denoted by VA and VB, respectively. Then, 
X 1 X2 X3 X47 
VA= (l+r) 1 + (l+r) 2 + (l+r) 3 + · · · + (l+r) 47 
-z -z -z Y 1 Y 39 
YB= (l+r) l + (l+r) 2 + (l+r) 3 + (l+r) 4 " · · + (l+r) 47 
where 8 is t~e individual's discount rate. 
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The net present value (NPV) of investing in higher education is 
given by (Vg - VA). The investment is considered profitable if the 
NPV is positive, and the individual's decision would be to enrol in 
higher education. 23 Conversely, if NPV < 0, the individual would be 
better-off not attending university. 
An alternative way of making the same comparison is to 
calculate the value of 8 which equates VA and v8 . This particular 
discount rate is called the ''Internal Rate of Return" (IRR). The 
decision rule would then be as follows: If IRR exceeds the 
individual's discount rate, the investment is considered profitable. 
The same procedures as described in the preceding paragraphs 
can be used to determine the social profitability of higher 
education. In this case, however, the income streams $Xi and $Yi will 
be pre-tax figures rather than post-tax, and Z is defin~d as the 
difference between direct social costs and the student's part-time 
earnings. Instead of the individual's discount rate, social 
profitability requires the use of the "social discount rate". In both 
private and social calculations, the figures should ideally be 
adjusted for non-pecuniary benefits. In the former case, these 
benefits include only those accruing to the individual, whereas in 
the latter case, they include external benefits as well. 
Although most practitioners agree that the NPV technique is 
superior to the IRR technique, the latter is generally accepted as 
being easier to interpret. This explains the dominence of IRR as a 
measure of educational profitability in the literature. For the 
purposes of deciding whether a particular educational investment is 
23. The justification for this decision rule is considered below in 
Section 2.5.2. 
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worthwhile, both the IRR and the NPV techniques will lead to the same 
conclusion, as long as the two alternative income profiles cross over 
only once (which eliminates the problem of multiple solutions in the 
IRR technique). In comparing the relative attractiveness of mutual l y-
exclusive investments, however, the ranking unde= the two techniques 
may differ. That is, the investment with the highest IRR may not 
necessarily also be the one with the highest NPV. When this happens, 
the NPV technique should be used. 24 
In this thesis, the profitability of education will be measured 
by its IRR for comparability with other studies. Where possible 
conflict between the IRR and NPV techniques exists, however, the NPV 
technique will be used. 
2.5 Some Outstanding Issues 
2.5.1 The Screening Hypothesis 
One of the greatest challenges to Human Capital Theory comes 
from what is known as "the screening hypothesis 11 • 25 Several versions 
of this argument exists, but the unifying theme in all of them is the 
proposition that education serves as a signalling device which 
enables employers to identify individuals who possess super i or 
ability and other desirable personal attributes, such as, high 
motivation, subservience to authority, good work attitude, and so on. 
In the extreme version of this argument, the education process does 
not impart any knowledge and skills which make individuals more 
24. For a fuller discussion, see, Dryden (1963) . 
25. The screening hypothesis also goes under various other titles 
like "credentialis:n", "educational filtering 11 , "pig-skin effect", 
"signalling11 , and so on. Original contributions to this literature 
include Spence (i974), Arrow (1973), Stiglitz (1975), Riley (1976). 
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valuable in the labour force; its social value, t o the extent that 
there is any at all, lies in the role it plays in matching the 
"right" people to the "right" jobs. 26 It is surmised that cheaper 
methods of allocating people to jobs exist, and hence, education is 
socially wasteful. The problem with this argument is that nobody has 
yet come up with an estimate of how much this allocative function 
performed by schooling is worth, or a convincing explanation of why, 
if cheaper methods of screening exist, employers do not use them. 27 
A number of attempts to test the screening hypothesis have been 
made. These include the studies by Taubman and Wales (1973), Chiswick 
(1973), Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974), Wolpin (1977), 
Psacharopoulos (1979), Riley (1979), Albrecht (1981), Liu and Wong 
(1982), Miller and Volker (1984), Lang and Kropp (1986). The results 
from these studies are quite mixed. Some studies, like Layard and 
Psacharopoulos (1974), conclude that the evidence is in conflict with 
the screening hypothesis. Others, such as, Lang and Kropp (1986), 
reject the human capital model in favour of the screening model. 
There are problems with each of the studies, and in general, it is 
difficult to be convinced one way or the other by the empirical 
evidence. 
26. See, Arrow (1973). 
27. Taubman and Wales (1975) have argued that such mechanisms may 
exist, although they have not been discovered yet. Whether something 
can be said to "exist" before its "discovery" is a question that is 
best left to philosophers. For the purpose of analysing society's 
production possi~ility set, however, it would seem most logical and 
useful to base the analysis on currently-known technology. 
29 
It should be noted that from the individual investment point of 
view, whether schooling is productivity-enhancing is irrelevant. 28 
Individuals will invest as long as it is profitable for them to do 
so. The educational investment will confer the same benefit to 
individuals irrespective of whether education makes them more 
productive, or simply provides them with a device to signal their 
superior ability. Hence, it is only the measures of social 
profitability which are called into question by the screening 
hypothesis. 
2 . 5.2 Choice of Discount Rate 
In almost all studies on the profitability of education, the 
existence of perfect capital markets is assumed. Under this 
assumption, individuals are able to freely borrow and lend at the 
market rate of interest i. As shown in Appendix 2.1, this allows the 
consumption decision of how much to consume in each period, to be 
made separately from the production decision of how much to invest in 
each period. This proposition is commonly referred to as the 
"Separation Theorem". An implication of the separation theorem is 
that irrespective of individuals' intertemporal preferences, 2 9 future 
income flows would be discounted with a constant discount rate equal 
to the market rate of interest. Hence, provided capital markets work 
perfectly, maximisation of discounted wealth is equivalent to 
individual utility maximisation.30 This is the usual justification 
28. The argument here refers to the effect of schooling on earnings. 
Clearly, for non-marketed effects, whether schooling is productivity-
enhancing is as important to the individual as it is to society. 
29. The only restriction is that individuals' utility functions are 
quasi-concave. 
30 . It is important to note, however, that we have abstracted from 
the demand for leisure. In integrated models where leisure enters 
30 
fo r employing the NPV and IRR techniques in the evaluation of 
educational investments even though it is not always explicitly 
stated. 
Capital markets are, of course, not perfect. It is well 
recognized that individuals may encounter considerable difficulties 
raising funds to invest in human capital because of the problems in 
using such capital as collateral. It has been shown, most recently by 
Kodde and Ritzen (1985), that if individuals face credit rationing 
or increasing borrowing costs in the capital market, the separation 
theorem breaks down. 31 In other words, we can no longer assess the 
profitability of an educational investment, independent of 
individuals' wealth and time preferences. 
Becker (1975, pp.102-104) has observed that the capital market 
for financing education is highly segregated, and that there are 
various sources from which funds can be dr~wn, each associated with a 
different cost. The cheapest sources of funds usually come from 
families and friends, and from individuals' own resources (savings, 
inheritances, etc.). These, however, tend to be limited, and 
individuals frequently have to resort to more expensive sources such 
as commercial loans, and cutting back on their consumption. When all 
sources are exhausted, the cost may be considered to be infinitely 
large. 
Strictly speaking, the break down of the separation theorem 
would invalidate the use of the NPV and IRR techniques as described 
into the utility function (see, for instance, Becker (1975) pp. 56-
66) the separation between consumption and production decisions 
breaks down. 
31. See, also, Parsons (1974), Wallace and Ihnen (1975), Johnson 
( 19 7 8 ) , Be 11 ( 19 8 4 ) . 
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in Section 2.4. To assess the profitability of an educational 
investment, it would be necessary to explicitly model individuals' 
preferences, their initial endowments, and the capital market 
constraints that they are faced with. As a practical compromise, 
however, it may be suggested that the NPV and IRR techniques can 
still be used, with the modification that the discount rates be 
allowed to vary across individuals, and across investments, 32 to 
reflect differences in the cost of- funds in each case. 33 Under this 
approach, the discount rate for an individual from a wealthy 
background is expected to be lower than that for an individual from a 
less wealthy background. The discount rate will also be influenced by 
the financing arrangements of the investment. For instance, between 
two schemes, one requiring an up-front payment of fees, and the other 
allowing students to defer their payment till when they are employed, 
we may expect the discount rate used by the same individual to be 
higher in the former case. 
The choice of the social discount rate is also far from 
straight-forward. Again, the problem arises because of the various 
imperfections in capital markets. In addition, taxes may also result 
in large distortions. Opinion is divided among economists as to 
whether the "correct" social discount rate should be the social rate 
of time preference, the social opportunity cost of capital, or some 
weighted average of the two.3 4 Cohn (1972, p.176) has concluded that 
32. The use of different discount rates across projects here is 
motivated by concerns quite apart from differences in riskiness 
across projects (which will be discussed later). 
33. Such an approach is adopted by Willis and Rosen (1979), for 
instance. 
34. For a recent review of the debate, see, Department of Finance 
(1987). 
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" the only consensus in this controve~sy is that there is a lack 
o f consensus". We do not intend to enter into this debate in this 
t hesis, but note only that the figures typically used in the 
l iterature for educational investments range from between 3% to 15% 
(with 10% being the rule-of-thumb figure). _ 
2.5.3 Variation in Rates of Return 
Empirical estimates of educational profitability are typically 
based on the comparison of mean earnings profiles corresponding to 
different schooling groups. The fact that there exists considerable 
variation in incomes among individuals with the same sex, age (or 
labour market experience), education, and other observable 
characteristics, has largely been ignored. Early on, Becker (1975, 
p.181) has drawn attention to the fact that there is substantial 
variation in the rates of return between individuals. This suggests 
that education, like other investments, carry with it a certain 
degree of riskiness. Unfortunately, as Blaug (1976, p.841) has 
observed that" ... the problems this creates for interpreting private 
rates of return have been generally ignored". 
The treatment of risk in the assessment of educational 
profitability has, as we have remarked in the previous chapter, 
tended to be rather ad hoc. The IRR of education is usually compared 
to the rate of return on investments with the same degree of 
riskiness in order to determine the attractiveness of the educationa l 
investment. 35 Without an explicit modelling of risk, however, it is 
difficult to see what this entails. Should the IRR be compared with 
the returns from investments in the stock market, for instance? And , 
35. Equivalently, in the calculation of the NPV, a "risk-adjusted" 
discount rate is used. 
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if so, which stocks? Or, should ~t be compared to the returns in t he 
housing market instead? And so, the list of questions goes on. 
Moreover, this procedure confuses the issues of time discounting and 
risk , and may result in misleading conclusions as Stiglitz (1988, 
pp.270-271) has pointed out. 
The large variation in individual rates of return also raises a 
further question: How does the rate of return to the marginal student 
(defined as the last student to be admitted under the selection 
criteria for entrance) differ from the average rate of return? For a 
number of policy questions, the first figure is often of more 
interest than the second, which has received the bulk of the 
attention so far. 
These, and other implications of the variability in individual 
rates of return are tackled in Part II of the thesis. 
2.5.4 Cross-Sectional and Life-Cycle Profiles 
Almost all existing empirical work on educational profitability 
have been based on cross-sectional data. Estimation proceeds by first 
obtaining the cross-sectional earnings profiles3 6 corresponding to 
different educational groups. These cross-sectional profiles are then 
treated as if they are life-cycle profiles of individuals with the 
corresponding education. The NPV or IRR can then be derived as 
described in Section 2.4. 
36. "Life-cycle" earnings profiles are obtained by tracing the same 
cohorts over its entire lifetime. "Cross-sectional" earnings 
profiles, on the other hand, are obtained by observing the earnings 
of individuals of _different ages at a single point in time. The 
profile is, therefore, made up of many different cohorts. 
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The critical assumption in using cross-sectional data is that 
i ndividuals' incomes grow at the cross-sectional rate. 37 In other 
words, the average income of, say, degree holders aged 25 in 1986 is 
a ssumed to be equal, ten years later in 1996, to the average income 
of 35 year-old degree-holders in 1986. 
There are several reasons why this assumption may not be valid. 
First, the economy is clearly neither static nor in a steady-state 
equilibrium. The demand and supply of graduates may change in the 
future. This may, in turn, result in the average income of 35 year-
old graduates today being substantially different to what 25 year-old 
graduates will receive in ten years' time. 
Second, the 35 year-old cohort may have characteristics 
(acquired and inborn) which are quite different to those of the 25 
year-old cohort. For instance, the 25 year-old graduates of today may 
be employed in jobs which have less on-the~job training compared to 
those in which the 35 year-old cohort were employed. Ceteris paribus , 
the average income of the 25 year-old cohort in ten years' time 
would, therefore, be less than the average income received by the 35 
year-old cohort today. On the other hand, the 25 year-old cohort may, 
on average, have higher innate ability and may have received higher 
quality schooling. This would then suggest that the average income o f 
the 35 year-old cohort may understate the 25 year-old cohort's future 
income. 
To the extent that the differences in characteristics across 
cohorts can be identified and measured, they can then be controlled 
37. Sometimes growth factors are incorporated to allow for secular 
growth in earnings. These are, however, ad hoc and undifferentiated 
between educational classes. 
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for using regression techniques. The problem is that many of these 
differences, such as the amount of on-the-job training and quality of 
schooling, are not directly measurable. Moreover, each cohort is by 
definition unique, and we can never be sure that differences across 
cohorts in all the characteristics which influence income are 
controlled for.38 
Economists have long been aware of the potential pitfalls in 
using cross-sectional data. Miller (1965), for instance, has examined 
the differences in results obtained by tracing the same cohort across 
two successive decennial censuses and by using the cross-section. He 
concluded that the two methods yielded "quite different results". 
In spite of this, cross-sectional data continued to be widely 
used in the literature for several reasons. First, longitudinal data 
are hard to come by, and they rarely cover a period long enough to 
allow entire iife-cycle earnings profiles to be constructed. 39 
Second, even if life-cycle earnings profiles could be obtained, 
they would apply to individuals who have already left the work-force. 
In the case of degree-holders, for instance, this would mean that the 
earnings profiles are for individuals who graduated some 40-50 years 
ago. It is difficult to see how useful this information would be to 
individuals currently contemplating whether to pursue higher 
education, given the changes that have occurred over the last four to 
38. For further discussion on the importance of examining cohort 
uniqueness, see, Bowman (1987). 
39. An alternative to using lor.gitudinal data is to use successive 
cross-sections to trace the same cohort over time. For a working-life 
of 40-50 years, however, this requires comoarable cross-sectional 
data encompassing four to five decades. Again, such information is 
rarely available. 
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five decades. 40 Since the interest in calculating rates of return 
lies primarily in the implications they hold for current educational 
decisions, it is what individuals (and society) expect to gain from 
their investment which is relevant. Hence, if cross-sectional data 
encompass the most up-to-date information, . and if students base their 
expectations on these data, then it can be argued that cross-
sectional data are the most relevant. 
Finally, the use of cross-sectional data carries with it an 
advantage in that they do not need to be adjusted for changes in the 
value of money. 
2.6 Australian Research on the Profitability of Education 
A handful of studies on the profitability of education in 
Australia were made in the 1970s. These include Blandy and 
Goldsworthy's (1973) study on private rates of return in South 
Australia, Selby-Smith's (1975a, 1975b) calculations of private and 
social benefit-cost ratios of various post-secondary courses, 
Chapman's (1977) study on the private returns to university 
qualification in the Australian Public Service, and Davis' (1977) 
estimation of the social rate of return to the training of doctors. 
Surveys of these studies are available in Blandy et al. (1979) and 
Miller (1982b). Therefore, the comments here will be brief. 
The Blandy-Goldsworthy and Selby-Smith studies were hampered by 
the lack of proper income data, and the authors had to pool their 
40. To the extent that there are differences in the characteristics 
across cohorts, these differences would tend to be larger, the 
further apart the cohorts are. In this sense, using the life-cycle 
profile of a cohort separated by more than 40 years to estimate the 
earnings of the ~he current cohort may be worse than using the cross-
section. 
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data from several different sources (and even different years) to 
construct the age-earnings profiles. This im.~ediately raises 
questions about the comparability o~ the data =rom the different 
sources, and the quality of the resulting estimates. Lack of 
appropriate income data was also a major p_roblem iri the Davis study 
requiring him to make some very dubious assumptions about the shape 
of the age-earnings profiles. Chapman's study had the unusual luxury 
of a large sample size combined with good quality earnings data. 
Unfortunately, the scope of coverage is limited to males in clerical 
or administrative positions in the Second and Third divisions of the 
Australian Public Service, which makes it difficult to generalise the 
results to the population as a whole. 
With regards to higher education, Blandy and Goldsworthy have 
found that the private rate of return for males is around 14%. The 
figure is raised slightly (to 15.2%) if students are assumed to be in 
receipt of Commonwealth University Scholarships. Selby-Smith's 
results show that private rates of return to various university 
under-graduate courses generally exceed 8%. The private Benefit-Cost 
ratios (discounted at 8%) appear to be somewhat higher for higher 
degrees. From the social point of view, however, Selby-Smith has 
found that the returns to higher degree courses and a number of 
under-graduate courses to be less than 8%. Davis' estimate of the 
social rate of return to medical training is around 10%. Finally, the 
Chapman study reports rates of return to university education between 
11% to 16%, depending on the assumption regarding student earnings. 
The results from these early studies were generally interpreted 
as suggesting that higher education is an attractive proposition 
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c ompared with other possibilities for investment, at least f=om the 
point of individuals. 
In the 1976 Australian Census, a question on income was 
included for the first time since 1933. This enabled Miller (1982a, 
1982b) to conduct his investigation from a broad base and to estimate 
the rates of return to different levels of schooling for both males 
and females, and for Australian and overseas-born. Miller's results 
indicate that the private rate of return to a Bachelor degree is 
around 21% for all groups (male, female, Australian-born, overseas-
born). The social rates of return are slightly lower -- around 16% 
for males and 15% for females -- but is still regarded as profitable. 
A major short-coming of the census data is that the exact 
dollar amounts of individuals' incomes were not asked. Instead, 
respondents to the census questionnaire were asked to indicate which 
of the fourteen pre-determined income intervals their incomes fell 
into. It was, therefore, necessary for Miller to specify the mean 
values of the incomes for each of the fourteen categories. This task 
was particularly difficult for the top category which was an open 
interval, set at $18,000 and above. Almost 25% of all male degree-
holders with reported income fell into this category, with the 
percentages in some specific age groups exceeding 50%. The estimated 
rates of return were, therefore, not surprisingly, very sensitive to 
the choice of the mean income for this top category, as Miller has 
found. The problem is, however, less severe in the case of females, 
where only 4% of all female graduates fell into the top income 
category. 41 
41. The percentages of male and female high-school leavers with 
incomes in the top category are 0.4% and 2.7% respectively. The bias 
imparted by the open-ended income category to the shape and position 
39 
It is interesting to note that Miller's estimate of the private 
rate of return to higher education is substantially higher than those 
reported in the earlier studies. In a later study [Miller (1984)], he 
attempted to confirm his earlier results by re-estimating with a 
different data set. Using data from the 19_73-74 Income Distribution 
Survey on the incomes of full-time full-year male workers, he 
estimated that the private rate of return to higher education is 
22.4%. Miller concluded that the estimates from the two data sets 
were very similar, and that the results could, therefore, be used 
with some degree of confidence. 
In a recent study, Miller and Volker (1987) examined the 
profitability of doing a three-year degree to individuals under 
alternative fee structures. Data from the 1985 panel of the 
Australian Longitudinal Survey was used for this purpose. They 
estimated that for males, with a 4% discount rate, the NPV of higher 
education fell from $47,500 when no fees were imposed, to $42,128 
when fees of $2,000 were levied. In the case of females, the NPV fell 
from $49,133 to $43,361. Their results, therefore, suggest that 
university education would remain a highly attractive investment to 
individuals even when a $2,000 fee is charged, assuming that 4% is 
the appropriate discount rate. 
A major short-coming with this study is that the data on which 
the analysis is based consisted only of youths between the ages of 16 
and 25. For degree-holders, this implies that the earnings of 
graduates with no more than four to five years work experience is 
used to predict the earnings over their lifetime. The results would, 
therefore, be highly sensitive to the functional form of the earnings 
of the income profiles of high-school leavers is, therefore, not 
likely to be large. 
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function which is imposed. As such, Miller and Volker's results need 
to be treated with great care. 
In summary, previous Australian research on the profitability 
of higher education have generally concluded that it is an attractive 
investment from the point of individuals. The question of social 
profitability is less often addressed, but if we accept Miller's 
(1982b) results, then higher education appears to be attractive from 
society's point of view as well. 
CHAPTER 3 
PRIVATE PROFITABILITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
Is higher education a profitable investment from the point of 
individuals in Australia? Several studies pave attempted to answer 
this question. However, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, 
there are problems with each of these previous studies primarily 
because suitable income data were not available to the researchers. 
The recent initiatives taken by the Government to reform the higher 
education system, have renewed interest in the question of the social 
and private benefits of higher education. On the one hand, in the 
light of the proposal to substantially increase the number of 
graduates, there is an urgent need to know whether we already have 
too many graduates from an investment perspective. On the other hand, 
it is important to know the effect that the imposition of the 
tertlary tax would have on student incentives to enrol in higher 
education. 
The former question, which relates to the social rates of 
return, is addressed in the next Chapter. In this chapter, we assess 
the profitability of higher education from the point of view of 
private individuals, using the NPV and IRR techniques described i~ 
Chapter 2. In addition, we examine how the rate of return differs 
across sexes, whether it is more profitable to pursue higher 
education on a part-time basis, and how the rate of return changes 
under different fee-paying regimes. 
This chapter is divided into 6 sections. Section 3.1 describes 
the data used in this analysis. The private rates of return to higher 
education applicable to full-time students are presented in Section 
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3.2. In Section 3.3, we consider the issue of differences in the 
number of hours worked. Section 3.4 examines the private rates of 
return to students who pursue their degrees on a part-time basis. We 
also gain some insight into the magnitude of the consumption value of 
higher education by comparing the returns to full-time and part-time 
students. Section 3.5 analyses the impact of various fee-paying 
proposals on the private rates of return. We sum up the findings of 
this chapter in Section 3.6. 
3.1 Data Description 
Income data for this study were drawn from the sample file of 
the 1985-86 Income and Housing Survey. This particular data set is 
notable for its rich and extremely good quality data on income. The 
survey is based on a multi-stage area sample of private and non-
private dwellings, and covers about a sixth of one percent of the 
population of Australia. The data were collected by means of personal 
interviews by trained interviewers in the period September to 
December 1986. A total of 17,714 observations, each containing 253 
variables, are available in the 'persons record' of the sample file. 
Demographic variables include age (15, 16-17, 18-20, 21-24, and in 5-
year groups from 25), sex, school-leaving age, and details of post-
school qualifications. Labour force variables include the number of 
weeks worked in the 1985-86 financial year, the number of weeks spent 
looking for work, and the number of hours usually worked in a week. 
Respondents were specifically asked by the interviewers to 
refer to his or her personal records, such as, tax returns or 
assessments, pay slips, group certificates, etc. in answering 
questions about income to enhance the accuracy of the data. Details 
were sought with respect to the amount the individual received in 
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1985-86 from wages and salaries, income and trusts, government 
pensions and benefits, personal investrner.ts, superannuation, and 
other regular payments. Within each of these main sources, 
information on the detailed breakdown was also asked. As well, 
respondents were asked for the amount of tax paid for the 1985-86 
financial year. 
The period income of some individuals might have been low 
because they were not earning for the whole period. The most obvious 
of this group are those who were studying full-time for part or all 
of the period. They have been excluded from the analysis. 1 
For the purpose of the analysis, a high-school leaver is 
defined as anyone who completed the highest year in secondary school, 
but did not possess any post-school qualifications. A degree-holder 
is defined as anyone with a Bachelor degree or higher. Ideally, we 
would have liked to separate the higher degree holders from those 
with just pass and honours degrees, but the data do not permit us 
this luxury. 
3.2 Private Internal Rates of Return to Higher Education 
In this section, the private internal rate of return to higher 
education for full-time students is calculated. Initially, we ignore 
the distinction between earned and non-earned income, and consider 
the differences in total income across educational groups. As 
1. Others include migrants who arrived during or after the period, 
and persons who were out of Australia for the whole period. Ideally, 
we would have liked to exclude these individuals as well. However, 
because of the way the data were made available, we were unable to 
identify these individuals. Fortunately, the number of such 
individuals is small and, therefore, unlikely to affect our results 
significantly. See A.B.S. Cat.No. 6546.0 p. 29. 
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discussed in the previous chapter, after-tax figures are used in 
private rates of return calculations. 
The average after-tax total income and the number of 
observations for degree-holders and high-school leavers by sex and 
age are given in Table A3.l.1 of Appendix 3.1. The age-income 
profiles for each of the four groups (degree-holders and high-school 
leavers, male and female) are constructed as follows. For high-school 
leavers, we assume that the figure for the 15-20 age category is the 
income of individuals aged 19. In the case of degree-holders, the 
figure in the 21-24 age category is assumed to be the income of those 
aged 23. For all other age categories, we assume that the figures in 
Table A3.l.1 are the incomes of individuals of average age in each 
age group. Linear interpolation is then used to determine the incomes 
at all other ages. The resulting cross-sectional income profiles are 
shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
It is unclear what economic significance should be attached to 
the dip in the male high-school leavers' earnings profile over the 
ages of 40 to 55. The low incomes could simply be the result of 
sampling errors. In any case, this dip does not affect our results 
substantially since it occurs fairly late in the life-cycle, and is 
therefore, heavily discounted. 
Rates of return are calculated for individuals having just 
completed high school under the assumption that members of the 
relevant sex group believes that their income experience in the 
future will correspond with the average income experience of the 
group. That is, we assume that individuals believe that their future 
incomes will be as given by the cross-sectional income profile of 
graduates if they were to proceed to higher education before entering 
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the workforce, and by the i nc ome profi l e of high -sch ool leavers i f 
t hey were to join the workforce immediately. 2 , 3 
It is a common practice to assume that the time taken to 
c omplete is three years. Although this is certain to be less than the 
time taken by a typical individual for completion, it is argued that 
i ndividuals believe that they would complete their degrees in the 
minimum time required. 4 Even so, three years would still be an 
underestimate since a number of courses require minimums of more 
than that for completion (medicine, dentistry, architecture, law, 
veterinary science, engineering, etc.). In our case, this is further 
compounded by the inclusion of honours and higher-degree holders 
amongst the pass-degree holders. We have, therefore, decided to 
assume three and half years as a minimum time taken to complete the 
degree. 5 
The net income received whilst studying has a major impact on 
the rate of return to higher education. The Commonwealth Department 
2. Implicit in this procedure is the assumption that there are no 
systematic ability differences between high-school leavers and degree 
holders. The sensitivity of results to this assumption is addressed 
in Part II of the thesis. 
3. Individuals' annual income depends on the total number of hours 
worked during the year and the wage rate. The former, in turn, 
depends on the number of weeks worked during the year, and the 
average number of hours worked during those weeks. In this section, 
we assume that individuals form their expectations regarding their 
future participation rates, unemployment probabilities, average 
weekly number of hours worked, and wage rates on the basis of the 
cross-section. 
4. Chapman (1977) p.147. 
5. The rate of return figures calculated are sensitive to th i s 
parameter. Miller (1984) who was also unable to distinguish between 
pass and higher-degree holders used a figure of 3.3 years as t he time 
taken to complete. We examined the course and level (pass, graduate 
diploma, Masters, PhD) mixes of degree-holders in the 198 1 Census, 
and found that the average minimum time for completion was around 3.5 
years. 
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o f Employment, Education, and Training estimated that in 1984, the 
average annual course-related expenses (union and general service 
fees, cost of books, stationery, equipment, materials, etc.) for a 
university undergraduate amounted to $595. 6 It was also estimated in 
the same report that university students on the Tertiary Education 
Allowance Scheme (TEAS) received an average of $2,565 in assistance, 
and earned an average of $865 during the year. Those not on any 
student assistance schemes, on the other hand, averaged $1,483 in 
income from employment. Converting these figures into 1985-86 dollars 
and rounding off, we assume that the direct cost to the individual in 
studying amounts to $660 per year. Three scenarios with respect to 
the amount of income received whilst studying are considered in this 
study : a) $0 (or -$660 net); b) $1,640 (or $980 net); and c) $3,790 
(or $3,130 net). Scenario (b) corresponds to students not on any 
assistance scheme, and earning the average income for that group, and 
scenario (c) reflects the situation faced by a typical TEAS recipient 
who had worked some time during the year. 
In the calculations, we have also assumed that individuals, 
regardless of qualifications, retire at the age of sixty. The choice 
of the retirement age is not likely to affect the rate of return to 
any great extent, since incomes some forty years after the decision 
whether to enrol in higher education is made are very heavily 
discounted. 
Table 3.1 shows the rates of return to higher education 
corresponding to each of the three income scenarios, calculated using 
after-tax total income. 
6. Department of Employment, Education, and Training (1987a). 
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TABLE 3.1: PRIVATE INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
(TOTAL INCOME) 
NET INCOME WHILST STUDYING 
-$660 $980 $3,130 
MALES 9.68% lQ_.75% 12.64% 
FEMALES 12.64% 14.27% 17.32% 
A prominent feature of figures in Table 3.1 is the higher IRR 
for females compared to males. This is principally because female 
graduates have relatively higher participation rates, lower 
unemployment rates, and longer working hours compared to female non-
graduates, resulting in significantly higher incomes for the former 
group. Participation rates and working hours for men differ to a much 
lesser degree across education groups, with most of them working 
full-time, for the full year. The monetary advantage of having a 
degree is consequently lower. The higher profitability of higher 
education to females is not necessarily incompatible with the 
observation that males, on average, earn more than females. The IRR 
figures in the table are obtained by comparing the incomes of 
graduates to the incomes of high-school leavers of the same sex, and 
it is this differential which determines the profitability of higher 
education. There is no reason to expect this differential to be 
larger for males just because the incomes of males are, on average, 
higher than the incomes of females. 
A second prominent feature of the figures is their magnitude. 
Given that the real after-tax returns to individuals from investments 
in the market portfolio since the mid-1970s are of the order of 4 to 
7 per cent, 7 our estimates show that higher education appears to be 
7. Department of Finance (1987). 
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profitable to the private individual, even if he or she did not 
receive any form of student assistance, and did not work at all. 8 
Among those who worked whilst studying (scenarios band c), the 
returns to the recipients of TEAS are significantly higher than those 
not on any form of student assistance, particularly in the case of 
females. An implication of this is that changes in the eligibility 
requirements for student allowances would, ceteris paribus, have a 
greater impact on female enrolment in higher education compared to 
male enrolment. This is not at all surprising, since males, on 
average, tend to have higher incomes than females, which means that a 
given dollar-amount in tertiary allowances reduces the opportunity 
cost of female students proportionately more than that of male 
students. 
It is often argued that rates of return estimated with income 
figures are biased upwards, since the human and the non-human 
components of wealth tend to be correlated. The argument is that 
schooling influences individuals' incomes only through its effect on 
their earnings potential. As such, earned income, rather than total 
income should be used in the calculations. We are able to determine 
the extent of the bias arising from the use of total income with our 
data set. 
Earned income is defined in this thesis as the income from 
wages or salary, and from the individual's own business, trade or 
profession. Table A3.l.2 of Appendix 3.1 shows the average pre-tax 
earned income by sex and age for high-school leavers and degree 
8. This assumes that investments in the market portfolio are in the 
same risk class as investments in higher education. If the latter is 
considered to be more risky, then it may well be the case that higher 
education is unattractive to individuals as an investment. This 
problem is discussed in Part II of the thesis. 
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-holders. The - earnings profiles for the four groups are constructed 
in the same way as before. These pre-tax earnings profi~es are 
plotted in Figures 3.3.and 3.4. 
In calculating the private rates of return, the personal tax 
rates operating in the 1985-86 financial rates are applied to the 
gross earned-income profiles. 9 The rates of return to higher 
education using earned income are presented in Table 3.2. 
TABLE 3.2: PRIVATE INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
(EARNED INCOME) 
NET INCOME WHILST STUDYING 
-$660 $980 $3,130 
MALES 9.84% 11.07% 13.30% 
FEMALES 13.34% 15.20% 18.76% 
Comparing the figures in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we note that for 
both sexes, the rates of return calculated using earned income are, 
in fact, slightly higher. The differences are, however, negligible. 
This may be due to the higher take-up rate of the various forms of 
government benefits among individuals in the non-graduate group, and 
the proportionately greater effects these payments have on their 
total incomes. 
In summary, the results in this section confirm the findings of 
the earlier studies that higher education appears to be a profitable 
investment to individuals. It is also found that the differences in 
the rates estimated us~ng income, as opposed to earnings data, are 
small. There are three non-mutually exclusive reasons for the latter 
finding. First, the link between human and non-hcrnan wealth may n o t 
- --
9. No allowance is made for tax deductions and rebates. 
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b e as strong as commonly assumed. Second, the non-human c omponent of 
total wealth may be small. Finally, to the extent that the various 
forms of transfer payments from the government benefit non-graduates 
more so than graduates, the rates of return calculated using the 
total income concept would, ceteris paribus, be smaller than the 
rates calculated using the earned-income concept. This last factor 
would reduce, and might even reverse the upwards bias caused by any 
link between human and non-human wealth. 
3.3 Adjustments for Hours Worked 
It was established in the previous section that having a degree 
is associated with higher earnings in the labour market. Those 
calculations, however, do not take into account differences in the 
number of weeks worked, or the number of hours worked per week. 
Eckaus (1973b) has pointeq_ out that one of the differences between 
human capital and physical capital is that in using the former to 
earn income, individuals in which the capital is embodied suffer some 
loss of utility. Consequently, he has argued that rates of return 
calculations should be estimated using hours-standardised earnings 
data. 
Eckaus' argument can be easily understood with the help of a 
diagram. Figure 3.5 shows the leisu=e-labour choice in a 
indifference-curve framework. AC and AD are the budget-lines which 
define the consumption sets for a typical high-school leaver and a 
typical graduate, respectively. Empirically, we can only observe the 
points X and Y. The procedure in the previous section measures the 
income advantage to having a degree by the distance GH. This measure, 
however, is composed of both the "income" and "substitution" effects. 
To isolate the pure "income" effect so as to give a welfare measure 
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in terms of either the compensating variation (FD), or the equivalent 
variation (CE), the number of hours worked needs to be standardised, 
either at AJ or AI. In practice, it is unimportant which figure we 
choose to standardise the number of hours at. 1 0 
The key to Eckaus' argument is that individuals working more 
hours are worse off ceteris paribus because they have less time for 
leisure, or they could have used the extra hours productively in home 
activities (mowing the lawn, child-care, etc.). The hours-
standardisation is equivalent to valuing leisure (or home production) 
at individuals' marginal wage rates. This implicitly assumes that 
individuals are completely free to choose the number of hours in a 
year that they work. If this last assumption does not hold, then 
individuals may, in fact, value the extra hours at more, or less than 
their marginal wage rates. 11 
There are . circumstances where individuals may value the extra 
"leisure" at zero, or even negatively. For instance, if those who are 
working less hours are only doing so because they cannot find more 
work, it can be argued that the extra ''leisure" not only does not 
bring any utility, but may even cause disutility due to stress, low 
self-esteem, and so on. In this case, the estimates presented in 
Table 3.2, which implicitly assume that there is no disutility 
10. This is because the direct cost to students in terms of course-
related expenses is small compared to the opportunity cost. In the 
limit, when the direct cost is zero, the rate of return is invariant 
to choice of the standard number of hours worked. See Eckaus (1973b) 
p.124 footnote 7. 
11. Individuals who are constrained to work less than they would have 
liked, would value the extra leisure at less than their wage rates, 
and conversely for those who are constrained to work more than they 
would like at the margin. 
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associated with working extra hours would, therefore, adequately 
reflect the value of a degree. 12 
Alternatively, as Miller (1982b, p.65) has argued, if we view 
higher education as a "ticket" which provides entry into jobs which 
are different to those open to high-school leavers (hours associated 
with the jobs being one such difference), and are interested only in 
assessing the monetary advantages of the job package, or if we merely 
want to know the monetary returns to having a degree assuming that 
the choice of hours is as reflected by the cross-section, then the 
figures in Table 3.2 would suffice. 
On the other hand, if the number of hours worked is a choice 
variable, and we want to know more than just the monetary returns, 
then Eckaus' argument would apply, and hourly-standardised incomes 
should be used. 13 
Hourly wages are not reported in our data set. Although it is 
possible to construct such a variable using the information on 
income, number of weeks worked, and the number of hours usually 
worked per week, such a procedure would require assumptions about the 
distribution of the number of hours worked, since, data on this 
variable are available only ~n broad intervals (0-9, 10-19, 20-34, 
35-44, and 45+). The a_ternative, which is the procedure we adopted, 
12. If one argues that working less hours entails a loss of utility, 
then ideally, the dol_ar value of this loss should be added to the 
earnings of those working more hours. This valuation is, 
unfortunately, difficult. Consequently, the extra hours are usually 
assumed to be valued at zero for simplicity. 
13. A more sophisticated treatment would be to model labour-supply 
and educational investment decisions simultaneouslv [see, for 
instance, Becker (1975) , Heckman (1976a), Blinder and Weiss (1976), 
Ghez and Becker (1975), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)]. Such a 
treatment is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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is to base the rate of return estimates on the earnings of full-time, 
full-year workers. 14 The cost of doing this, however, is that our 
sample size is reduced quite significantly, particularly for females. 
The restriction of the sample to full-time, full-year workers 
affects the estimated rates of return in two ways. First, to the 
extent that the earnings of the high-school leavers when they first 
enter the labour force are higher for the restricted sample than for 
the full sample, the opportunity cost of higher education increases. 
Ceteris paribus, this would lead to a lower rate of return compared 
to that estimated with unadjusted earnings. 
Second, to the extent that degree-holders in the full-sample 
are more likely to have worked full-time and for the full year than 
high-school leavers of the same age, the restriction of the sample 
would raise the earnings profile of the latter group by a larger 
margin. The standardisation of hours worked would, therefore, reduce 
the difference in earnings between the two groups, and lower the 
estimated rate of return to higher education. 
The discussion in Eckaus (1973b) proceeded in such a way as to 
give the impression that the hours-adjustment affects estimates of 
the rate of return only via the second avenue. This is incorrect. If 
anything, the effect via the first avenue would tend to be more 
potent due to the discounting process. The effect on the opportunity 
cost is weighted more heavily in the calculations than the effect on 
net returns which accrue in the future. 
14. Note that hours worked may still vary to some degree even among 
those who work full-time (defined as 40 hours a week and above): 
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The pre-tax average earned income by education, sex and age for 
the sample full-time full-year workers is given in Table A3.l.3 in 
Appendix 3.1. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the corresponding pre-tax 
earnings profiles. The private rates of return to higher education 
calculated using these profiles are given in Table 3.3. 
TABLE 3.3: PRIVATE INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
(EARNED INCOME, FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS) 
MALES 
FEMALES 
NET INCOME WHILST STUDYING 
-$660 
7.73% 
8.80% 
$980 
8.68% 
9.84% 
$3,130 
10.27% 
11.63% 
Comparing the figures in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we note that the 
rates of return calculated using the restricted sample are smaller. 
For instance, the IRR to males using the full sample is 11.07% 
(assuming net income while studying of $980). When the sample is 
restricted to full-time, full-year males, this falls to 8.68%. This 
suggests that the higher earnings of graduates are due, at least in 
part, to the longer hours they worked, on average, in a year. 
A second point of interest is that the effect of the 
standardisation of hours worked on female rates of return is stronger 
than on the male rates. The IRR for males falls by between 2-3 
percentage points compared to the fall of 4-7 percentage points for 
females when the sample is restricted to full-time full-year workers. 
This is not unexpected since the difference in participation rates 
between graduates and non-graduates is much more marked in the case 
of females. It is interesting to note, however, that even after 
standardising the number of hours worked, the rate of return to 
higher education for females is still higher than for males. 
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Finally, we note that higher education appears to be a 
profitable investment for individuals even when we focus solely on 
full-time full-year workers. 
3.4 Private Rates of Return to Part-Time Students 
So far, we have examined the privates rates of return to higher 
education assuming that individuals pursue their degrees on a full-
time basis. In this section, we compare the strategy of studying 
full-time with that of pursuing a degree on a part-time basis. 
Because the data do not allow us to distinguish between graduates who 
studied full-time from those who studied part-time, some assumptions 
must be made. First, we assume that while studying, part-time 
students earn the average of high-school leavers of the same age. 
Second, we assume that upon graduation, their earnings are equal to 
the average earnings of degree-holders of the same age. Third, we 
assume that part-timers take 7 years to complete their degrees. 
The first assumption may appear overly generous to those opting 
to study part-time. One may be inclined to believe that part-time 
students tend to have less demanding jobs with lower wages compared 
to the average high-school leaver in the workforce who is not 
studying. The evidence from the 1981 Census, howeve~, indicates 
otherwise. Focusing on just high-school leavers below the age of 
thirty, it was found that for both males and females, those studying 
part-time earn more than those who were not studying. 1 5 
15. Regression results are given in Appendix 3.2. The higher earnings 
of those studying part-time could be a reflection of the 
characteristics of this group which are not modelled e.g. motivation 
and ability. The inclusion of these variables may well · reverse the 
signs on those studying part-time. In that case, our first assumption 
would underestimate the opportunity cost of studying part-time. 
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It could also be argued that graduates who obtained their 
degrees on a part-time basis might be expected to earn more than 
similarly-aged graduates who studied full-time, since they have more 
years of labour force experience. However, in terms of experience as 
a graduate, the advantage lies with latter group. To the extent that 
experience in non-graduate work is irrelevant to their performance in 
graduate-work, we may then expect those who studied part-time to earn 
less than those who completed their degrees on a full-time basis. 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us the luxury of testing these 
hypotheses. Consequently, the middle ground was chosen for our second 
assumption. That is, on graduation, those who completed their degrees 
on a part-time basis cannot be distinguished from similarly-aged 
individuals who studied full-time. 
We consider two different scenarios of part-time study. The 
first assumes that the individual starts his or her part-time study 
at age 19, immediately following the completion of high-school. This 
scenario is referred to in the analysis as PTl. The second scenario 
(referred to as PT2) considers the case of an individual who joins 
the workforce upon completion of high-school, and does not commence 
his or her studies until the age of 25. In both cases, the direct 
cost to the student was set at $660 per year, and the retirement age 
is assumed to be 60. 
The internal rates of return to higher education by part-time 
studies are presented in Table 3.4. The figures estimated using the 
restricted sample consisting of only full-time, full-year workers are 
given in the table as well. 
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TABLE 3.4: PRIVATE INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATION BY 
PART-TIME STUDY (EARNED INCOME) 
FULL-SAMPLE RESTRICTED-SAMPLE 
PTl PT2 PTl ?T2 
MALES 30.60% 36.46% 31.07% 34.22% 
FEMALES 40.77% 40.01% 34.67% 36.41% 
The most striking feature of the figures in Table 3.4 is 
clearly their magnitude. Pursuing higher education on a part-time 
basis appears to be an extremely profitable venture. This is so 
whether we use the full- or restricted-samples. Why then would 
students opt to study full-time? Several possible reasons may be 
suggested. 
First, the ranking of investment projects by the NPV and IRR 
criteria may differ as we have discussed in the previous chapter. 
Hence, although the IRR to part-time study is higher than to full-
time study, individuals may nevertheless be financially better off 
pursuing their degrees full-time. To overcome this deficiency in the 
IRR technique, the NPVs to both modes of study at various discount 
rates are calculated. These are given in Table 3.s. 1 6 Figures for the 
restricted sample of full-time full-year workers are used in this 
exercise. 17 
16. Figures for the full-time mode of study correspond to colu:nn 3 of 
Table 3.3. 
17. Results applicable to the full sample of are given in Appendix 
3 . 3 . 
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TABLE 3.5: PRI VATE NET PRESENT VALUE OF HI GHER EDUCATION BY MOD E OF 
STUDY (1 985/86 DOLLARS) 
Discount Full-time PTl PT2 
Rate 
MALES 
IRR 10.27% 31.07% 34.22 % 
0% $162,860 $184,020 $162,060 
3% $65,780 $86,130 $70,740 
5% $34,440 $54,240 $42,090 
10% $900 $19,350 $12,680 
15% -$9,390 $7,770 $4,220 
FEMALES 
IRR 11.63% 34.67 % 36.41 % 
0% $196,700 $215,550 $187,300 
3% $80,840 $99,300 $79,300 
5% $44,210 $62,360 $46,440 
10% $5,450 $22,710 $13,700 
15% -$6,690 $9,630 $4,600 
The danger of using the IRR to choose between two mutually 
exclusive investment projects is apparent from the figures. Note, for 
instance, that IRR ranks PT2 above PTl in the case of males. Yet, for 
the range of discount rates considered here, the NPV of PTl is 
clearly higher. That is, individuals (with discount rates between 0% 
and 15%) are better off commencing their part-time studies 
immediately upon completion of high-school (PTl) instead of later 
(PT2). However, between part-time and full-time studies, both IRR and 
NPV (within the range of discount rates considered here) give the 
same ranking, with the exception of the comparison between full-time 
and PT2 at a zero discount rate. Students are clearly better off from 
an investment perspective completing their degrees on a part-time 
basis. Therefore, the potential conflict between IRR and NPV rankings 
does not explain why the full-time mode of study may be preferred. 
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In the case of females, again, within the range o f discount 
rates considered here, PTl is preferred to PT2 (contrary to what the 
respective IRRs suggest). That is, between the two part-time 
strategies commencing higher education at 19, and commencing at 25 
-- the former would be preferred from an investment ·perspective. The 
comparison between full- and part-time modes of study is slightly 
more complicated. Here, at low discount rates, the NPVs associated 
with PT2 is lower than those associated with studying full-time 
(again, conflicting with IRR ranking). Hence, for females with low 
discount rates, if the only choices available were studying full-
time, or PT2, the former would be preferred. If, however, the choice 
of commencing part-time higher education immediately, upon completion 
of high-school (PTl) were available as well, then our investment 
model predicts that females would choose to study part-time. Again, 
we are forced to conclude that the conflict between IRR and NPV 
cannot be the whole story. 1 8 
The second possible explanation for preferring full-time 
studies is that, so far, our calculations have implicitly assumed the 
household as the decision-making unit. That is, we have not 
considered transfers of income within the family. If individuals were 
to regard non-repayable cash assistance from parents, relatives and 
friends as part of his or her income whilst studying (not unlike 
other forms of student assistance like TEAS), then the cost of full-
time higher education is reduced, and rate of return increased. To 
the extent that these money gifts would not be forthcoming if 
individuals were working (and studying on a part-time basis), they 
may bias individuals' decision towards studying full-time. The 
18. For both sexes, the results using the full sample are very 
similar. 
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Department of Employment, Education and Training19 has estimated that 
in 1984, university students, on average, received a total of $1,435 
in money gifts from parents, relatives and friends. Although this 
amount does not appear to be large enough to eliminate the difference 
in NPV between the modes of study, it may _well be an important part 
of the whole explanation. 
Thirdly, not all jobs have working hours which are flexible 
enough to permit workers to enrol in higher education. This may make 
the part-time choice irrelevant to all but a handful of cases. 
Closely related to this point, are the non-monetary sacrifices 
associated with simultaneously holding a full-time job and studying 
part-time. Even if individuals could find jobs which permitted them 
to pursue higher education on a part-time basis, they may still be 
disinclined to choose this option, simply because it is considered 
too "stressful". On the other side of the coin, full-time study has 
the attractiveness of offering students a less-taxing life-style, 
with the opportunity to participate in a wide variety of sports, 
recreational, and other student activities, organised within the 
higher education institutions. It allows students time to interact 
with each other on an intellectual, and social basis. These 
consumption benefits are purchased as part of a whole educational 
package when students choose to study full-time. Under this 
interpretation, the difference in the profitability of full-time and 
part-time studies reflects the value individuals place on these 
consumption benefits. 2 0 The figures in Table 3.5 allow us to estimate 
19. Department of Employment, Education, and Training (1987a), p.14 0 . 
20. Consumption benefits are defined in this context to include not 
having to suffer the stress and loss of leisure associated with part-
time studies. To the extent that the alternative to studying full-
time is not studying at all (rather than studying part-time), and to 
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how much these consumption benefits associated with higher education 
are worth. The present values of these benefits at various discount 
rates are shown in Table 3.6. For easy interpretation of the figures, 
we have also calculated the equivalent value of the consumption 
benefits per full-time year of higher edu~ation. 21 
TABLE 3.6: VALUE OF CONSUMPTION BENEFITS TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
(1985/86 DOLLARS) 
MALES FEMALES 
Discount Present Annual Present Annual 
Rate Value Value Value Value 
0% $21,160 $6,050 $18,850 $5,390 
3% $20,350 $6,210 $18,460 $5,630 
5% $19,810 $6,300 $18,150 $5,770 
10% $18,450 $6,490 $17,260 $6,070 
15% $17,160 $6,630 $16,310 $6,300 
For males, the value placed on these consumption benefits are 
around $6,000 to $6,500 per full-time year of higher education. For 
females, they are in the range of around $5,500 to $6,500 per year. 
Even if we deducted from these figures, the value of money gifts from 
friends and relatives (say, $1,500 per year), the estimated value of 
consumption benefits is still very sizeable. 22 
It is important to note that the figures in Table 3.6 are not 
estimates of the total consumption benefits to higher education as 
such. They do not include, for instance, the alleged consumption 
the extent that the stress and loss of leisure suffered by part-time 
students would not result if individuals were not studying, our 
estimates would be biased upwards. On the other hand, part-time 
students do enjoy some of the consumption benefits of higher 
education. To that extent, our estimates would be biased downwards. 
21. For this exercise, we have used the figures corresponding to PTl. 
22. The figures calculated using the full-sample (Appendix 3.2) are 
smaller in the range of $3,500 to $4,500 for males, and $2,000 to 
$3,500 for females. Nevertheless, they are far from negligible. 
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benefits derived from "the joy of learning". The consumption benefits 
associated with the effect of higher education on his or her abi l ity 
to appreciate ''the finer things in life" such as art, classical 
music, and the opera have also not been included. 
There is some evidence which suggests, however, that the "joy 
of learning" to most students may be small, or even negative (Fane 
(1984a)J. There is also some debate as to whether the effect of 
higher education on a person's taste should be considered a benefit 
as such [Blaug (1965)]. To the extent that these two omitted 
components are small, or should be ignored on conceptual grounds, the 
figures in Table 3.6 may be regarded as estimates of the total 
consumption benefits of higher education. 
3.5 Private Rates of Return Under A1ternative Fee-Regimes 
In 1974, tertiary fees were abolished in Australia. Since then, 
successive governments have come under increasing pressure to squeeze 
the higher education budget.· With an increasing number of eligible 
students being rationed out of the higher education system, and 
continuing pressures on the size of the deficit, the idea of a user-
pays system became more and more attractive. The first step towards a 
user-pays system was taken in 1986 when the Higher Education 
Administrative Charge (HEAC) was introduced. HEAC involved a charge 
of $250 per annum ($272 in 1989) on all students, other than those 
receiving AUSTUDY or TEAS. The next step came in 1988, where upon t he 
recommendation of the Wran Committee, the Government announced in t h e 
1988-89 Budget that the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) 
would be implemented from January 1, 1989. Under this scheme, 
students are charged a uniform rate of $1800 in 1989 dollars (which 
is indexed for inflation) for each year of equivalent full-time 
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study. The repayment can be made through the tax system, or paid 'up-
front'. Under the first alternative (referred to as HECSl in the 
analysis below) students pay an additional 1% of their personal 
taxable income once their incomes reach $22,000, 2% at the $25,000 
threshold, and 3% at $35,000, until their _liabilities are completely 
discharged. These threshold figures are in 1989 dollars and are 
indexed for inflation. With 'up-front' repayments (referred to as 
HECS2 below), students are offered a 15% 'discount' on their 
liabilities. As part of the package, the higher education 
administrative charge was abolished. 
The Liberal-National Opposition has since released their Higher 
Education Policy statement. Among other things, they propose a pro-
rata tuition-charge of $1,200 per full-time student year. In the 
analysis that follows, this is referred to as the LIB scheme. As 
well, institutions are permitted to offer additional places "on 
whatever basis they see fit". This means that institutions can offer 
places to those Australians who fail to be admitted under the normal 
merit-based channel, on a full-fee basis, in the same way that they 
are currently ma~ing places available to foreign students. 
Starting from 1989, students have another alternative. 
Australia's first private university -- Bond University -- began 
classes for its first intake of students. Potential students are 
lured with the possibility of completing a normal three-year degree 
in two years, under their three-semester-a-year system. Fees are set 
at $6,000 per. semester. 
How do students fare under each of these fee-regimes? We 
compare the private rates of return and net present values under the 
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following alternative regimes : 1) zero fees; 2) HEAC; 3) LIB; 4) 
HECSl; 5) HECS2; 6) Full-Fees; 7) Bond University. 
For this exercise, the restricted sample of full-time, full-
year workers is used. 23 The figures in Table A3.l.3 are converted 
into 1989 dollars using the CPI. To obtain after-tax earnings, the 
personal tax rates operating in 1988-89 are applied to the figures. 
The analysis is limited to the choice full-time study only. 24 In all 
cases other than (7), income while studying, and course-related 
expenses (excluding fees), in 1989 dollars, are assumed to be $2,070 
per annum and $830 per annum, respectively, and the completion time 
is 3.5 years. 
Students of Bond university are assumed to complete their 
degrees in two years. They are assumed not to have any earnings 
whilst studying, and to incur course-related expenses (excluding 
fees) of $1,245 per annum (1. 5 x $830). Under the "full-fees" regime, 
students are assumed to be charged $12,000 per full-time year of 
study. This figure is based on the fee structure in Bond University. 
We noted in the previous chapter that under imperfect capital 
markets, the cost of funds may differ across individuals, and across 
investment projects. An individual may, therefore, use a different 
discount rate for each fee-regime, depending on the amount (and 
hence, the cost) of funds that needs to raised in each case. With the 
exception of HECSl, and the zero-fee regime, students are required to 
23. Equivalent results using the full-sample are given in Appendix 
3. 3 . 
24. The attractiveness of the various fee-regimes considered in this 
section may well be different for those contemplating studying part-
time. As well, there are impo~tant and interesting issues relating to 
the relative attractiveness of part and full-time studies under each 
of the fee-regimes. These are left for subsequent research. 
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pay some amount of money up-front. 25 Under some regimes (e.g. HEAC), 
the amount is small. Under others (e.g. Bond University), the amount 
can be quite substantial, and students may not always be able to 
raise the money to finance their higher education. Even the loan 
scheme introduced by the Westpac Bank "exc_lusively" for Bond 
University students would not completely alleviate the problem. Here, 
students are given the opportunity of borrowing up to a maximum of 
only $5,000 a year (bearing in mind that fees amount to $6,000 a 
semester), and then, only after they have passed their first year. 
Hence, liquidity constraints may mean that the cost of funds for some 
individuals, under some regimes, is effectively infinite. More 
generally, we can assume that, in the absence of a perfect capital 
market, the cost of funds for most individuals will rise with the 
amount of up-front fees, becoming infinitely large for some, at some 
point. Hence, the discount rate used to evaluate the educational 
investment will tend to rise with the amount of up-front fees. 
The IRR and NPV (at various discount rates) of higher education 
under the various fee-regimes are presented in Table 3.7. A number of 
interesting observations may be made. First, the NPV criterion (at 
0%) ranks HECS2 above HECSl. The reason for this is that if 
individuals have a zero discount rate, then the 15% discount offered 
on up-front payment of HECS is a true saving to the individua1. 26 
Since the real interest rate on bank deposits is generally positive, 
it is unlikely that individuals will use a zero discount rate in 
evaluating their investments. At a discount rate of 3% (5% for 
25. Even under HECSl and the no-fee regime, students may have to pay 
union fees and other charges levied by the institution. 
26. The assumption here is, of course, that individuals believe that 
their future incomes will follow the cross-sectional profiles of 
full-time full-year graduates. 
TABLE 3.7: PRIVATE INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN AND NET PRESENT VALUES (1989 DOLLARS) OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
UNDER VARIOUS FEE-REGIMES 
Discount No Fees HEAC LIB HECSl HECS2 Full- Bond 
Rate Fees Uni. 
MALES 
IRR 8.87% 8.72% 8.28% 8.34% 8.13% 5.45% 5.30% 
0% $199,010 $197,920 $194,810 $192,710 $193,650 $165,110 $165,290 
3% $75,830 $74,820 $71,900 $70,970 $70,820 $44,190 $43,040 
5% $36,310 $35,340 $32,550 $32,180 $31,510 $6,040 $4,130 
10% -$5,450 -$6,310 -$8,840 -$8,230 -$9,770 -$32,670 -$36,130 
15% -$17,770 -$18,550 -$20,860 -$19,710 -$21,700 -$42,440 -$47,030 
FEMALES 
IRR 9.52% 9.35% 8.89% 9.04% 8.73% 5.34% 5.68% 
0% $221,330 $220,240 $217,130 $215,030 $215,980 $179,330 $186,870 
3% $85,270 $84,260 $81,350 $80,640 $80,270 $46,000 $51,820 
5% $42,480 $41,510 $38,720 $38,670 $37,680 $4,860 $9,690 
10% -$2,280 -$3,140 -$5,670 -$4,690 -$6,610 -$36,220 -$33,470 
15% -$15,740 -$16,520 -$18,820 -$17,320 -$19,670 -$46,570 -$45,430 
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females) or higher, the NPV under HECSl is higher than under HECS2, 
and students would be better off choosing the tax option (HECSl). 
This is even more so for students from poorer families who may have 
t o borrow to cover the "up-front" payment. As we have argued, these 
students may use a higher discount rate to_ evaluate HECS2 compared to 
HECSl. 
A second point to be made about the recent introduction of HECS 
is that the effect on the private rates of return is negligible. 
Comparing the figures under HEAC and HECSl, we note that the IRR for 
both sexes falls by less than 0.4 of a percentage point. If we take 
into account the income-contingent aspect of HECSl, and factor into 
our calculations the fact that some individuals may withdraw from the 
labour force (permanently, or otherwise), or engage only in part-time 
work prior to completely discharging their debt, then the effect on 
the IRR will be even less. 27 This is particularly applicable to 
females. 
HECSl is also advantageous to females for a second reason. 
Since female graduates generally earn less than their male 
counterparts, they take a longer period to discharge their debt to 
the government. Given the (real) interest-free nature of the debt 
under HECSl, this implies that in present value terms, females tend 
to pay less than males for the same education. This difference is 
small when we focus solely on full-time full-year workers. For the 
full sample, however, the advantage to females in paying through the 
tax-system (HECSl) instead of up-front (HECSl) is immediately obvious 
(see Table A3.3.3 in Appendix 3.3). 
27. Some individuals may even be better off under HECSl than HEAC. 
For instance, if an individual never earns above $22,000 per annum, 
then HECSl is effectively the same as a zero-fee regime. 
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How does the Liberal-National scheme compare with HECS? The 
figures show that the IRR under the LIB-=egime is very close to that 
under HECSl. At low discount rates, the NPV tends to be slightly 
higher under LIB. It is important, however, to reiterate that the 
former scheme requires an up-front payment, which may pose liquidity 
problems for some individuals. If individuals were induced to use a 
higher discount rate for the LIB-scheme, then, they may well prefer 
HECSl to LIB. For instance, if individuals were to use a discount 
rate of 3% in evaluating HECSl, and a 5% discount rate for LIB, then 
for both males and females, the NPVs under HECSl would be 
considerably higher than under LIB. Moreover, the income-contingent 
nature of payments under HECS provides an insurance function which 
makes it even more attractive, to the extent that individuals are 
risk-averse.28 
The rate of return under full-fees ($12,000 per year) is 
significantly lower than the rates under HEAC, LIB, or either of the 
HECS options. The IRR falls to 5.45% for males, and to . 5.34% for 
females. These returns are no more than what individuals can obtain 
from alternative investments. 29 Given the illiquid nature of human 
capital 
capital 
investment. 
graduates cannot sell off his or her accumulated human 
individuals may not see higher education as an attractive 
Finally, the IRR under the Bond University scheme is not very 
different to that under the full-fee regime. Although students save 
28. This is considered in Chapter 7. 
29. As cited earlier, the Department of Finance estimates that the 
real after-ta~ rates of return to individuals from investments in the 
market portfolio have averaged between 4 and 7 per cent since the 
mid-1970s. The returns to individuals from investment in housing and 
household mortgages have been found, also, to lie within this range. 
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considerably in terms of foregone ea=nings, this is offset by t h e 
highe~ present value of the fees to be paid. Instead of paying 
$36,000 for a three-year degree over three years, the same amount has 
to be paid over two, which increases the cost in present value terms. 
In addition, if we were to take into account the fact that the 
substantial up-front payment required under the BOND-scheme may 
increase the cost of funds to individuals, then studying in Bond 
university would appear even less attractive. 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, we examined the private rate of return to 
higher education in Australia. The results support the findings of 
earlier studies that higher education appears to be an attractive 
investment to individuals. The rates of return, however, tend to be 
lower than those estimated by Miller (1982a). How much of this is due 
to the value of the degree having changed over the period, and how 
much is due to differences in our methodologies, cannot be determined 
at this stage. 
It was also found that the rates of return estimated using 
total income are not significantly different to those estimated using 
earned income. Three possible explanations for this were suggested. 
First, the link between the human and non-human components of wealth 
may not be as strong as commonly assumed. Second, the non-human 
component of wealth is small. Third, transfer payments from the 
government may benefit non-graduates more than graduates. To the 
extent that this is so, it tends to offset any upward bias on the 
rate of return caused by the inclusion of non-human wealth in the 
calculations. 
77 
Depending on whether we regard observed differences in the 
number of hours worked across individuals as the result of 
unconstrained individual choices, and whether we are interested only 
in the monetary returns to investment in higher education, we may 
wish to standardise income for the number _of hours worked. 
Restricting our sample to only those who worked full time and for the 
full year, we found that the returns to higher education were 
significantly lower, particularly in the case of females. In spite of 
this, higher education still remains an attractive investment, 
especially for those in receipt of TEAS. 
The rate of return to completing a degree on a part-time basis 
is found to be extremely high. This is consistent with Chapman's 
(1977) earlier finding using data on males working in clerical and 
administrative positions in the Australian Public Service. One 
explanation is that the difference in the rates of return between 
part-time and full-time study reflects the consumption benefits 
associated with the latter. Under this hypothesis, we estimated that 
the value placed on these consumption benefits amounts to around 
$5000 to $7000 per full-time year of study. 
In the penultimate section of this chapter, we analysed the 
effect of HECS and of several other fee-structures on private rates 
of return for full-time students. It was found that HECS would push 
the rate of return down from the HEAC-regime, but only negligibly. It 
was also found that individuals would generally be better off paying 
through the tax system, contingent on their income, rather than 
paying up-front with a 15% discount on their liability. 
Private rates of return under Liberal-National scheme are very 
similar to those under HECS. However, it requires an up-front 
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payment, which may result in some individuals being better off under 
HECS. 
Finally, the rates of return under a full-fee regime, and for 
Bond University students are substantially lower than under HECS, or 
any of the other fee-regimes we have considered. The figures suggest 
that higher education may not be an attractive investment to 
individuals when full-fees are charged, even if they could complete 
their courses in two years. 
Throughout the chapter, we have assumed that there are no 
ability differences between university graduates and high-school 
leavers. To the extent that part of the observed income differential 
is due to the superior ability of the former group, our estimates 
will be biased upwards. Moreover, we have concentrated solely on the 
mean income profiles of the two groups. The variance around these 
mean profiles has been ignored. In other words, the riskiness of 
education as an investment is not explicitly modelled. This has led 
to some ambiguity as to which is the appropriate discount rate to use 
as a benchmark with which the profitability of education may be 
judged. These issues will be addressed in Part II of the thesis. 
CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL PROFITABILITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
In this chapter, we examine the profitability of higher 
education as an investment from the social point of view. This 
chapter is divided into four main sections. In the next section, we 
calculate the social rates of return under alternative assumptions 
regarding the magnitude of externalities. Section 4.2 presents some 
novel calculations which attempt to infer the magnitude of 
externalities from the fee-structure of the recently introduced 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). In Section 4.3, we 
discuss the consistency of HECS with the Government's aim to expand 
the higher education system on the grounds of allocative efficiency. 
Section 4.4 concludes. 
4.1 Social Rates of Return to Higher Education 
In calculating the social rates of return to higher education, 
it is extremely important to specify the question we are attempting 
to answer. If the question is whether higher education, as a whole, 
has been a profitable investment from the society's point of view, 
then it is the relation between average benefits and average costs 
which is relevant. On the other hand, if we want to know if society, 
at the margin, should expand investment in higher education, then 
clearly, it is the relation between the benefits and costs in 
producing an extra graduate that is of interest. It is the latter 
question which we are concerned with in this chapter. 
As in the previous chapter, our analysis is based on the mean 
income profiles across educational groups. For social rate of return 
calculations, however, pre-tax earnings profiles are used. We assume 
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that the expected earnings of the marginal graduate are as given by 
the mean earnings profile of degree-holders. 1 It is also assumed that 
this individual's earnings would have been as given by the mean high-
school earnings profile had he or she not attended university. We 
assume, further, that markets are sufficiently competitive so that 
earnings reflect the marginal productivities of workers, 2 and that 
the higher productivity of more educated workers is the result of the 
extra schooling they received. 3 
On the cost side, in addition to private expenditure on course-
related items (assumed to be $660 per year in 1985/86 dollars), 4 the 
cost to tax-payers in providing the educational service -- wages of 
teaching and support staff, books, computer and laboratory facilities 
etc. -- must also be included. Throsby (1986) has recently estimated 
cost functions for Australian universities. The marginal total 
cost 5 , 6 at the mean value of total student load derived from his 
1. This would be the case if the variance around the mean earnings 
profile is due purely to luck, or if the selection criteria used to 
allocate university places is uncorrelated with individuals' future 
earnings. We shall discuss this in greater detail in Part II of the 
thesis. 
2. As note previously, this is to be interpreted in a life-cycle 
context. 
3. As noted in Chapter 2, these last two assumptions are required 
only in social rate of return calculations. In private rate of return 
calculations, whether earnings reflect workers' marginal 
productivities, and whether schooling increases their productivity or 
acts simply as a signalling device is irrelevant. 
4. We have assumed this figure to be the same as in the private rate 
of returns calculations (Chapter 3). Strictly speaking, the figure 
here should be lower, since, union fees and other university charges 
should be excluded (see Chapter 2). The difference, however, is 
small, and is therefore ignored. 
5. Throsby estimated separate cost functions for departmental, and 
for central expenditures. The marginal total cost is the sum of the 
marginal departmental and marginal central costs. 
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estimates (Tables I and II) is $5,210 (1984 dollars). Th~s f~gure, 
however, includes research costs. Elsewhere, Throsby (1985) has 
estimated that the proportion of departmental expenditure 
attributable to teaching is 56%. Assuming that the proportion of 
central expenditure attributable to teaching is the same, the 
marginal total cost for the teaching function of universities amounts 
to $2,917 per student-year. Converting to 1985/86 dollars and 
rounding off, it is assumed, therefore, that the marginal cost of 
providing an extra place in unversity is $3,200 per year. 
In estimating the cost to society in producing an extra 
graduate, it is important to realise that a large proportion of 
students do not complete their courses in the minimum time required. 
Moreover, the resources used by those students who dropped out of 
university without completing their courses must also be included. 
West et al. (1986) have estimated that for every 1000 full-time 
first-year students enrolled in a university on April 30 in any year, 
771 would eventually graduate as full-time students. Of the 
remainder, 66 would change to part-time studies at some point during 
their course, 152 would drop out in their first year, and 11 in later 
years. For simplicity, it is assumed that all withdrawers do so at 
the end of their first year. Ignoring those who change to part-time 
studies, it follows that on average for every 100 successful 
graduates, we need to add the social cost of the resources used by 
the other 21 students who fail to complete. This adjustment is made 
by increasing -the first-year costs (direct and indirect) of each 
6. Almost all social rate of return calculations in the literature 
have used the average cost rather than the marginal cost because the 
latter is seldom available. The assumption implicitly made in these 
calculations insofar as they are to be used to assess whether society 
has over- or under-invested in eduction, is that the two are equal. 
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graduate by a factor of 1.21. Strictly speaking, the cost of 
producing an extra graduate will need to be adjusted by a factor 
higher than this, since, ex ante the marginal graduate would tend to 
have a higher than average probability of dropping out. For 
simplicity, however, the average probabili_ty is assumed. 
The number of years which the marginal graduate is assumed to 
take in completing the course has a strong bearing on the estimated 
profitability of higher education. The 1984-85 National Social 
Science Survey7 contained a question which asked respondents for the 
number of years of tertiary education completed since they left 
school. For degree-holders, the mean number of years reported was 
approximately 4.5. This figure is used as the number of years taken 
by the marginal graduate to complete his or her degree. 8 
Offsetting the costs is the amount students earn from part-time 
employment while studying. This is assumed to be $1,640 (1985/86 
dol lars) per annum which, in real terms, is the average amount earned 
by university students not in receipt of any educational assistance 
in 1984. The figure for those receiving Tertiary Education Assistance 
Scheme (TEAS) allowances is smaller. 
In the first part of the analysis, we shall use the mean 
earnings profile corresponding to the full sample. The implicit 
assumption is that other than the time spent at work, individuals are 
not socially productive.9 
7. For detail·s, see, Kelley et al. (1987). 
8. To the extent that the marginal graduate is likely to take longer 
to complete his or her course, this assumption would, again, cause an 
understatement in the cost of producing an extra graduate. 
9. This assumption allows us to disregard differences in the number 
of hours worked. 
83 
Table 4.1 presents estimates of the marginal social rate of 
return to higher education for males and females. A number of 
hypothetical values for externalities associated with higher 
education are considered. These represent (subjective) annual dollar 
values one may place on the externalities .flowing from an extra 
graduate, for each year from graduation to retirement (at age 60) . 1 0 
TABLE 4.1: MARGINAL SOCIAL RATES OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
(FULL SAMPLE) 
MALES 
FEMALES 
HYPOTHETICAL VALUE OF EXTERNALITIES PER YEAR 
$0 
9.93% 
11.25% 
$1,000 
10.23% 
12.24% 
$2,000 $5,000 
11.07% 13.52% 
13.21% 16.00% 
$10,000 
17.46% 
20.28% 
The major features of the results in Table 4.1 are as follows. 
First, compared to the private rates of return (Table 3.5) the social 
rates (assuming zero externalities) are smaller. This is, in part, 
because in calculating the private rates of return, we followed the 
literature in assuming that individuals believe that they would 
complete their courses in the minimum time required. 11 In the social 
calculations, however, we increased the expected length of study to 
reflect the possibility of failure. In part, the social returns are 
als o lower because of the addition of the cost borne by tax-payers in 
providing the educational service. 12 
10. Arguably, externalities will continue to flow from the marginal 
graduate even after he or she retires. This does not affect our 
calculations much because they will be highly discounted. 
11. The importance of this assumption is examined in Part II of the 
thesis. 
12 . On the other hand, the use of pre-tax instead of post-tax 
earnings tends to increase the social rates of return (over the 
private rates) because graduates tend to pay more tax over their 
lifetime. 
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Secondly, as with private rates of return, the social rate of 
return is higher for females. This is due, to large extent, to the 
higher participation rate and hours worked by female graduates 
compared with female non-graduates. 
Thirdly, the adjustment for externalities has a surprisingly 
small impact on the calculated rates of return. For every increment 
of $1,000 on the annual value placed on the externalities from an 
extra graduate, the social rate of return is increased by less than 
one percentage point. 
Do these figures support the Government's position on expansion 
of the higher education system from the point of efficient resource 
al location? The Department of Finance (1987) has argued that the 
appropriate discount rate to be used in the evaluation of government 
p rojects is given by average cost of funds in the corporate sector. 
I t has estimated that the real required rate of return on total 
a ssets since the mid-1970s is about 12.1% . 1 3 
Using 12.1% as the appropriate social discount rate, the 
decision as to whether to expand the higher education system clearly 
depends on the value one places on the externalities flowing from an 
extra graduate. If the value, as commonly argued in some quarters 
[see, for instance, Fane (1984a)], is negligible, then resources can 
be more productively employed elsewhere in the economy. For males, 
unless society values the externalities at more than $3,250 per 
annum, an increase in the number of tertiary places cannot be 
justified on efficiency grounds alone. In the case of females, our 
13 . On the other hand, some researchers have argued that the cost t o 
t he Government in borrowing from abroad is only about 3 %, and that i t 
is this figure which should be used as the social discount rate. See, 
fo r instance, Kelley (1988). 
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calculations suggest that an expansion would only be favoured if the 
externalities from an extra graduate are valued at more than $850 per 
annum. 
Obviously, if the social discount rate is low {say, below 9%), 
then the existence of positive spill-overs is not necessary to 
support an expansion of higher education from the point of allocative 
efficiency. As a rule-of-thumb, 10% is the figure commonly used to 
as sess the profitability of educational investments. At this discount 
rate, the figures suggest that for males, the amount of resources 
spent on higher education is near optimal. For females, on the other 
hand, there may still be an under-investment from the efficiency 
point of view. 
The assumption that only time spent working is socially 
productive is clearly an extreme case. It would certainly not be 
true, for instance, of those who chose to withdraw from the labour 
force, or worked fewer hours in order to bring up their children or 
to perform household chores. Unfortunately, putting a dollar value on 
these services is extremely difficult. One possible assumption is 
that at the margin, individuals equate their marginal productivities 
in home and market activities. The value of these home-produced 
services is, therefore, given by the extra income they could 
otherwise have earned in the labour market. This, in turn, suggests 
that it may be more appropriate to use the earnings profiles of full-
time full-year workers in the estimation of the social rate of 
return. The results are shown in Table 4.2. 
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TABLE 4.2: MARGINAL SOCIAL RATES OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATI ON 
(RESTRICTED SAMPLE) 
MALES 
FEMALES 
HYPOTHETICAL VALUE OF EXTERNALITIES PER YEAR 
$0 $1,000 
7.68% 8 . 50% 
7.88% 8.76% 
$2,000 
9.30% 
9.60% 
$5,000 
11.59% 
12.03% 
$10,000 
15.18% 
15.77% 
A number of interesting features in the table may be noted. 
First, the social rates of return estimated using the restricted 
sample of full-time full-year workers are smaller than those 
estimated with the full sample, especially for females. Secondly, the 
rates of return for males and females are very similar. Finally, we 
note that using a social discount rate of 10%, the case for expanding 
higher education would rest on the perceived size of externalities 
f lowing from an extra graduate. 
4.2 Implied Value of Externalities in HECS 
It is clear from the previous section that the desirability of 
e xpanding higher education from the point of allocative efficiency 
ultimately depends on the marginal value of externalities (unless the 
s ocial discount rate is sufficiently low). Relatedly, in discussions 
about the appropriate level of fees for higher education, it is again 
t he value of externalities which plays the key role. Although work 
has begun on estimating the value of specific types of externalities 
a ssociated with education as noted in Chapter 2, we are a long way 
f rom having a comprehensive estimate. 
In this section, we approach the question of externalities from 
a different perspective. Rather than attempting to estimate the value 
of externalities associated with higher education so as to determine 
t he appropriate level of fees, we calculate, instead, the value _of 
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externalities implied by the fee-structure under the assumption that 
the fee structure was motivated solely by concerns of efficiency. The 
usefulness of this approach is that it provides some ir.sights 
heretofore unavailable into the credibility or otherwise of the 
current policy stance from the perspective of the conventional 
fr amework of allocative efficiency. 
The method is clarified by considering the well-known 
proposition in welfare economics that for allocative efficiency, and 
in the absence of relevant market distortions, goods should be goods 
should be priced at: 
where Px is the price if good x; 
Mx is the marginal cost of producing x; and 
Ex is the marginal value of the externalities associated 
with the production or consumption of x. 14 
This pricing rule can be explained easily with the help of 
Figure 4.1. 
Assume that the marginal private and social costs and benefits 
are as shown. The costs and benefits are all given in present value 
te rms, discounted by the social discount rate. The marginal benefit 
curves are assumed to slope downwards because as more places are 
provided, the flow of tertiary graduates increases, and this, in 
turn, drives down their earnings. The distance between the benefit 
curves measures the value of externalities flowing from an extra 
graduate. 15 
14. See, Brennan (1988) for a discussion of the application of this 
rule in the context of higher education. 
15 . In this analysis, we ignore income taxes. See, Brennan (1988) for 
a discussion of the complications on the pricing rule resulting from 
the distortionary effects of the tax system. 
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- FIGURE 4.1: PRIVATE AND SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
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The marginal private cost curve shows the cost under a zero-fee 
regime, and is assumed to slope positively due to the increasing 
opportunity costs to students from the increased earnings of high-
school leavers as relatively more individuals pursue higher 
education. The distance between the marginal private and social costs 
r eflects the marginal cost of resources used in the provision of 
t ertiary education, which is paid for by the Government. 
Given the position of the curves as drawn, a zero-fee regime 
(in the absence of quotas) would lead to an over-investment in higher 
education from the social point of view (i.e. q' > q*). On the other 
hand, if students were made to pay "full" fees (defined in this 
context as the marginal cost to the Government), then there would be 
a n under-investment in tertiary education (i.e. q" < q*). It is clear 
that the optimal fee is given by the distance BC. 
The substantial methodological point is that given estimates of 
AC, the marginal cost to the Government in providing an extra place, 
and BC, the charge levied on students, it is possible to derive the 
value which the Government places on net marginal externalities, AB. 
I mportantly, it is worthwhile emphasizing again that the validity of 
these calculations depends on the assumption that in setting the 
charge on students, the Government is concerned solely with 
al locative efficiency. The goal of this exercise is to get some 
understanding of the annual dollar value of spill-overs from higher 
education implied in the context of HECS. 
The assumptions regarding the cost of producing an extra 
graduate are as discussed in the previous section. The Government is, 
therefore, assumed to incur a cost of $3,872 (1.21 x $3,200) i n the 
fi rst year, $3,200 in the second, third and fourth years, and $1,6 00 
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in the fifth year. The present value of this stream of costs to t he 
Government at the beginning of year 1 depends importantly on the 
social discount rate used. The higher the discount rate is, t he lower 
the present value of the marginal cost. 
To obtain an estimate of BC it is ne-cessary to determine the 
effective steady state charge expected under HECS. This can be 
approximated by assuming that the Goverment uses the average full-
time earnings profiles of graduates under the assumption that 4.5 
years are spent in higher education. This implies that the total 
undiscounted amount charged is $8,100 in 1988-89 dollars or $6,430 in 
1985-86 dollars for both males and females. 1 6 
However, because the time pattern of repayment differs between 
the sexes, the discounted fees the Government expects to recoup must 
al so vary with sex. Since male graduates are more highly paid on 
average, members of this group discharge their debt relatively 
quickly. This implies that the present value of repayment from the 
average male exceeds that of the average female. 
With this as background, Table 4.3 sets out the present values 
of the marginal cost to the Government in producing an extra 
graduate, male and female, the amount expected to be recovered 
th rough the tertiary tax on average, and the implied marginal value 
of externalities, at various discount rates. To put the implied value 
of externalities in the context of the results in the previous 
section, it is useful to think of the externalities as a constant 
16 . For consistency, the amount recouped from dropouts must also be 
added. Since we have assumed that dropouts, on average, stay for a 
year in unversity, and that for every 100 successful graduates there 
are 21 dropouts, the extra revenue from the dropouts per graduate is 
$3 78 (0.21 x $1,800) in 1988-89 dollars or $300 in 1985-86 dollars. 
Fo r simplicity, we assume that this amount is always paid in year 1 . 
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stream of benefits, valued at $X per annum, flowing from an extra 
graduate each year, from graduation to retirerner.t. The value of Xis 
given in the final two columns of the table. 
TABLE 4.3: ESTIMATES OF MARGINAL VALUE OF EXTERNALITIES 
(1985/86 DOLLARS) 
( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5) ( 6) ( 7) ( 8 ) 
Discount Marginal Effective Implied Annual Value of 
Rate Cost Fee Externality Externality 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
0% 15,070 6,780 6,780 8,300 8,300 220 220 
3% 13,950 5,090 4,850 8,860 9,100 450 470 
5% 13,270 4,240 3,930 9,030 9,340 670 690 
7% 12,650 3,560 3,220 9,080 9,420 940 970 
10% 11,800 2,780 2,440 9,020 9,350 1,420 1,480 
12% 11,280 2,370 2,060 8,900 9,220 1,800 1,870 
15% 10,570 1,900 1,620 8,670 8,950 2,450 2,530 
18% 9,930 1,540 1,300 8,390 8,630 3,180 3,270 
2 0% 9,550 1,350 1,140 8,190 8,410 3,710 3,810 
The results may be summarised as follows. For the range of 
social discount rates considered above, the implied value of 
externalities flowing from an extra graduate is around $8,000 to 
$9 ,500 in present value terms (1985-86 dollars). At low discount 
rates (0%-7%), this implies that for the tertiary tax to be 
consistent with allocative efficiency, the marginal graduate is 
expected to deliver to society around $200 to $1,000 worth of spill-
ove rs per year. At higher social discount rates (10%-20%), the annual 
delivery of spill-overs ranges from around $1,500 to $3,800. 
A useful summary statistic is the marginal value of 
externalities associated with a 10% social discount rate, which is 
probably the least controversial figure to use. At that level, the 
marginal male and female graduate must deliver, respectively, around 
$1 ,420 and $1,480 per year in spill-overs for the tertiary tax to 
represent an optimal charge in terms of allocative efficiency. In 
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other words, allocative efficiency were the main concern of the 
Government when deciding on the size of the charge, then the policy 
implicity suggests that the external economies from reduced crime, 
more informed voting, lower welfare and public health costs, inter 
alia, outweigh any possible external diseconomies to the tune of 
about 5 per cent of the average full-time full-year income of degree-
holders (around $30,000) .1 7 
It is important to offer several observations on the 
methodology used in the context of the current rationing of 
university places. The figures in columns (5) and (6) in the table 
are estimates of the Government's valuation of the externalities 
* expected to flow from an extra graduate at the optimum (i.e. at q). 
Implicit in the framework is the assumption that at the optimum there 
will be no excess demand for places. Since we are not attempting to 
measure the value of externalities at the current (rationed) level of 
graduates, or the Government's perception of this magnitude, the fact 
that the system is in a situation where the number of students 
enrolled in higher education is supply-determined is not pertinent to 
the validity of these calculations. This is true so long as the 
marginal cost of producing an extra graduate to the Government 
remains approximately the same as the system expands towards the 
opt imal level. Throsby's (1986) regression results suggest that the 
ma rginal total cost of providing university places is relatively 
insensitive to the total student load. However, it may still be the 
case that as the system expands, the ratio of dropouts to graduates 
rises, and the average time taken to complete a degree increases. 
Thi s would lead to an increase in the cost of producing an extra 
17. A.B.S., 1986 Income Distribution Survey, Persons with Earned 
Income, Cat. No. 6546.0. 
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graduate to the Government. To the extent that the cost at the 
optimum is higher than at the current level of enrolments, our 
estimates of the marginal value of externalities would be biased 
downwards. 
4 . 3 Internal. Consistency of HECS and Expa·nsion of Higher Education 
The analysis in the previous section can be carried one step 
further to consider the consistency of HECS with the Government's 
resolve to expand the higher education system. The idea behind this 
is relatively straight-forward. 
holds: 
* At the optimum enrolment level q, the following relationship 
MPB(q*) + EXT(q*) = MPC(q*) + MRC(q*) ( 4. 1) 
where MPB(q*) is the marginal private benefit at q*; 
* * EXT(q) is the marginal value of externalities at q; 
MPC(q*) is the marginal private cost under a zero-fee 
. * d regime at q; an 
MRC(q*) is the marginal cost to the Government in 
producing an extra graduate at q*. 
All magnitudes are expressed in present value terms discounted by the 
social discount rate. The equation can be rearranged into: 
* * * * [MPB(q) - MPC(q) - MRC(q )] + EXT(q) = 0 ( 4. 2) 
Let the current enrolment level be denoted by q#. As we have 
noted, the marginal cost to the government in producing an extra 
university place is fairly insensitive to the enrolment level. It is, 
therefore, assumed that MRC(q#) = MRC(q*). 
Quite clearly, if q* < q*, then 
( 4. 3) 
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Thi s follows directly from the assumptions that the MPB curve is 
downward-sloping and the MPC curve, upward-sloping. 1 8 Hence, 
[MPB(qt) - MPC(q*) - MRC(q#)] + EXT(q*) > 0 ( 4 • 4) 
Note that the sum of terms within the square brackets is simply the 
marginal social NPV to higher education at current enrolment levels, 
assuming zero externalities. If (4.4) is found not to be true, it 
must mean that q# ~ q* (assuming that EXT(q*) is correctly 
est imated). That is, the current level of enrolment is actually 
higher than the optimal level. Rather than expanding the higher 
education sector, the Government should be shifting resources out of 
the sector into more socially productive projects. In this case, the 
marginal value of externalities implicit in HECS would not be 
consistent with the desire to expand higher education from the point 
of allocative efficiency. 
Column (2) of Table 4.4 shows the marginal social NPV at the 
current enrolment level, assuming zero externalities. The figures in 
column (3), which are taken from Table 4.3, show the present value of 
the marginal externalities implicit in HECS at the optimal level of 
enro lments (i.e.EXT(q*). Since the figures in these two columns are 
all expressed in present value terms, they can be simply added to 
yield the marginal social NPV given the value of externalities 
implicit in the tertiary tax (i.e. the left-hand-side of (4.4)). This 
is given in the final column of the table. 
18 . See the discussion in the previous section. 
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TABLE 4.4: SOCIAL NET PRESENT VALUE OF HIGHER EDUCATION WI TH 
EXTERNALITIES IMPLIED BY HECS (1985-86 DOLLARS) 
Discount 
Rate 
( 1) 
0% 
3% 
5% 
7% 
10% 
12% 
15% 
18% 
20% 
0% 
3% 
5% 
7% 
10% 
12% 
15% 
18% 
20% 
NPV with 
zero 
Externalities 
( 2) 
286,360 
100,370 
41,680 
7,960 
-18,400 
-27,430 
-34,520 
-37,470 
-38,200 
277,940 
97,780 
41,670 
9,550 
-15,690 
-24,500 
-31,650 
-34,900 
-35,870 
Implied 
Marginal 
Externalities 
( 3) 
MALES 
8,300 
8,860 
9,030 
9,080 
9,020 
8,900 
8,670 
8,390 
8,190 
FEMALES 
8,300 
9,100 
9,340 
9,420 
9,350 
9,220 
8,950 
8,630 
8,410 
NPV with 
Implied 
Externalities 
(2) + (3) 
294,660 
109,230 
50,710 
17,050 
-9,390 
-18,530 
-25,850 
-29,080 
-30,010 
286,240 
106,890 
51,010 
18,980 
-6,340 
-15,270 
-22,700 
-2£,260 
-27,460 
The results reveal a number of highly interesting points. 
First, at low discount rates (0%-7%), the marginal social NPV with 
the implied value of externalities is positive. The value of 
externalities implicit in HECS appears, therefore, to be consistent 
with the social desirability for an expansion in higher education on 
grounds of efficiency. 
At higher social discount rates (10%-20%), however, the NPV is 
negative. It is interesting to note that with a 10% social discount 
rate, HECS is inconsistent with the Government's commitme~t to 
inc rease the capacity of the higher education sector. This suggests 
that if 10% were indeed the appropriate social discount rate, then 
either the value of externalities is actually higher than HECS 
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i mplies, or that its rationale for expanding higher education is not 
based on grounds of allocative efficiency alone. Alternatively, the 
fee-structure may be motivated on grounds other than allocative 
efficiency. 19 
It is worth emphasizing that the ana·lysis in this section is 
based on a "first-best" efficiency framework. It is assumed that 
there are no market distortions and income taxes. Further, the 
Government is assumed to maximize allocative efficiency. In the 
"first-best" world, HECS is clearly inconsistent with the 
Government's commitment to expand higher education, at some discount 
rates, from the efficiency point of view. In a "second-best" world, 
however, the two policies may well be consistent. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we focussed on the question of whether society 
has over- or under-invested in higher education from an efficiency 
point of view. This is a particularly important question in the light 
of the Government's commitment to expand higher education. Attempts 
to answer this question have been hampered by the lack of consensus 
regarding what is the appropriate social discount rate and the size 
of the externalities from higher education. The results in Section 
4.1 show that the marginal social rate of return to higher education 
is around 10% for males and 11% for females, using the full sample, 
and assuming zero externalities. Using the rule-of-thumb 10% figure 
as a benchmark to judge educational investments, these figures 
suggest that the marginal returns to the resources used in higher 
19. Another possible explanation is that we have under-estimated the 
marginal private benefit to higher education because the non-
pecuniary benefits have not been included. 
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education are about the same as coul d be obtained in alternative 
uses. Using the restricted sample of full-year ful l -time workers, the 
r ate of return falls to about 7%-8%. Hence, if we accept 10% as the 
appropriate social discount rate, the case for expanding higher 
education would seem to rest on the existence of positive 
externalities associated with higher education. 
Becker (1960, p.350) commented three decades ago, that: 
"External or indirect effects are very embarrassing to 
the economist, since his theories say little of them, he 
has few techniques for measuring them, and he usually 
does not even think he knows much about them." 
Although some progress has been made in this area since then, 20 
a convincing estimate of the overall magnitude of externalities 
as sociated with higher education remains illusive. In Section 4.2, we 
addressed the issue of externalities from a different angle. Instead 
of attempting to estimate its magnitude, we asked: What is the the 
marginal value of externalites implicit in the fee-structure, 
as suming that the Government was motivated solely by allocative 
efficiency? This approach presents us with so~e insights heretofore 
unavailable. At a 10% discount rate, the marginal value of 
externalities implict in HECS was estimated to be around $1,400-
$1 ,500 per year. 
In Section 4.3, the value of externalities i mplied by the HECS 
st ructure was incorporated in estimates of the marginal social NPV o f 
higher education. This enabled us to assess the consistency of the 
HECS structure with the Government's commitment to e xpand higher 
education, from the point of allocative efficiency. I t was f ound t h a t 
at low discount rates (0 %-7 %), an expansion o f h i gher education i s 
20 . See, for instance, the work of Haveman and Wolfe (1984). 
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consistent with the marginal value of externalities implicit in HECS. 
At discount rates of 10% or higher, however, the two were 
inconsistent. This suggests that either the marginal value of 
externalities is understated (in which case HECS is not an optimal 
fee), or the aim of expanding higher education is based on concerns 
other than allocative efficiency, or both. 
PART II 
ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS 
10 0 
In Part I of the thesis, the focus was on t he aggregate 
statistics. The analyses were based solely on the comparison of the 
mean earnings profiles across different schooling groups. Whilst 
these results are useful in giving a broad view of economic effects 
of higher education, their limitations must be recognized. In 
particular, the aggregate results conceal the extent of variability 
in the personal experiences of individuals. Hence, although it is 
certainly the case that degree-holders earn more than similarly-aged 
high-school leavers on average, it is by no means true of each and 
every individual degree-holder vis-a-vis each and every high-school 
l eaver. This is so, even if we restricted our attention to only those 
who worked full-time, and for the full year. 
As an illustration, the distributions of earned income obtained 
from the 1985/86 Income and Housing Survey for 30-39 year-old full-
t ime-full-year male workers 1 are given in Figure II.1. The mean and 
median incomes for degree-holders in the sample are, respectively, 
$3 1,430 and $30,920. For high-school leavers, they are $23,020 and 
$2 2,000 respectively. Clearly, degree-holders are better off, on 
average. However, we find that about one-fifth of the degree-holders 
ea rn less than the median income of high-school leavers. The fraction 
of degree-holders earning less than the mean income of high-s c hool 
leavers is also about a fifth. On the other hand, about 14% of high-
school leavers receive more than the median income of degree-holders, 
and 13% earn more than the mean. These figures show that the 
experiences of individuals may be quite different from those of the 
1 . The figures are calculated from the 1985-86 Income and Housing 
Su rvey. Definitions of the sample, and of t he income concepts are as 
given in the previous chapters. 
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"statistically average" individual -- a point which is all too 
frequently neglected in policy discussions. 
The extent of the variability in income within each educational 
group can also be seen from the figures provided in Table II.l which 
show the standard deviation and the coeff~cient of variation of pre-
t ax earned income by age groups. 
TABLE II.1: PRE-TAX EARNED-INCOME (1985-86 DOLLARS) BY AGE FOR MJ..LES 
WHO WORKED FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR 
AGE 
<24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
<24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
MEAN 
20570 
28050 
35290 
41840 
35000 
15840 
21990 
24970 
23600 
27350 
SD 
DEGREE-HOLDERS 
5640 
11870 
17450 
26540 
15270 
HIGH-SCHOOL LEAVERS 
5630 
9460 
16530 
17310 
20630 
CV 
27.4% 
42.3% 
49.4% 
63.4% 
43.6% 
35.5% 
43.0% 
66.2% 
73.3% 
75.4% 
It is evident from the table that there is considerable 
va riation in earned incomes within each age-education group, even 
amongst full-time, full-year workers. Becker (1975 p.181) has pointed 
out that if members of the same cohort are affected very differently, 
then individuals may well be justified in ignoring the aggregate 
results, when deciding whether to pursue higher education. The extent 
of the variation within each age-education group suggests that 
Becker's point may be relevant here. Hence, to better understand the 
effect of higher education on individuals, a much more careful 
analysis of the variation in individual incomes is required. 
The variation in individual income poses (at least) two 
interesting and important sets of questions to researchers. First, in 
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addition to education and age (or experience), which other factors 
a re important in determining an individual's earnings? Second, how 
does the variability _in income affect the ex-post and the ex-ante 
profitability of higher education? 
With regards to the first question, ·the factor which has 
r eceived the most attention to date is native ability. From the 
outset, critics of the human capital approach to education have 
argued that more highly educated individuals earn more, largely (or 
e ven, solely) because of their superior innate ability. This has led 
to a proliferation of studies on the extent of the "ability bias" in 
estimates of the returns to educatiori. 2 
Other researchers have considered the role of family background 
[Hauser (1973), Mincer and Polachek (1974), Weisbrod (1962)], 
individual motivation [Weisbrod (1962)], marital status [Griliches 
(1976)], school quality [Griliches and Mason (1972), Wales (1973)], 
fi rm size [Hatton and Chapman (1987)], cohort size [Welch (1979), 
Berger (1983)], industry of employment [Wachtel and Betsey (1972)], 
tenure [Chapman and Tan (1980)] and so on, in their attempts to 
explain what determines individuals' earnings. 
Despite the concerted efforts of researchers, and the 
inc reasing sophistication of the estimation techniques and data sets 
used, a large proportion of the variance in i ndividual earnings still 
remains unexplained. Typically, these so-called "Hu~an Capital 
Earnings Functions" explain less than half the total variance in 
earnings. This has prompted at least one researcher to suggest that 
2. See, for example, Griliches and Mason (1972), Griliches (1977), 
Hause (1971), Chamberlain (1978), Taubman and Wales (1974), a nd the 
survey in Psacharopoulos (1975). 
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l uck is at least as important as human capital in determining an · 
i ndividual's earnings. 3 Others, however, attribute the unexplained 
variance largely to differences in personal characteristics of 
i ndividuals which are unmeasured, and perhaps, even unmeasurable. 
These concerns have opened up a whole new line of inquiry which 
asks: how much of the observed differences in earnings is systematic, 
or caused by differences in individual characteristics (both measured 
and unmeasured), and how much is stochastic, or due to luck? This 
line of research is, to a great extent, facilitated by the increasing 
availability of panel data, which permits researchers to exploit 
i nformation in the error structure in a way which is not previously 
possible with single-period cross-sectional data. 
For our purposes, the disentangling of income variation into 
it s systematic and stochastic components is important because the 
implications of each of the components on the profitability of higher 
education from the point of individuals, and of society, are quite 
di fferent. On the one hand, if the income variation within each 
education-age group is due entirely to the random effects of luck, 
then ex-ante, higher education is equally profitable across all 
individuals. In this case, the aggregate results in Part I provide 
reasonable guides to what any individual can expect to earn, 
conditional on their education. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
individuals are not indifferent to risk, there is still the question 
of how to take into consideration the effect of the uncertainty in 
fut ure earnings on the ex-ante profitability of higher education. If 
higher education increases the variability of individuals' incomes, 
then the ex-ante value of a degree to those who are risk-averse is 
3. Jencks (1972). 
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lower than suggested by the rates of return calculated in Part I. The 
converse is true if higher education reduces the uncertainty 
associated with future earnings. 
On the other hand, if the variation within each age-education 
category arises entirely from differences ·in the unmeasured 
characteristics of individuals (which are known to the individuals 
themselves), the rates of return calculated in Part I on the basis of 
mean earnings profiles may be of less relevance. In this case, 
depending on their respective endowments of the unmeasured 
characteristics, and how these characteristics are valued across jobs 
as sociated with different educational qualifications, individuals may 
expect to have lifetime earnings which are more, or less, than those 
given by the mean earnings profiles. Consequently, their rates of 
return may differ quite markedly from that based on the mean outcomes 
ac ross schooling groups. 
The variation in individual rates of return has an important 
policy implication. Discussions of whether society, at the margin, 
should expand investment higher education, have largely been based on 
ave rage rates of return. To the extent that individual rates of 
return are systematically related to the selection mechanism used to 
allocate university places, the rate of return to the marginal 
graduate may be quite different to the average rate of return. It 
foll ows, therefore, that the average rate of return may be a 
misleading indicator of the returns to an expansion in higher 
education. 
Part II of the thesis consists of three chapters (Chapters 5-7) 
which discusses these issues. FollowiDg Lillard and Willis (1978), we 
assume that the earnings function is of the form: 
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i = 1, ... ,N; t = 1, ... ,T; 
where Yit is the natural logarithm of annual earnings of the 
ith person in ~he tth year; 
rt are time dummies; and 
Xit contains the usual human capital variables. 
The error structure is assumed to be of the following form: 
where oi is a random individual component, which is assumed to be 
time-invariant, and captures the individual-specific characteristics 
not included in Xit; and Yit is a stochastic component (which may be 
serially correlated). 
In Chapter 5, the focus is on the effect of risk on the private 
profitability of higher education. We assume in that chapter, that 
the error term (uit> consists only of the stochastic component (i.e. 
cr82 = 0). A simple two-step procedure is developed, which enables us 
to adjust the profitability of higher education for risk. We examine 
how the results in Part I of the thesis, which are based on a 
certainty framework, are altered as a result of the uncertainty in 
fut ure incomes. In addition, the impact of the risk of dropping out 
of university, as well as of the uncertainty with respect to the 
length of time required to complete the course on the economic value 
of a degree is analysed. 
Chapter 6 is concerned with the effect of differential 
abilities across individuals on the private returns to higher 
education. There, we assume that the error term (uit> consists solely 
of the individual-specific component (i.e. Uit = Oi). Using the 
Willi s and Rosen (1979) model of educational self-selection, three 
cases of sorting by ability into different educational groups 
positive hierarchical sorting, negative hierarchical sorting, and 
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non-hierarchical sorting are identified. I n a dd ition, a fourt h 
case, whereby no sorting by ability occurs, may arise under cert ain 
conditions. It is not possible with our data to test for the type o f 
so rting which takes place. Nevertheless, by pairing incomes from 
di fferent parts of the high-school leavers' income distribution wi t h 
incomes from different parts of the degree-holders' income 
distributions, we can shed some light into the extent to which rate 
of return estimates based on mean earnings profiles may be biased i n 
each of the four cases. As well, we can gain considerable insight 
with regards to how individual rates of return may differ from the 
average return to the group. 
The individual and stochastic components are brought together 
in Chapter 7, using the parameter estimates from Miller (1989) as a 
guide to their relative importance. The aim of this chapter is to 
consider some policy implications arising from differential ability 
ac ross individuals, as well as the riskiness of higher education as 
an investment. In particular, we analyse the effect of the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) on the incentives of indivi dua l s 
with different ability levels to invest in higher education, as wel l 
as the extent to which HECS is made more attractive vis-a-vis othe r 
fee-paying proposals because of its income-contingent nature. 
CHAPTER 5 
RISK AND THE PRIVATE PROFITABILITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
5.1 Introduction 
The analyses in Part I of the thesis were set within a 
certainty framework. In the private rate of returns calculations, 
individuals were assumed to use the minimum time required by their 
courses as the basis of their calculations, and the possibility of 
fa iling to complete was not considered. As well, they were assumed to 
know the future income streams associated with the alternative levels 
of education with complete certainty. 
Clearly, these assumptions are untenable in the real world. 
Uncertainty is very much a fact of life, and the ex-post 
profitability of higher education may differ _quite markedly across 
individuals. In other words, there are risks 1 associated with 
investing in higher education. To the extent that individuals are not 
indifferent to risk, they will take the uncertainty into account when 
evaluating the profitability of the educational investment. 
Becker (1975) had clearly anticipated these diffic lties. In 
his book, Human Capital, he identified three types of risks 
1. In the original economics of uncertainty literat~re, the terms 
"uncertainty" and "risk" have quite different meanings. The former 
refers to situations whereby the probability distribution of the 
out come is unknown, whereas the latter is used in situations where it 
is known. Since, we shall be dealing only with situations where the 
probability distribution is assumed to be known, we shall follow the 
example of other researchers applying the concept of uncertainty to 
education, and use the terms "risk" and "uncertainty" 
interchangeably. 
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as sociated with investments in human capital. 2 First, there is 
uncertainty regarding the length of life. Second, individuals may be 
uncertain about their ability to learn, and to benefit from the 
schooling process. Finally, there is uncertainty about the returns to 
education due to events which are not predictable -- in other words, 
luck. In this chapter, we are primarily concerned with the third type 
of uncertainty. 3 
It is important to note that adjustments for risk need not 
necessarily make higher education less profitable even if all 
individuals are risk-averse. This is because the uncertainty in the 
returns arises from two separate sources: a) that associated with 
successful completion of the course and the length of time taken; and 
b) the uncertainty in income as a graduate vis-a-vis income as a 
high-school leaver. The first source of uncertainty unambiguously 
leads to a reduction in the profitability of higher education. The 
effect of uncertainty from the second source is not as clear-cut. 
There is no a priori reason to expect the income of high-school 
leavers to be more, or less, variable than that of degree-holders. If 
the possession of a degree leads to less variability in future 
earnings, and this effect dominates the uncertainty from the first 
source, then from the point of individuals, higher education is risk-
reducing. The (risk-adjusted) rate of return to higher education 
will , as a result, be higher than when uncertainty is ignored. 
2. Becker (1975) p.77. 
3. Questions relating to uncertainty in ability are taken up in the 
next chapter. 
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Despite the obvious importance of this issue, there have been 
fe w attempts to consider the empirical implications of risk on the 
ex-ante profitability of education. To the best of our knowledge, 
t here has only been one study [Weiss (1972)] which has attempted to 
empirically estimate the effect of risk on· the ex-ante returns to 
education. Unfortunately, as we shall see, there are some rather 
serious shortcomings with that study. It should be noted, as well, 
t hat none of the previous studies addresses the risk of failure. This 
i s a serious oversight, particularly in the case of Australian higher 
education where, according to the William's Committee, more than 40 % 
of students fail to complete their degrees in the minimum time 
r equired. 
This chapter develops a simple two-step procedure to assess the 
p rivate profitability of higher education as an investment in the 
presence of uncertainty. The approach is sufficiently flexible to 
al low for the probability of the failure to complete, and the 
uncertainty with regards to the time required for completion of the 
degree, to be incorporated. We shall use the model developed to 
examine how the results in Part I of the thesis are a l tered as a 
result of the adjustment for risk. 
There are seven sections in this chapter. Section 5.2 reviews 
the handful of studies on the effect of risk on human capital 
investment. We shall point out why these studies are not 
sat isfactory, and proceed, in Section 5.3, to develop a model which 
overcomes some of the difficulties. Section 5.4 presents the 
empirical results of our model. In Section 5.5, t he effects of 
interest rates, and the level of initial wealth on the profitability 
of higher education are analysed. Section 5.6 examines the issue of 
111 
serial independence in year-to-year income variations. The main 
conclusions of the chapter are set out in Section 5.7. 
5 . 2 Literature Review 
5. 2 . 1 Variability in IRR and Discounted Lifetime Income 
One of the main conclusions of Becker's (1975) pioneering work 
on investment in human capital was that the private rate of return to 
college education, in aggregate, was quite substantial even after 
adjustments for differential ability. Becker was quick to point out 
t hat these results applied to individuals only insofar as members of 
t he same cohort were affected 'more or less to the same extent'. 
Unfortunately, that was not the case. Becker found that there was 
considerable variation in the gain within a group even after 
s tandardizing for sex, race, locality (urban or rural), and graduate 
or drop-out status. As a crude approximation, he estimated that the 
coefficient of variation of the rate of return to college education 
was 'almost certainly higher than one and possibly a good deal 
higher'. This implies that although the rate of return to the cohort 
i n aggregate might be 12%, many members of that cohort would receive 
mo re than 25%, or less than 0% on their investments. He concluded 
t hat: 
" the variation in gain within a group ... is much 
greater than can be explained by the variation in ability 
alone. So great is it that an individual can be only 
loosely guided by the gain of his cohort, and has to place 
considerable weight on his own situation and hope for the 
best." fpp.181-182] 
Hause (1974) suggested that while it was not possible to 
compute the probability distribution of an individual's discounted 
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l ifetime income from cross-sec~ional data because the covariances of 
a nnual incomes over the life cycle cannot be derived, it was 
possible, nevertheless, to obtain an upper bound to the coefficient 
o f variation of the discounted income stream. He showed that the 
s upremum of the standard deviation of disc·ounted lifetime income was 
s imply the discounted value of the standard deviation of income at 
e ach age. That is: 
Dividing this supremum of the standard deviation by the mean 
d iscounted value of the income stream, which is equal to the 
d iscounted value of the mean earnings profile, yields an upper bound 
t o the coefficient of variation of individuals' discounted lifetime 
i ncome. 
A lower bound to the coefficient of variation can also be 
obtained. If the income profile is determined by a large number of 
uncorrelated increments over short intervals of time, then the 
coefficient of variation of the discounted lifetime income approaches 
ze ro. Hause admitted, however, that these bounds were 'unpleasantly 
wide for estimating the true variability of discounted lifetime 
i ncomes', and recommended that the estimating procedure developed by 
Fase (1970, 1971) be used instead. 
In the Fase study, a random-walk model of earnings was 
specified, and .estimated using Dutch Income data for 1965. Using the 
estimated parameters of the model, Fase computed the before-tax mean s 
and standard deviations of the discounted lifetime incomes (from age 
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2 5) 4 for five different levels of education. His results showed that 
there was considerable variation in the lifetime incomes at all 
l evels of education. In the case of university graduates, for 
i nstance, the mean and standard deviation were 581,000 gld {Dutch 
Guilders) and 159,000 gld, respectively. Ih view of the sizeable 
variation within each educational group, it is somewhat surprising 
that in his later calculations of the economic value of education, 
only the mean income profiles were used. 
More recently, Miller and Volker {1989) analysed the riskiness 
of higher education as an investment in Australia. They demonstrated 
t hat there was a great deal of uncertainty regarding an individual's 
position in the wage distribution, and argued that individuals 
incorporate this uncertainty into their evaluation of investment in 
education. In their formulation, individuals are assumed to make 
their educational choices on the basis of both the present value of 
the income stream associated with a particular educational level, and 
the standard deviation of this present value. By considering the 
polar cases of zero, and perfect correlation in individuals' year-to-
year income variation, Miller and Volker estimated that the standard 
deviations of the discounted lifetime incomes were $7,643 and $7,654 
{1985 dollars) for male year 12 leavers and male university degree-
holders, respectively, in the zero-correlation case. In the case of 
perfect correlation, the figures were $42,133 and $42,200, 
respectively. In each case, the coefficient of variation of 
dis counted lifetime income for high-school leavers was higher than 
4. A 4% discount rate was used in his calculations. 
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f or university degree-holders. 5 Miller and Volker concluded that 
there was, therefore, a lower relat~ve degree of riskiness attached 
t o the income streams of degree-holders, and that this further 
enhanced the financial attractiveness of higher education as an 
i nvestment. 
The studies reviewed so far demonstrate that from an 
i ndividual's investment perspective, there is considerable risk 
attached to investing in education. What is lacking, however, is a 
f ramework within which these risks can be taken into account and the 
r ates of return (or NPV) adjusted accordingly. Until such a framework 
i s provided, it is difficult to see how these measures of ~iskiness 
c an be used, or indeed, if they are even the appropriate measures, in 
5 . The standard deviations of lifetime incomes for the zero and 
perfect correlation cases are, respectively: 
= 
crzc L., <1t 2 = (l+r)2t 
n 
t=O 
and (j'PC L., <1t = (1-r)t 
n 
I n their calculations, Miller and Volker used the variance of the 
predicted earnings from their regression as an estimate of crt 2 . That 
is , 
crt 2 = s 2 (1 + 1/N + (Xi-X)' (X'X)-1 (xi-X) J ( *) 
where s 2 is the variance of the least squares residuals and N is the 
sample size. Note that for both Year 12 graduates and degree-holders, 
s 2 is restricted to be the same. Since the third term in (*) which 
measures the deviations in the characteristics from the mean is 
small, the restriction implies that crt 2 for the two groups will be 
close to each other. Given the higher mean income for deg~ee-holders, 
it is not surprising, therefore, that Miller and Volker found the 
coefficient of variation for this group to be smaller. 
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-t he sense that the higher the "risk" (as measured by these 
s tatistics) the worse-off risk-averse individuals are, ceteris 
paribus. There are several reasons for this. 
First, what is relevant to individuals in assessing the 
p rofitability of investing in education is the change in income 
variability6 as a result of the additional education. Contrary to 
what Becker [1975 p.184] has claimed, this change may not be 
r eflected by the variation of the gain from the extra education, 
whether it is measured by the rate of return or the net present 
value. To illustrate this, suppose that the income stream of high-
s chool leavers is subject to some variability, but not that of 
degree-holders. Under these circumstances, both the NPV and IRR of 
higher education will show some variability. Note, however, that as 
t he income stream of high-school leavers increases in variability, 
both the NPV and IRR become more variable as well. Yet, it is clear 
t hat higher education has become more, and not less, attractive to 
risk-averse individuals. Hence, rather than becoming more risky as 
t he increased variability of NPV or IRR suggests, higher education 
has become less risky. 
Second, even if the variances of the respective discounted 
lifetime earnings associated with the various levels of education are 
computed separately, there are still problems. The means of the 
discounted lifetime incomes associated with alternative educational 
levels may be different, as is usually the case. Hence, the ordering 
of riskiness may differ, depending on whether the variance or the 
6 . More accurately, it is the change in the variability of 
consumption which matters, as we shall see later. 
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coefficient of variation is used. In the Miller and Volker (l989) 
study, for instance, the standard deviation of discounted lifetime 
income for university graduates is higher than for high-school 
leavers. The coefficient of variation, on the other hand, is lower. 
It is not clear under these circumstances ·which ( if any) of the two 
statistics should be used as a measure of riskiness. 
Thirdly, income streams with present values which have 
identical means and variances may be associated with consumption 
streams which have quite dissimilar variances. As such, risk-averse 
individuals may not necessarily be indifferent between these income 
streams. This will become clearer after the discussion in Section 
5. 3. 
Finally, the use of the variance statistic (or standard 
deviation, or coefficient of variation) as the measure of ris-kiness 
may be questioned. It can be shown that the variance statistic would 
only suffice as a measure of risk under very special conditions, 
namely, that the utility function is quadratic and/or the random 
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r eturns are a linear transformation of spherically distributed random 
vector. 718 
To sum up, the above studies show that there is considerable 
variability in the returns to education. Unfortunately, these studies 
stop short of telling us how this affects the attractiveness of 
education as an investment. This question was taken up by Weiss 
(1972). 
5.2.2 Weiss' Utility Model of Income 
Weiss developed a uti~ity-maximization model which allowed 
risk-adjusted rates of return to education to be calculated. He 
a ssumed that given the level of education, occupation, and type of 
employment, individuals believe that income at each point in the 
future is a random variable drawn from a distribution identical to 
that currently observed in each corresponding age group. This implies 
that individuals' incomes are independently distributed across time, 
and across educational alternatives. In the Weiss model, instead of 
just using the mean of the currently observed income distribution at 
7. This condition is both necessary and sufficient (assuming that the 
utility function is non-quadratic) when there exists a riskless 
asset. In the absence of a riskless asset, the spherically 
distributed random vector is replaced by a random vector in which the 
last n-1 components are spherically distributed conditional on the 
fi rst component, which has an arbitrary distribution. These results 
are proved by Chamberlain (1983). See also Meyer (1987) who 
identifies a restriction on the returns which is sufficient (but not 
necessary) to -ensure that the mean-variance approach is consistent 
with expected utility maximization. Meyer argues that this 
res triction, in contrast to others, such as requiring the returns to 
be normally distributed, holds in many economic models. 
8. For "small'' risks, Pratt (1964) has shown that the variance may 
be used as an approximate measure of riskiness. This property is used 
. in later sections. 
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every age to predict their future incomes, as we have assumed in 
Chapter 3, individuals use all the available information in the 
distribution. 
The income distribution within each alternative is assumed at 
each age, to be log-normal. That is, 
Individuals seek to maximize their expected utilities, which 
as sumed to be of the form: 
E { 
T 
dt} EU - f e-rt V (Yt) 
to 
where r is the individual's subjective discount rate. 
The problem is further simplified by assuming that: 
V(Yt) = 
Ytl-a 
1-a 
where a is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
The objective function can, therefore, be expressed as: 
T 
EU = f e~rt ( Yt~ (ct2 + 1) (B2-B) /2) dt 
ta 
where B = 1-a; 
Ct is the coefficient of variation at time t. 
Weiss then defined the rate of return as the subjective 
discount rate at which the individual was indifferent between 
is 
acquiring and not acquiring the additional education. Note that if 
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i ndividuals are risk-neutral (i.e. a=0), the objective function 
r educes to Je-rty~ dt, which is simply the discounted lifetime 
i ncome. The rate of return is then the rate which equates the 
discounted cash flows associated with the two alternative educationa l 
l evels, just as in the certainty case presented in Chapter 3. For 
risk-averse individuals (a>0), Bis less than zero. A mean-preserving 
i ncrease in Ct, the coefficient of variation of the income 
d istribution at time t, reduces the expected utility of the income 
s tream, reflecting their distaste for uncertainty. 
Using data on the earnings of scientists in the United States 
f rom the 1966 National Register of Scientific and Technical 
Personnel, Weiss computed the rates of return to a doctorate degree 
by type of employment and degree of risk-aversion. His results showed 
t hat even small increases in the degree of risk-aversion would reduce 
t he rates of return quite substantially. In all cases, the rate of 
r eturn fell below zero with a coefficient of relative risk-aversion 
of just 0.8. 9 The most dramatic case was for those employed in 
educational institutions. There, the rates fell from 15.6% to less 
t han zero as the coefficient of risk aversion increased from O (risk-
neutral) to 0.8. 
One puzzling aspect of Weiss' results is that the coefficient 
of variation of income is lower, at each age, for the more highly 
educated. In other words, education is apparently risk-reducing. That 
being the case, one would expect the rate of return to education to 
9 . Barsky et al. (1986) report that recent studies have found that, 
empirically, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is around 3. 
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rise as the degree of risk-aversion increases, opposite to what his 
results show. Weiss explained that this paradoxical result was due to 
the fact that an increase in the degree of risk-aversion had two 
opposing effects on the rate of return. First, an increase in a, the 
coefficient of risk-aversion increased th~ concavity of V(.) which, 
in turn, increased the rate at which the marginal utility of income 
dec lined. Hence, the increment in future incomes due to additional 
education would be given less weight in utility terms. Coupled with 
this, the sacrifice of current income was also made more "costly". 
The result was a decline in the rate of return to education. On the 
other hand, an increase in the degree of risk-aversion also meant 
that the risk-reducing aspect of education was given a higher weight, 
which would have the effect of raising the rate of return. His 
results indicated that, empirically, the first effect dominated. 
Weiss' study has been severely criticized by Hause (1974), who 
noted that Weiss' main finding of moderate degrees of risk-aversion 
substantially reducing the rates of return, was caused by the 
'foreseen absence of earnings while attending school', and had 
nothing to do with risk. The root of the problem was traced to Weiss' 
fo rmulation of the objective function for the consumer, which Hause 
desc ribed as being 'anti-Fisherian with a vengeance'. He pointed out 
that if one accepted the view that utility was derived from 
consumption, and not from income directly, then Weiss' objective 
function could only be justified if intertemporal shifts in 
consumption th~ough borrowing and saving were not possible. The 
implication of this is that, between two certain income streams with 
the same present value, one of which has the same income in every 
period, and the other having low incomes in the beginning and high 
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i ncomes in later periods, risk-averse individuals would prefer the 
f ormer. Furthermore, the higher the degree of risk-aversion, the 
s tronger the preference for the former. This follows directly from 
t he assumed diminishing marginal utility of income at each point in 
t ime, and has nothing to do with risk. It was this, together with the 
a ssumption of zero income while studying, which led to Weiss' 
conclusion. 
Hause (p.804) argued that: 
"Diminishing marginal utility of income was introduced in 
the expected utility hypothesis of von Neumann-
Morgenstern to characterize risk aversion. It is 
technically misleading to conclude that the assumption of 
risk aversion necessarily implies anything about 
intertemporal preferences under certainty. This 
unsatisfactory formulation is obvious if we consider an 
individual with "risk preference" (by considering -l<a<O 
... ). In this case, the maximand ... implies that of all 
certain income profiles with the same present value, the 
least desirable is a constant income over time, and the 
most desirable streams are those concentrated at one 
point (or period) of time." 
He concluded that Weiss' formulation was, therefore, 'theoretically 
i nappropriate for dealing with the problem at hand', and that his 
main empirical finding was unjustified. 10 
10. The difficulty of separating intertemporal substitution and risk-
aversions in utility functions such as that used by Weiss is the 
motivation behind the recent studies by Epstein and Zin (1987a, 
1987b) who developed two classes of utility functions each of which 
has the attractive feature of allowing the two parameters 
(coefficient of risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution) to 
be clearly separated. 
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5.2.3 Two-Period Consumption Models 
The two-period model developed by Levhari and Weiss (1974) 
overcomes some of the problems inherent in the Weiss model. In 
particular, the utility function is defined explicitly on 
c onsumption, and individuals are permitted to transfer income across 
time periods by borrowing and lending. 1 1 Individuals are assumed to 
obey the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and seek to maximize expected 
utilities. 
Apart from lending, individuals can also transfer income to 
period 2 by investing in human capital. These investments are assumed 
t o be time-consuming, and reduce the amount of time available for 
work in the first period. The proportion of time devoted to investing 
i n human capital in the first period is denoted by p (O<p<l). 
Earnings in the second period, Y2 , depend on p, and the (unknown) 
s tate of the world,µ: 
Y2 = f(p,µ) 
whereµ is a random variable with a known distribution. 
Finally, individuals are assumed to have no desire to leave 
bequests. The individual optimization problem can, therefore, be 
written as: 
11 . Levhari and Weiss interpret the interest rate as the return on 
physical capital. This is somewhat misleading since the interest rate 
i s assumed to be known with certainty, implying that investments in 
physical capital are riskless. It is more appropriate to treat t h e 
interest rate simply as the rate at which one can borrow and lend i n 
a perfect capital market. 
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u'>O; u"<O 
subject to: 
Y2 = f(p,µ) 
where Y1 = potential earnings in the . first period; 
A= individual's initial wealth; and 
r = riskless rate of interest. 
Y1, A and rare all assumed to be known, and exogenous to the 
i ndividual. An interior solution to the optimisation problem is 
a ssumed to be attained. 
The major conclusions from Levhari and Weiss' comparative 
s tatics exercise using this simple two-period model are that: 1) the 
e ffect of increased risk on investment in human capital is in 
general, ambiguous; 2) an increase in initial wealth encourages 
i nvestment, if risk increases with p (i.e. fpµ>O), and the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth; 3) an 
i ncrease in the rate of interest discourages investment in human 
capital if the individual is a borrower, and had an ambiguous effect 
i f the individual is a lender. 
Extensions to the Levhari and Weiss model were made by Eaton 
and Rosen (1980) for taxation and endogenous labour supply, and by 
Pa roush (1976) for interest rate uncertainty. Kodde (1986) attempted 
to test the Levhari and Weiss model empirically using the data he 
c o l lected on a _sample of high-school graduates which contained 
i nformation of their expectations of incomes (with and without 
f urther education), as well as their decisions on whether to pursue 
fu rther education. Kodde found that parental income (as a proxy f or 
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wealth) increased the probability of pursuing further education. 
Expected foregone earnings, on the other hand, had a negative effect, 
indicating that the substitution effect dominated the income effect. 
There is some difficulty, however, in interpreting the effect of an 
increase in the perceived riskiness of future income on the demand 
for education. This is, in part, due to the rather crude measures 
used to capture uncertainty (individuals' estimates of their highest 
and lowest possible levels of future earnings). 
This criticism notwithstanding, Kodde's study represents an 
important first step towards the empirical application of uncertainty 
models of human capital investment. A significant drawback in Kodde's 
approach, however, is that it does not yield estimates of the 
profitability of education which are easily interpretable. Moreover, 
fo r empirical applications, it is desirable to extend beyond the 
simple two-period model into one in which both the investment in 
human capital and the returns to these investments are distributed 
over time. An additional dimension of the uncertainty in human 
capital investment can be incorporated by allowing the opportunity 
cost of investment (Y1 in the two-period model) to be subject to 
uncertainty as well. 
These modifications are considered in the model to be presented 
in the following section. Our objective there, is to develop a simple 
framework whereby the risks associated with investment in higher 
education can be readily incorporated into conventional measures of 
profitability, such as the NPV. 
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5.3 Intertemporal Consumption under Uncertainty 
In this section, we present a simple two-step procedure to 
adjust higher education returns for uncertainty. The strategy i s, 
f irst, to convert the uncertain income streams associated with the 
t wo alternative educational levels into their respective certainty-
equivalent streams. We can then apply the standard NPV techniques 
employed in the previous chapters to these certainty-equivalent 
i ncome streams. 
The idea behind the two-step procedure is not new; it is a 
s tandard technique for dealing with uncertainty in Cost-Benefit 
analysis (see Stiglitz (1988) p.270-271, for example) . 12 
Unfortunately, the literature on Cost-Benefit analysis is rather 
vague on how one should convert the uncertain income streams into 
their respective ce~tainty equivalents. This has led Mishan [1982, 
p. 365], for instance, to complain that: 
"This notion of uncertainty equivalence is, perhaps, a 
useful ploy in working through abstract economic 
constructs where the troublesome fact of uncertainty can 
be formally accommodated without any amendment to the 
theory, simply by attributing a certainty equivalent to 
every uncertain magnitude. But it provides little 
guidance to the economist engaged in evaluating a 
project .... The knowledge that some rational being, when 
faced with the problem of placing a value on some future 
magnitude, might well choose a value very different from 
that chosen by another equally rational individual, may 
be of some consolation to him in his perplexity. But it 
cannot provide him with a clear decision rule" 
The novelty of our contribution lies in the use of an 
intertemporal-optimization model of individual consumption, which i s 
12 . I am grateful to Paul Miller for bringing this to my attention. 
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d rawn from the Permanent Income and Life-Cycle Consurr~tion literature 
[see, for example, Hall (1978), Deaton (1987)], to derive the risk-
premiums associated with alternative (uncertain) income st~eams, and 
f rom these, the respective certainty-equivalent streams. The 
r esulting framework is one which is theoretically appealing, and 
which can be readily understood. As well, it is sufficiently flexible 
to allow for variations such as the incorporation of the risk of 
f ailure in university, and for a wide range of policy issues to be 
examined (see Chapters 6 and 7). A further advantage of our framework 
is that the results generated are straight-forward to interpret. 
The first step requires the setting up of a utility mcdel in 
which individuals' perceptions and attitudes to risk can be 
considered. For this purpose, a multi-period model of intertemporal 
consumption under uncertainty is specified. As in the Levhari and 
Weiss model, we assume that the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms hold, 
so that individuals seek to maximize expected utilities. To simplify 
the problem, we assume that the utility in any period depends only on 
that period's consumption. Again, as in the Levhari and Weiss model, 
we assume also that individuals can borrow and lend at the market 
interest rater, and that they have no desire to leave bequests. 
Individuals determine each period's consumption after that period's 
income is known. 
The optimization problem at the beginning of period t may be 
expressed as: 
Max 
Ct 
subject to: 
T-t 
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{
T-t } 
Et L ( 1 + 8) -'t U ( Ct +·d 
't=O 
I, ( 1 + r) -'t ( Ct +'t - y t +'t) = Bt 
't=O 
where Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on all 
information available at the beginning of period t; 
Bt is the bank balance at the start of period t; 
Yt is the income in period t; and 
8 is the individual's subjective discount rate. 
Note that this is exactly the same model as that used by Hall 
(1978) in his investigation of the permanent-income hypothesis. Hall 
proved that given this optimization problem, individuals would 
arrange their consumption pattern such that: 
= 
i s satisfied at every t. 
( 5 . 1) 
To simplify the problem even further, we assume that 8 = r. 13 If 
t he utility function is quadratic, of the form: 
t hen, (5.1) reduces to: 
( 5. 2) 
13. This simplification is also made in the consumption model of Hall 
and Mishkin (1982), and is statistically consistent with the 
empirical evidence in Hall (1978). 
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For other utility functions, (5.2) is a first-order approximation of 
(5.1) _14 , 15 
Given that individuals do not intend to leave any bequest, 
consumption in the terminal period is: 
At the start of the penultimate period (t=T-1), BT-land YT- l are 
known, and the individual chooses CT-l in accordance with (5.2). That 
is , 
= (BT-1 + YT-1 - CT-1) (l+r) + ET-1(YT) 
= [ 1 + (l+r)] -l [ (BT-1 + YT-1) (l+r) + ET-1 (YT)] 
In the period t=T-2, CT-2 is chosen such that CT-2 = ET-2 (CT-1) . 
ET-2 (CT-1) = {l + (l+r) }-1 ET-2{ (BT-1 + YT-1) (l+r) + ET-1 (YT)} 
Applying the rule that Et[Et+i(.)] = Et(.), 16 
CT-2 = {l + (l+r) + (l+r) 2 }-l { (BT-2 + YT-2) (l+r) 2 + 
ET-2 (YT-1) (l+r) + ET-2 (YT)} 
14 . Et U' (Ct+ 1) ::= Et [ U' (Ct) + U" (Ct) . (Ct+ 1 -Ct) ] . 
Thus, (5.1) => U"(Ct) .Et(Ct+l - Ct) ::= 0 =>Ct::= Et(Ct+l). 
15. Note that this consumption rule demonstrates the property of 
"certainty equivalence" i.e. expected consumption depends solely on 
the expected values of future incomes, and are not affected by their 
va riability. This does not, however, imply that individuals are 
necessarily indifferent to changes in income variability, since they 
affect the variability of their consumption. 
16. This follows directly from the definition of Et. 
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By repeated substitutions, we have 
T 
Ct = Gt. { (Bt + Yt) (l+r) T- t + I (l+r) T- i Et (Yi ) } 
i =t +l 
where Gt = {1 + (l+r) + (l+r) 2 + 
r 
= ( l+r) T-t +l - 1 
( 5. 3) 
The consumption rule given in (5.3) is intuitively appealing. 
At the start of period t, Yt and Bt are known. In addition, the 
i ndividual has some expectation as to how much income he or she would 
r eceive in the next T-t periods. The individual wants to spread 
consumption evenly over time. Based on the amount currently at his or 
her disposal (Yt + Bt) and expected future incomes, the individual 
computes the constant amount (given the assumption that the 
i ndividual's discount rate is equal to the market rate of interest, 
i .e. o = r) he or she can afford to consume in the current, and in 
e ach of the future periods. This constant amount is, precisely, the 
expression ·on the right-hand side of (5.3). 
The cost of the uncertainty in future consumption at times, 
c an be measured by means of an annual risk premium, p, which 
satisfies: 1 7 
T T 
L ( 1 +8) s -t U ( Es ( Ct ) - p ) = L ( 1 +8) s-t Es U (Ct ) ( 5 • 4) 
t=s +l t=s+l 
Note that E5 (Ct ) is a constant fort= s+l,s+2, ... ,T, and will be 
denoted by~- By definition, individuals are willing to pay up to $p 
in each of the future periods to obtain the certain consumption 
17. This follows the derivation in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981). 
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st ream {C,C, .. . ,C}, instead of the uncertain consumption stream 
{Cs+1 ,Cs +2 , ... ,CT} . It follows from this, that individuals would be 
indifferent between receiving the certain income stream {E 5 (Y5 +1>-p, 
E5 (Y 5 +2>-p, ... , E5 (YT)-p} and the uncertain income stream 
{Ys+i ,Ys+2, ... ,YT}. We call the former income stream, the "certainty-
equivalent" income stream. 
For "small risks", 18 we can use the Taylor's series expansion 
to approximate each term in (5.4) by: 
U(E 5 (Ct) - p) ~ U(~) - p.U' (~); and 
where A(C) = -U"(C)/U' (C) is the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion . 
Hence, 
1 2 A(~) 
p -
T 
(l+O) s-tEs ( var (Ct)) 
t=s+l 
T 
L (l+O) s-t 
t=s+l 
( 5. 5) 
We now have a way in which uncertain income streams associated 
with alternative educational levels can be transformed into their 
certainty-equivalents. These can then be treated as if they are 
actual riskless income streams for the alternative levels of 
education, allowing the NPV to be computed. 20 The IRR can also be 
18 . See Pratt (1964). 
19. This is an exact result for the quadratic utility function. 
20. It is important to note that the certainty-equivalent profiles 
are functions of the individual's discount rate. For internal 
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derived, 21 and compared with the individual's discount rate which, in 
this case, is equal to the rate of return on riskless assets. 22 For 
reasons which will be given later, however, interpretation of the IRR 
c an be rather difficult. Hence, only the NPV results are given in the 
next section. 
Earlier~ in Section 5.2.1, we stated that the variances of 
di scounted lifetime incomes may be misleading indicators of their 
r elative riskiness. We claimed that individuals may not be 
indifferent between two alternative income streams with present 
values which have identical means and variances. This can be easily 
demonstrated using the model developed above, and is shown in 
Appendix 5.1. 
consistency, the NPV must also be calculated using this same discount 
rate. 
21. The computation of the IRR is more complicated than simply 
finding the discount rate which equates the present values of the 
alternative certainty-equivalent profiles because these certainty 
profiles are themselves functions of the discount rate. 
22 . In Chapter 3, we compared the IRR with the return an individual 
can obtain 'by investing in the market portfolio'. The assumption 
implicit in this procedure is, of course, that investment in 
education is 'similar in risk' to investment in the market portfolio. 
Without formally modelling risk and its impact on individuals, 
however, it is difficult to see what 'similar in risk' means. 
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5.4 Empirical Estimation 
5. 4. 1 Data and Method of Estimation 
As in the previous chapters, the data are drawn from the 
1985/85 Income and Housing Survey. We restrict our sample to full-
time-full-year male workers with positive earned incomes in 1985/86, 
so as to abstract from income variation arising from differences in 
hours worked. 23 
Following Lillard and Willis (1978), the earnings function is 
specified as: 
where 
i = 1, ... ,N; t = 1, ... ,T; ( 5 . 6) 
Yit is the natural logarithm of annual earnings of the ith 
person in the tth year; and 
Xit contains the usual human capital variables. 24 
Lillard and Willis assume that the error term is made up of an 
"individual-specific" component (Oi) and a "stochastic" component 
(Yit) . 25 They allow for serial correlation in the latter component, 26 
of the form: 
23. The difficulties involved in the treatment of differences in the 
number of hours worked have been explored in Part I of the thesis. 
24. In the original Lillard and Willis model, time dummies crt) have 
also been included to capture the combined effect of time-varying 
macroeconomic variables such as productivity changes, and market 
conditions. Since our data consist of only a single cross-section of 
individuals, r~ is omitted. Hence, the uncertainty considered in this 
chapter is restricted to the uncertainty in a given market situation. 
To the extent that the incomes of degree-holders are less sensitive 
to the fluctuations of the business cycle (see Oi (1962) for 
example), higher education would tend to be more attractive to risk-
averse individuals than our figures would suggest. 
25. Lillard and Willis refer to them as "permanent" and "transitory" 
components. We have chosen not to use their terminology since the 
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Vit = 'YVi t-1 + 11 i t ( 5 . 7) 
where y is the serial correlation coefficient common to all 
i ndividuals, and 1lit is a purely random component (- NID(O,cr~ 2 ). The 
variates oi, 1l i t are assumed to be independent of each other and of 
In this chapter, it is assumed that individuals attribute all 
t he observed variability in income to the "stochastic" component, and 
believe that their future (uncertain) incomes will be the same as 
t hat currently received by individuals with the corresponding 
educational qualifications in the cross-section. Initially we also 
assume that the stochastic component is serially independent (i.e. 
y=O). This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5.6. 
Individuals are assumed to know their life-span with complete 
certainty (assumed here to be 60), and not to retire from the work-
f orce before then. In all calculations, it is assumed that net 
e arnings whilst studying (earnings less course-related costs) is 
known with complete certainty, and amounts to $980 per year. In 
Section 5.4.2, we ignore the risks arising from the uncertainty with 
s econd component may well have "permanent" effects. For instance, an 
i ncome shock resulting from an incapacitating accident may cause an 
i ndividual's income to be lower in the current, and all future 
periods. Less dramatically, some authors have argued that 
unemployment may have permanent "scarring" effects on an individual's 
f uture earnings. See, for example, Miller and Volker (1987). 
2 6. Lillard and Willis suggest that the serial correlation term may 
be interpreted in two ways. First, it reflects the effect of random 
s hocks which last for more than one year, but deteriorates over time 
(the rate of deterioration being determined by y). Second, it 
r eflects the effect of (unobserved) individual-specific 
characteristics which change slowly through time. 
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r espect to the time required for completion and the risk of non-
completion, and focus our attention on the variability of the income 
p rofiles related to the alternative levels of education. The risk of 
failure will be introduced into the model in Section 5.4.3. 
It is assumed that within each educational qroup, k, 
individuals' earnings are generated by the following earnings 
function: 
( 5. 8) 
where ak,bk,ck are parameters; and 
Uki is a random disturbance term which is independently 
and identically distributed across individuals within 
each educational group. 
Ordinary Least Squares techniques are used to estimate this 
relationship. For simplicity, we assume that uk i is normally 
distributed. 27 From each of the regressions, the variance of the 
r esiduals sk 2 is obtained. A particular realization of the earnings 
for an individual, aged j, with educational level k is given by: 
Y j , = exp ( a'k + }j'k j + c'k j 2 + e j , ) 
e j , is a residual randomly drawn from the normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance, sk 2 . 
The after-tax amount is obtained by applying the marginal tax-
rates operating in 1985-86 to Yj, . 28 By repeated sampling, the 
27 . The importance of this distributional assumption, as well as the 
pa rticular functional form used in the above specification are 
examined in Appendix 5.2. 
28 . For simplicity, no allowance for rebates and tax deductions is 
made in the application of the tax rates. From here on, unless 
otherwise stated, all references to earnings and income are to be 
taken as the post-tax amounts. 
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distribution of income at each age, and for each educational 
alternative, is thereby generated. 
The life-time consumption pattern corresponding to any 
particular sequence of life-time realizations in earnings can be 
computed by sequentially applying the consumption rule in Equation 
(5.3), and updating the following period's wealth. In the decision of 
whether to proceed to university, we are interested only in the 
income and consumption streams from the age of 19 (assuming that the 
individual finishes high-school at 18). Let the sequence of life-time 
realizations -in earnings for a particular individual be 
{Y19",Y20", ... ,Y6o"}. Given the starting wealth, B19, and the 
individual's realized income for that year, Y19", the consumption for 
the period, c19", is determined using (5.3) . 29 The individual's wealth 
at the start of the following year, 
can be computed once C19" is chosen. c20 " is then determined, given 
Y20", and so on, until the entire consumption sequence of 
{C19",C20", ... ,C6o"} is obtained. 
A large number (5000) of these sequences of life-time 
reali zations in earnings is generated for each educational group by 
independently sampling from the income distribution of the respective 
educational groups, at each age. The corresponding sequences of life-
time consumption are then computed as in the above illustration. 
Subsequently, the variance of consumption at each age, var(Ct), which 
29. Note that Y20", Y21" ... YT" are not known at this point. 
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i s required in the computation of the risk premium, is calculated for 
each of the educational groups. 
5.4.2 Empirical Results 
Table 5.1 presents the regression results for both degree-
ho lders and high-school leavers. The predicted age-earnings profiles 
of the two educational groups are shown in Figure 5.1. 
TABLE 5,1; ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS IN EARNINGS FUNCTIONS* 
variable 
AGE 
AGE2 
CONSTANT 
s2 
no. obs. 
degree-holders 
0 . 72802 X 10-1 
(3. 66) 
-0. 72886 X 10-3 
(3.03) 
8.6451 
(21. 84) 
0.0585 
0.32525 
527 
* absolute t-statistics in parenthesis 
high-school 
0. 67676 X 10-l 
(4.87) 
-0.74530 X 10-3 
(4.05) 
8.5205 
(34.85) 
0.0740 
0.32986 
559 
Comparing the earnings profiles in Figure 5.1 to those in 
Figure 3.6 where linear interpolation of the mean incomes in each 5-
year age interval was used to construct the profiles, we note that 
the semi-logarithmic-quadratic earnings function popularized by 
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Mincer (1974) 3 0 replicates the mean age-earnings profiles fairlywell. 
Thi s increases our confidence in using such a simple specification 
fo r our model. Both the profiles in Figure 5.1 display features 
t ypical of Mincer-type earnings functions. That is, each of the 
profiles initially rise with age, reaching· a peak and then 
subsequently declining as age increases. The earnings profile for 
degree-holders is generally steeper, and reaches a peak at a later 
age than the profile for high-school leavers (54 compared with 45). 
Bearing in mind that the dependent variable in the regression 
i s in logarithmic form, and that the mean earnings-profile of degree-
holders is almost everywhere higher than that of high-school leavers, 
it is quite possible for the variance of earnings (in levels) to be 
greater for degree-holders compared to high-school leavers, despite 
the variance of the residuals (s 2 ) being smaller for the forme= 
group. 31 Table 5.2, which shows the standard deviations of income for 
each of the two educational groups at selected ages, confirms that 
this is indeed the case. The figures are estimated from the income 
distributions generated using the procedure outlined in the previous 
sub-section. For the ages presented, other than at age 20, the 
standard deviation of the earnings (in levels) of university 
30. Our functional form differs slightly from that of Mincer in two 
aspects. First, we allow the slopes of the earnings profiles to 
differ across educational groups. This, as Psacharopoulos and Layard 
(1979) argue, is more consistent with the theory. Secondly, we have 
used age and age 2 instead of experience and experience2 as proposed 
by Mincer. However, since we do not have a direct measure of labour 
market experience, the use of a constructed potential experience 
variable (age-years of schooling-5) is the same as using the age 
variable itself. 
31. Statistically, this difference is insignificant at the 5% level. 
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graduates is greater than that of high-school leavers, and quite 
substantially so. 
Also shown in Table 5.2 are the standard deviations of 
consumption obtained from the simulation exercise outlined in Section 
5. 4.1. The real rate of interest is assumed to be 5% in the 
calculations. 
IASLE s I 2 : SIAND8RD l2EVIAIIQN Qf (fQSI-IA~) E8RNEl2 ItICQI:=lE AND 
CQNSUMfIIQN AI SEL1::CIEI2 AGES SJ: EQUCAIIQtl 
DEGREE-HOLDERS HIGH-SCHOOL LEAVERS 
AGE SD (Ct) SD(Yt) SD (Ct) SD (Yt) 
20 0 0 480 6450 
25 830 8150 980 7080 
30 1440 8860 1390 7710 
35 1990 10050 1770 8270 
40 2550 10440 2190 8570 
45 3270 11380 2720 8420 
50 4180 11620 3360 8380 
55 5580 11030 4430 8150 
60 13940 10260 10540 7700 
The most striking feature of Table 5.2 is how much smaller the 
variation in consumption is, compared to the variation in income 
(with the exception of the final period). This is, of course, due to 
the ability of individuals to smooth their consumption over time by 
borrowing and lending. It is evident from these figures that the cost 
of uncertainty to individuals is considerably less than what the size 
of income fluctuations suggests. This is another reason why it is 
important to develop a model where utility is derived from 
consumption, rather than from income, such as in the Weiss (1972) 
mode l. 
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In the calculations presented below, the utility function is 
a ssumed to be of the form: 32 
U (C) { 
cl-a 
1-a 
= 
ln (C) 
a ;;:: 1 
a = 1 
This specification is characterized by its constant relative risk 
aversion, R(C) = a. 33 Note, however, that A' (C) < 0. That is, the 
coefficient of absolute risk-aversion decreases with C. 
( 5. 9) 
In the calculation of the risk premium, 34 the coefficient of 
absolute risk-aversion, A(C), is evaluated at~, the level expected 
annual consumption, which is a function of the interest rate, the 
32. Results for two other specifications of the utility function --
t he constant A(C) Utility Function and the Quadratic Utility Function 
a re reported in Appendix 5.2. 
33. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined by 
R (C)=-CU"(C)/U"(C). Note that it is trivially related to the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion, A(C) by: C.A(C)=R(C). 
34. The point of this whole exercise is to convert the uncertain 
i ncome streams associated with the alternative levels of education 
i nto their respective certainty equivalents so that the profitability 
of higher education may be assessed at the time when students are 
decidinq whether to enrol in university. Hence, the risk premium is 
calculated based on the information at that time i.e. s=l8 in (5.5). 
From here on, the risk premium and the expected annual consumption 
l evel are both to be understood as the values applying at the time 
when the decision whether to enrol is being made. That is, 
p 
t=l 9, 2 0, ... , 6 0; and 
60 
t A(~) 1 (1+8) lB-tE1s ( var (Ct)) 
t=l9 
60 
1 (1+8) 18-t 
t= l 9 
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i nitial wealth, and the expected future income stream. The last of 
t hese is, in turn, a function of the individual's educational level. 
Hence, the values of A(C) used in the calculation of the risk 
p remiums associated with the different educational levels will, in 
general, be different. Only in the unlikely case that C is identical 
between the alternative educational levels, will the value of A(C) be 
the same. 
Let Cct and Ch denote the expected annual consumption associated 
with the uncertain income streams of degree-holders and high-school 
leavers, respectively. Given the coefficient of relative risk-
aversion, R(C), both A(Cct) and A(Ch) can be easily derived: 
A(Cct) = R(C)/Cct; 
Table 5.3 presents the risk premiums to the two alternative 
uncertain income streams, and the private NPV to higher education at 
various values of R. The interest rate is assumed to be 5%, and 
individual's initial wealth (i.e. at the completion of high-school) 
is set at zero. 
TABLE 5,3; RISK PREMIUMS (PER ANNUM) AND PRIVATE NPV OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
R(C) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
RISK PREMIUM 
Degree 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
High-School 
0 
150 
300 
450 
600 
750 
NPV 
31480 
30580 
29680 
28780 
27880 
26980 
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The interpretation of the figures in the table i s extremely 
st raight-forward. As an illustration, consider an individual with a 
coefficient of relative risk-aversion of 3. As noted earlier, 3 is 
t he figure typically found in studies of the permanent-income 
hypothesis. If the individual were to attend university, he or she 
would receive an uncertain amount in each period of her working life, 
drawn from the income distribution of degree-holders at each 
corresponding age. Instead of this uncertain income stream, the 
individual would be willing to give up $600 each year (or $10,500 
upfront) 35 in exchange for receiving the mean of the income 
distribution at each age with complete certainty. In other words, the 
present value of the lifetime income stream associated with a degree 
would be worth $10,500 less because of the uncertainty attached to 
it . 
On the other hand, if the individual were to decide not to 
proceed to university, he or she would receive in each period an 
uncertain amount drawn from the income distribution of high-school 
l eavers of the corresponding age. The amount the individual would be 
wil ling to give up in exchange for the mean of the distribution in 
each period with complete certainty is $450 per annum (or $7,800 
upfront at 5% discount rate). The present value of the income stream 
as sociated with this option would be worth $7,800 less to this 
individual because of the uncertainty. The private NPV of investing 
in higher education would, therefore, be $(10,500 - 7,800) = $2,7 00 
less because .of the additional risk associated with having a degree. 
35 . This is the present value of an annuity of $600 at 5 % interest 
rate for 42 years (i.e. age 19 to 60). 
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Hence, the NPV falls from $31,480 in the risk-neutral case (R=0) to 
$28,780 -- a fall of $2,700 -- when the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion is 3. 
Not surprisingly, the magnitudes of the risk premiums are quite 
small. Even for relatively more risk-averse individuals (R=S), the 
risk premium does not exceed $1,000 per annum (or $17,500 upfront). 
This is a direct result of the ability of individuals to reduce the 
variability in their consumption by borrowing in "bad" years, and 
saving during "good" ones. The difference in the risk premiums 
between the uncertain income streams of high-school leavers and 
university graduates is even smaller, varying from Oto $250 per year 
fo r the range of R considered. Consequently, the risk-adjusted 
private NPV is not very different to the unadjusted one. 36 Using the 
moderate figure of R=3, the adjusted NPV is about 8.5% less than the 
unadjusted NPV. Our earlier conclusion that higher education is a 
highly profitable private investment to individuals remains 
unaltered. 
5.4.3 Risk of Failure 
Students embarking on higher education face the risks of 
dropping out and/or taking longer than the minimum required time to 
complete their courses. We refer to these risks, generally, as the 
ris k of failure. Conceptually, the decision whether to drop-out, or 
to repeat, in the event of failing a part of the course, is 
endogenous. lt depends on their degree of risk aversion, and their 
36 . Note that the NPV when the individual is risk-neutral (i.e. R=0) 
is exactly equal_ to the unadjusted NPV. 
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perception of a whole series of conditional probabilities such as t he 
p robability of failing a second time, given that they have fai l ed 
once, the probability of failing some other parts of the course , 
g iven the failure and subsequent passing of the first part, and so 
on. Detailed data on students' progression· through higher education 
i s, unfortunately, not available. Hence, the decision whether to 
r epeat or drop-out is assumed to be exogenous. We assume that of 
every 1000 students commencing higher education, 175 drop out at the 
e nd of their first year, 495 complete their courses in the minimum 
t ime required (3.5 years), and the remaining 330 take 6 years to 
c omplete. Hence, of the 82.5% who eventually graduate, only 60% of 
t hese complete in minimum time. 37 Figure 5.2 provides a flow-diagram 
of the expected progression through higher education of a typical 
cohort. 
37. As cited earlier, the William's Committee estimated that 56.7 % 
finished their courses in the minimum time required. The drop-out 
rate of 17.5% is derived from the figures in West et al. (1986) for 
fu ll-time university students. 
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FIGURE S.2: FLOW-DIAGRAt1 OF PROGRESSION THROUGH UICTlERSITY 
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Students are assumed to use these probabilities in their 
calculation of the returns to higher education. Further, those who 
remain after the end of first year are assumed not to know if they 
wi ll complete their degrees in the minimum time required, until the 
end of that time period. After that, those still remaining know with 
certainty that it will take them 6 years to finish their degrees. We 
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assume that university drop-outs have the same earnings as high-
s chool leavers of the same age, 38 and that graduates who take 6 years 
t o complete their degrees are paid similarly to those who took only 
3 .5 years. 39 
The addition of the risk of failure to the model introduces a 
f urther complication to the computation of the risk premium. In the 
p revious case (Section 5.4.2), no additional information on future 
i ncomes is available until it is actually revealed. That is, 
for all i,j < t 
Hence, the expectation in period 1 of, say, the income in period 40, 
i s exactly the same as the expectation in period 2, period 3, and so 
on, up to period 39. In other words, the outcomes of earnings in 
e arlier periods provide no extra information on the outcomes of later 
periods. 
In the present problem, this no longer holds. Prior to the 
c ommencement of their studies, individuals do not know which of the 3 
paths in Figure 5.2 they will be following. The expected income at 
38. Becker (1975) finds that college drop-outs earn more than high-
school leavers of the same age, even after adjustment for abi l ity 
differences. Hence, the years in college, despite the fact that the 
student did not graduate, are not entirely "wasted". Unfortunately , 
t here are no similar studies on the returns to college drop-outs in 
Australia. To the extent that Becker's results carry over to 
Australia, our estimates of the expected returns to higher education 
will be biased downwards, and the riskiness of the h i gher educat i on 
biased upwards. 
39. Again, this assumption is forced upon us by the inadequacy of t h e 
data. It may be preferable to assume that graduates are paid 
according to the number of years in the work-force. In this case, the 
e arnings of those who take longer to graduate will lag behind t h e 
e arnings of similarly-aged graduates who complete the i r degrees in 
the minimum time. This correction is, however, not attempted here. 
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age 30, say, is then a weighted average of the expected incomes of 30 
year-old high-school leavers and degree-holders: 
where Y3od = income of 30 year-old degree-holde=s; 
Y3oh = income of 30 year-old high-school leavers; 
q = probability of following path 1; and 
E1s ( ·) = Mathematical expectation using all information 
available at age 18. 
By the end of their first year in university, however, individuals 
will know for certain whether they will be proceeding along path 1 on 
the one hand, or paths 2 and 3 on the other. Hence, their expectation 
of the income they will receive in their thirtieth year is either 
In general, 
Ei (Yt) = ql .E (Y1,t) + q2 .E (Y2,t) 
+ ( 1-ql-q2) . E ( Y 3, t) 
OR 
q2 q3 
= q2+q3 E (Y2,t) + q2+q3 E (Y3,t) 
OR 
= 
OR 
= 
i<19; t>i; 
i=l9,20,21;,t>i; 
i>21; t>i. 
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where ql,q2,q3 are the probabilities of t h e ~ndividual 
following paths 1,2 and 3 respectively; 
Yj , t denotes the income at age t for individuals 
following path j; and 
The variance of consumption for each - of the three paths is 
calculated as in Section 5.4.2. Individuals are uncertain, at the 
time the decision whether to enrol in higher education is made, as to 
which path they will be proceeding along if they decide to enrol in 
university. Hence, the consumption stream corresponding to the choice 
o f going to university is, in effect, a gamble with the uncertain 
consumption streams corresponding to each of the paths as outcomes. 
Denote the mean and variance of the consumption in period t if the 
i ndividual were to follow path i (i=l,2,3), respectively, by C1,t and 
var(Ci,t). Then the variance of consumption associated with the 
choice of attending university is given by: 
var(Ct ) = ql.var(C1,t) + q2.var(C2,t) + q3.var(Ct ,3) 
+ ql. [ (1-ql) (C1,t-C3,t) 
+ q2. [ (1-q2) (C2,t-C3,t) 
The variance of the consumption stream corresponding to the 
uncertain income stream of high-school leavers is t h e same as in 
Section 5.4.2. The risk premiums and the private NPV of higher 
education for various degrees of risk-aversion are as calculat ed 
previously, and the results are given in Table 5.4. 
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TABLE 5,4: RISK PREMIUMS <PER ANNUM} AND PRIVATE NPY OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION WITH RISK OF FAILURE 
R(C) RISK PREMIUM NPV 
Degree High-School 
0 0 0 13180 
1 230 150 11720 
2 470 300 10260 
3 700 450 8800 
4 940 600 7340 
5 1170 750 5880 
The figur~s in Table 5.4 show that the introduction of the risk 
of failure reduces the expected (or unadjusted) NPV substantially, to 
about 40% of the value when individuals are assumed to complete their 
courses in the minimum time required. This is because now there is a 
17.5% chance of them dropping out and receiving negative returns on 
their investments. In addition, there is a 33% chance that they will 
take six years to complete their degrees, which lowers their returns 
substantially. 
The risk premiums for high-school leavers are the same as in 
Table 5.3. For those choosing to attend university, the risk premiums 
are higher. 40 Hence, in dollar terms, the adjustment for risk will 
clearly matter more than when the risk of failure is ignored. 
Proportionately, the adjustment is also more important here because 
the unadjusted NPV is much lower. At R=3, the risk-adjustment reduces 
the NPV by more than 33%. For the relatively more risk-averse (R=5), 
40 . The magnitude of the risk premium depends on both the variability 
of consumption and A(~), the coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
evaluated at~, the expected annual consumption level (see equation 
(5 .5)). Inclusion of the risk of failure clearly increases the 
variability of consumption. It also reduces the expected lifetime 
income corresponding to attending university which, in turn, leads to 
a fall in~- As a result, A(~) is larger (since A' (C) < 0). For both 
these reasons, the risk premium corresponding to university 
at tendance increases when the risk of failure is included. 
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t he adjustment for the cost of uncertainty reduces the NPV by more 
t han 55%. 
To sum up, researchers have tended to concentrate on the 
variability of income profiles associated with the different levels 
of education in their examination of the risks in educational 
i nvestment. The risk of failure, which may result in students 
dropping out of college, or taking longer than the minimum time 
r equired to complete their degrees has, so far, been ignored. The 
analysis in this section shows that in the complete certainty 
f ramework, the private NPV of higher education is a sizeable $31,480. 
The adjustment for the uncertainty in future income streams reduces 
t he ex-ante value of higher education to $28,780 (at R=3). With the 
i nclusion of the risk failure this figure falls to only $8,800, or 
l ess than 30% of the value under complete certainty. 41 
In Appendix 5.2, the sensitivity of these results to the 
f ollowing assumptions is examined: a) the specification of the 
Utility Function (5.9); b) the functional form of the earnings 
f unction (5.8); c) the normality of the residuals. It is found that, 
quantitatively, the estimates of the risk premiums and the risk-
adjusted NPV are somewhat sensitive to these assumptions. 
Qualitatively, however, the main conclusions appear to be quite 
r obust. That is, taking into account uncertainty reduces the 
attractiveness of higher education, but for moderately risk-averse 
41. This reduction is caused, both by the rise in risk premium as 
well as the reduction in expected lifetime income associated with 
attending university. 
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i ndividuals, higher education remains an attractive private 
investment. 
5.5 The Effect of 
Profitability 
Wealth and 
of Higher 
Interest 
Education 
Rates on the Private 
In this section, we examine the effects of: 1) a change in the 
interest rate; and b) an increase in the initial wealth, on the 
private NPV to higher education. 
In the certainty case, the rate of interest affects the 
calculation of the NPV only through the discounting process. Assuming 
that the income profile of graduates cross the income profile of 
high-school leavers only once, and from below, the effect of an 
increase in the interest rate is an unambiguous decline in the NPV. 
In the uncertainty case, on the other hand, there is an 
additional mechanism through which the interest rate could enter into 
the NPV calculation, namely, the risk premiums. We noted in Section 
5. 4.2 that in the calculation of the risk premium (p), the 
coefficient of absolute risk-aversion, A(C), is evaluated at C = ~, 
the expected level of annual consumption. We also noted that~ is a 
function of, amongst other things, the interest rate. Now, 
~ = E1s (Ct) t = 19,20, .. ,60 (see footnote 3 4) 
00 
= E 1 8 { Gt . [ B 1 9 ( 1 + r) 4 1 + L (l+r) 60-tEis (Yt)] } (from 5.3) 
t=l9 
00 
= Gt . B 1 9 ( 1 + r ) 4 1 + Gt L (l+r) 60-tE1s (Yt) (5.10) 
t=l9 
By writing the expected level of annual consumption as in 
(5 .10), consumption is separated into two components, one which is 
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due to the individual's initial wealth, and a second which comes f r om 
the capitalized sum of the individual's future earnings. It can 
easily be shown that the first term is an increasing function of the 
i nterest rate. That is, the higher the interest rate, the more 
individuals can afford to consume annually- from their initial wealth. 
The direction in which the second term changes with an increase in 
the interest rate is, however, ambiguous, depending on the time 
pattern of the income stream, as well as the level of the interest 
r ate. The sign of dC/dr is, therefore, ambiguous, and as a result, so 
i s the sign of dA(C)/dr. 
It is clear from the consumption rule (5.3) that the variance 
of consumption in any period is an increasing function of the rate of 
interest. However, the sign of the first derivative of 
T 
L (1+0) 5 -tEs(var(Ct)) 
t=s +l 
T 
L ( l+O) s-t 
t=s+l 
(see (5.5)) with respect to the rate of 
i nterest is ambiguous. Therefore, it is in general not possible to 
predict how the risk premiums will change in response to changes in 
the interest rate. It follows that, a priori, it is also not possible 
to predict how the NPV to higher education would be affected by a 
change in the level of interest rate. As a consequence of this 
ambiguity, although it is possible to compute the IRR to higher 
education under uncertainty, this figure is difficult to interpret. 
Unl ike the certainty case, now an IRR exceeding the rate of interest 
does not necessarily imply that individuals would be better off 
investing in the additional education. It is for this reason that we 
have only presented the NPV results in this chapter. 
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Table 5.5 shows the risk premiums to the uncerta i n income 
profiles associated with degree-holders and high-school leavers, as 
well as the private NPV at various interest rate levels. The initial 
wealth is assumed to be zero, and R is set at 3 in the calculations. 
Both the risk of income variability and the risk of failure are 
considered in these calculations. 
TABLE 5,5; RISK PREMIUMS (PER ANNUM) AND PRIVATE NPY OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION AT VARIOUS INTEREST RATE LEVELS 
interest 
rate (%) 
RISK PREMIUM NPV 
Degree High-School 
' 
0 920 550 109900 
3 750 470 32950 
5 700 450 8800 
7 710 460 -5210 
10 800 500 -16490 
The figures show that the effect of interest rate changes on 
t he size of the risk premiums appears to be rather small. Hence, it 
i s mainly through the discounting of the income gains from higher 
education which accrues in future periods that the interest rate 
makes its effect felt. Consequently, the risk-adjusted NPV falls with 
an increase in the interest rate. 
Interestingly, note that the risk-adjusted NPV is negative for 
i nterest rates of 7% and above. The real interest rate has, in recent 
months, been in excess of this figure. If individuals expect this 
spell of high interest rate to continue, higher education may no 
longer be considered profitable. 
We consider now, the effect of an increase in the initial level 
of wealth. In the certainty case, the private profitability of h i gher 
education is independent of individuals' wealth. This is a direct 
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r esult of Fisher's Separation theorem, 42 the basis of much of modern 
Capital and Finance Theory. Put simply, Fisher's Separation Theorem 
is the proposition that, provided a perfect capital market exists 
(i.e. individuals can freely borrow and lend at the going rate of 
interest, r), then consumption and production decisions can be 
determined separately. Hence, the production decision of whether to 
invest in additional education is independent of individuals' initial 
endowments and preferences, and depends only on the NPV of the 
investment. 
The independence-of-wealth proposition has led to strong 
criticisms on the human capital approach for ignoring the consumption 
aspects of schooling. These criticisms are overcome, to some extent, 
by the introduction of risk, which breaks down the independence and 
makes the schooling decision dependent on the individual's initial 
wealth. 
In our model, the initial level of wealth enters the NPV 
calculation via its effect on the risk-premiums. More specifically, 
it enters the calculation through its effect on individuals' degree 
of risk aversion. Note that both Cct and Ch are increasing functions 
of the initial wealth. That is, individuals with higher levels of 
init ial wealth can expect to consume more in each period. Recall that 
A' (C) < 0 for the utility function specified. Hence, the risk premium 
decl ines with the level of initial wealth. The effect of wealth on 
the NPV is, however, ambiguous. It depends on the relative size of 
the reduction in the premiums associated with the alternative income 
42 . See Appendix 2.1. 
155 
streams. If the risk premium of the income stream related to the 
choice of attending university is reduced to a greater extent than 
that related to the choice of not attending, then the NPV to higher 
education increases with the level of initial wealth. In this case, 
the wealthier one is, the more profitable higher education tends to 
be. Conversely, if the effect of wealth on the risk premium of the 
income stream in the case of not attending university is greater, 
then it is the poor who benefits more from higher education. 
Table 5.6 presents the risk premiums and the private NPV to 
higher education at various levels of the initial wealth. An interest 
rate of 5% is assumed, and the value of R is set at 3. 
TABLE 5,6: RISK PREMIUMS (PER ANNUM) AND PRIVATE NPY OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF INITIAL WEALTH 
initial wealth 
($ '000) 
0 
5 
10 
50 
100 
RISK PREMIUM 
Degree 
700 
690 
680 
610 
540 
High-School 
450 
440 
440 
390 
340 
NPV 
8820 
8880 
8940 
9350 
9770 
As expected, the risk premiums on the income streams associated 
with both educational levels decline as the level of initial wealth 
inc reases. For the range of initial wealth levels presented in the 
table, the dollar decline in risk premium in response to an increase 
in initial wealth is larger for the income stream associated with the 
choice of attending university. As a result, the NPV to higher 
education is positively related to the level of initial wealth. That 
is, the richer one is, the more attractive higher education tends to 
be . This is consistent with the evidence presented in Miller and 
Vo lker (1987), for instance, which shows the importance of 
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soc ioeconomic background variables and family size in determining an 
individual's probability of completing high school, and the 
probability of proceeding to higher education. 43 
5.6 Serial Correlation in Year-to-Year Income Variation 
Recall that in (5.7) the stochastic component of the error term 
(Vit ) is specified as: 
Yit = 'YVit -1 + l1it 
So far, we have assumed that year-to-year income fluctuations are 
independent. That is, y is assumed to be zero. In this section, we 
investigate the consequences of relaxing this assumption. A priori, 
we expect risk premiums to increase with the degree of serial 
correlation because the more highly correlated year-to-year income 
fluctuations are, the less able individuals are to smooth their 
consumption over time by borrowing and lending. In the limit, when y 
approaches unity, income evolves around a random-walk (with a 
determinate increment in each year). Under these circumstances, 
individuals will perceive each income shock as "permanent", and will 
adjust their consumption in each period accordingly. The variance of 
consumption in this limiting case will be equal to the variance of 
income. 
43 . The usual explanation for the importance of these variables is 
through their effect on the individuals' liquidity constraints and on 
their innate ability and tastes. Our model provides an additional 
avenue through which these variables may affect the individuals' 
schooling decisions. 
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Following Lillard and Willis (1978), we assume that the 
e arnings at the start of each individual's working life are shocked 
by an error of the form: 
Tl il y > 0 
'11-y2 Vil = 
Tlil y = 0 
and Tlit (-NID(0,cr~ 2 )) thereafter. Lillard and Willis suggest that 
this error structure may, alternatively, be interpreted as one 
a ssuming an infinite history of random shocks. Note that given this 
as sumption, the residuals for any single cross-section are 
homoscedastic, since the (unconditional) variance of the residual for 
any individual, at any point in his or her career, is cr~ 2 /(l-y2 ). 
For each educational level, cr~ 2 is estimated as s 2 (1-y2 ), where 
s 2 is the variance of the OLS residuals. The income shock in each 
pe riod is then randomly drawn form a normal distribution (mean 0, and 
variance cr~ 2 ) . 
It is assumed that individuals are fully aware of the values of 
Y and cr~ 2 for each of the alternative income streams. Prior to entry 
into the workforce, the best estimate of the error in each future 
period is zero. The variance of the error in each future period, 
conditional on the information available at that time, is cr~ 2 /(1-y2 ) 
On entry into the workforce, however, individuals will be able to 
exploit the information contained in the stochastic shocks. In each 
period, once the income in that period is revealed, individuals will 
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rev i se their expectations of future incomes. Given Uit , 44 t h e best 
est imate of the next period's error (Ui t+1 > is yuit , and i2 u2.t f or t h e 
fo llowing period's error (ui ~+2 >, and so on. In general, 
s = 1,2, ... ,T-t 
The variance of the error in each future period, conditional on u it , 
is given by: 
var (Ui t+slUit> = (1 + y2 + ... + y2s>cr,,2 
= cr,,2 
1-fs 
l-y2 
s = 1,2, .. ,T-t 
It is assumed that individuals use the first two terms of 
Taylor's series to approximate their future pre-tax incomes. That is, 
Et (YP it+s) A A = exp(lnY+y5 ut) + O.S.exp(lnY+y5 ut) .var(ui t +s l Ui t> 
where yPit+s·= pre-tax income of individual i in period t+s; 
l;y = predicted value of log(Ypit+s> from OLS regression. 
The expected post-tax income Et(Yit +s> is then obtained by applying 
the prevailing tax rates to Et(Ypit +s>. 
Table 5.7 presents the risk premiums corresponding to the 
income streams associated with the alternative educational choices, 
and the private NPV to higher education at various values of y. The 
rate of interest is set at 5%, and the initial wealth level at zero. 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion R is set equal to 3. 
44 . Recall that in this chapter, we assume that Uit = Yit · 
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TABLE 5,7: RISK PREMIUMS {PER ANNUM) AND PRIVATE NPV OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION FOR VARIOUS DEGREES OF SERIAL CORRELATION IN RESIDUALS 
serial corr. RISK PREMIUM NPV 
coeff. (Y) Degree High-School 
0 . 0 700 450 8800 
0.1 810 530 8410 
0.2 930 630 7930 
0.3 1080 750 7360 
0.4 1280 900 6640 
0.5 1530 1100 5740 
0.7 2370 1780 2920 
0. 9 4470 3530 
-3080 
As anticipated, the figures show that the risk premium 
increases with the degree of serial correlation. In all cases, moving 
fr om serial independence (y=O) toy= 0.5, mo~e than doubles the value 
of the risk premium. More interestingly, we note that the dollar 
inc rement in risk premium in response to an increase in y is larger 
fo r the income stream associated with attending university. As a 
result, the private NPV to higher education falls as the degree of 
serial correlation in year-to-year income variations rises. 
In the Lillard and Willis (1978) study, the value of y is 
es timated to be around 0.4. More recently, using data from 1985 and 
19 86 panels of the Australian Longitudinal Survey, Miller (1989) 
est imates that the correlation of earnings in adjacent years across 
individuals is around 0.4 for females, and 0.5 for males. 45 At these 
levels of correlation, higher education still appears to be 
45. Conceptually, the parameter estimated by Miller is different from 
that estimated by Lillard and Willis. Miller's parameter includes the 
correlation resulting from the individual-specific component. The 
equivalent figure in the Lillard and Willis study is around 0.84. The 
smaller estimate in Miller's study is, in part, due to the youth of 
his sample (aged 16-25 in 1985) which is typically cha r acterized by 
"job-shopping", and _high wage-mobility. 
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profitable for moderately risk-averse individuals, assureing that the 
rate of interest is 5%. 
5.7 Summary and Conc1usion 
In Part I of the thesis, we followed . the standard practice of 
using the NPV and IRR techniques to evaluate the private 
profitability of higher education as an investment. We noted that 
risks are not explicitly modeled in that framework. Yet, implicitly, 
when choosing the "appropriate" discount rate in the calculation the 
NPV, or when choosing the "appropriate" benchmark rate of return with 
which the IRR is to be compared, some concept of relative riskiness 
is required. 
Uncertainty is very much a part of life, and investment in 
higher education is by no means exempt from it. Potential students do 
not know with complete certainty how long they will take to complet~ 
their degrees, or if they will even successfully complete them. 
Neither do they have complete knowledge on the incomes they will 
r eceive in each future period corresponding to their educational 
choices. 
Past research has tended to ignore the issue of risk 
altogether. Insofar as the issue is addressed at all, researchers 
have generally been content with simply demonstrating that "it 
matters". We sought to remedy this deficiency in this chapter. A 
simple two-step procedure which allows risks to be incorporated into 
the standard measures of profitability is developed. The empirical 
results reveal that higher education is less attractive than the 
results obtained using the standard techniques (i.e. where risks are 
ignored) would suggest. However, for moderately risk-averse 
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i ndividuals, higher education is still financially attractive as an 
i nvestment. 
CHAPTER 6 
ABILITY AND THE PRIVATE PROFITABILITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
6.1 Introduction 
It was shown in the introduction to Part II that there exists a 
high degree of income variability at each education-experience level. 
In the previous chapter, it was assumed that this variability is due 
entirely to random (stochastic) effects. In this chapter, we assume, 
instead, that it is caused by differences in the unmeasured 
characteristics of individuals which, we shall simply refer to as 
"ability". The variability in incomes around the mean profile is, 
therefore, assumed to reflect the extent of variation in individuals' 
lifetime incomes, or human wealth. This raises the following 
questions. First, what are the implications of this large variation 
i n the lifetime incomes within each educational group on individuals' 
ex-post and ex-ante private rates of return? Second, how does the 
interpretation of residuals (in earnings functions) as unobserved 
individual ability affect estimates of the average returns to the 
group, such as those presented in Part I of the thesis? Questions 
like these quickly lead to issues of ability bias and self-selection 
which have been so prominent in the economics of education 
literature. 
Conceptually, the estimation of the rate of return to schooling 
is straight-forward. The actual task of estimating it empirically is, 
however, very much less so. The problem arises primarily because we 
cannot observe an individual's alternative income stream. In the 
calculation of returns to higher education, for instance, we would 
like to know what the individual's income profile would be if the 
individual had chosen to attend university, and what the profile 
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l ooks like if he or she had decided, instead, to join the workforce 
i mmediately after high school. It would then be a relatively simple 
exercise to compute the internal rate of return (or the NPV) to 
i nvesting in a university degree. In practice, what we have, of 
c ourse, is either one or the other income profile, and not both. 1 
The challenge to researchers is to find an appropriate comparison 
i ncome profile of an individual (or a group of individuals) differing 
only in the decision of whether to invest in higher education. 
Early researchers simply compared the earnings outcomes among 
schooling classes to obtain the returns to education. This was also 
t he approach adopted in Part I of the thesis, which we shall call the 
c onventional approach. The assumption implicit in this procedure is 
t hat educational groups differ only in the years of schooling and are 
otherwise identical (at least with respect to the characteristics 
which affect earnings) .2 
Critics of this approach argue that the higher earnings of the 
more educated are due, at least in part, to superior innate ability 
of this group. Hence, a simple comparison of the outcomes would 
overstate the benefit of schooling. Some would even go so far as to 
c laim that the entire difference in earnings is due to ability 
1 . Typically, we do not even have informaticn on the entire profile. 
With cross-sectional data, we observe only a single point along each 
i ndividual's lifetime profile. The problems this can lead to are 
e xplored in Part 3 of the thesis. 
2 . There are two ways of interpreting the rate of return calculated 
using the conventional approach. The first assumes that individuals 
a re all identical except for their educational attainments. Under 
t his interpretation, the rate of return to education to each and 
e very individual is the same. Under the second interpretation, 
d ifferences in individual-specific characteristics such as ability 
may exist. However, the distribution of these characteristics is 
a ssumed to be the same across the two educational groups. The rate of 
r eturn calculated using mean profiles is interpreted as the average 
r ate of return to the group. 
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differences. These concerns have led to a flood bf studies on the 
extent of the "ability bias" since the early sixties, particularly in 
the United States, utilising ever-more sophisticated econometric 
techniques and richer data sets. In Australia, work in this area of 
research has barely begun. 
In this chapter, we attempt to fill this gap in our knowledge. 
Whilst we do not have the necessary data to perform a complete 
analysis, it is possible to use the information contained in the 
r esiduals (of earnings functions) to gain some insight into the 
extent to which the average private rate of return estimated using 
the conventional approach may be biased. We shall also examine how 
individual rates of return may differ from the average returns to the 
group. Finally, the framework developed in the previous chapter is 
used to analyse the effect of individuals' uncertainty with regards 
to their own abilities on the ex-ante rate of return to higher 
education. 
The chapter is divided into five main sections. In the next 
section, a review of the literature is provided. Since excellent 
surveys on this topic already exist, 3 we shall attempt only to give a 
fl avour of the developments in this field. The Willis and Rosen 
(1979) model is, however, discussed in some detail since it provides 
a useful framework for analysing the results in later sections. 
Section 6.3 provides some estimates of the private rates of return 
us ing the residuals from earnings functions as indicators of 
individual ability. In Section 6.4, the effect of uncertainty in 
ability on individuals' ex-ante profitability of higher education is 
3 . See Psacharopoulos (1975), Griliches (1977,1979) and Willis 
(1986). 
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examined. The main conclusions of the chapter are set out in Section 
6. 5. 
6 . 2 Review of Ability Studies 
6 . 2.1 Simple Regression Studies 
Early attempts by researchers to control for ability 
differences consisted of simply entering whichever ability measure 
was available (such as IQ scores, school grades, and class ranks) as 
an additional regressor in the earnings equation. In other words, 
some version of the following equation is estimated: 
( 6. 1) 
where Y is measure of income, Sis the number of years of schooling, 
A is a measure of ability, and Xis a vector of personal attributes 
which may influence income. 4 
In most studies, the introduction of the ability variable 
lowers the estimated schooling coefficient somewhat, but by only 10-
20% . The independent contribution of the ability measure to the fit 
of the equation is, in general, minuscule. Hence, it would appear 
that if ability is important in influencing relative earnings at all, 
it is through its impact on educational attainment, rather than 
directly. These findings are echoed by the small handful of 
Australian studies which include an ability measure in the earnings 
function [Blandy and Richardson (1982), Richardson (1986), Kelley 
(19 88) 5 ]. The · results, therefore, support the view that a simple 
4. A fairly exhaustive survey of these early regression studies can 
be found in Psacharopoulos (1975). 
5 . Kelley's regression results were not published and were obtained 
by private correspondence. 
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comparison of the incomes among schooling groups leads to an upward 
bias on the estimated returns to schooling. However, they suggest 
t hat the magnitude of the bias is probably quite small. 
6.2.2 Some Econometric Problems 
There are a number of problems related to the estimation of 
r eturns to schooling using an equation like (6.1) . 6 We shall focus on 
j ust two of them here. The first concerns the measured ability 
variable. A fundamental question which arises is: Which is the 
correct measure of ability to use? Is it IQ, class rank, school 
grade, or some other measure? Psacharopoulos (1975) argues that the 
ability measure should relate to the ability to earn income. In this 
respect, the measures of ability typically used in regression studies 
are far from ideal. Becker (1975, p.83), for instance, notes that 
conventional measures of ability, " ... while undoubtedly relevant at 
times, do not reliably measure the talents required to succeed in the 
economic sphere". To the extent that the measures of ability used are 
imperfect or incomplete representations of "true ability", the 
es timated schooling coefficients may still be biased even after 
controlling for measured ability. 
Griliches (1977) suggests that two extreme views on ability are 
possible. The first views ability as being equivalent to IQ or 
something close to it. The only problem there is that the measures 
are subject to possibly large test-retest errors. In the second view, 
ability is that unobserved "thing" which enables some people to earn 
6. See Griliches (1977), Rosen (1977a), Hause (1971), Taubman and 
Wales (1973). 
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higher wages than others. 7 To the extent that conventional measures 
s uch as IQ can be used as indicators of this "thing", however, the 
s ame estimation procedure is applicable in both cases. That is, the 
ability variable is treated as being correlated with the error term, 
and an instrumental-variable approach is used to estimate parameters 
of the equation. 
Such an approach is adopted in Griliches (1976, 1977) . 8 He 
f inds that allowing for errors in the ability variable reduces the 
coefficient on schooling by even more than when the ability variable 
i s simply entered in the regression (a reduction of 23.5% compared to 
13.2% in the latter case). As well, the coefficient on the ability 
variable is significantly altered, suggesting that IQ scores are 
quite unreliable as measures of the true underlying ability. 
Griliches estimates that "noise" makes up about 30 per cent of the 
observed variance in the IQ variable. In view of this, more recent 
s tudies have abandoned the idea of including direct measures of 
ability, choosing instead to treat ability as an unobservable latent 
variable.9 
The second set of problems in the estimation of (6.1) relates 
to the possible correlation between the schooling variable and the 
e rror term. Griliches (1976) suggests three reasons for this. First, 
7 . In this second view, ability is only loosely related to IQ or 
similar measures . Griliches suggests that it may just as well be 
called "energy" or "motivation". 
8 . See, also, Griliches and Mason (1972). 
9 . This approach exploits the information in the error structure 
contained in sibling or longitudinal data. The basic idea behind 
t hese models is that if we can assume that different observations, 
across equations, across individuals, or across time, share the same 
values of the unobserved latent variable (in this case, A), then it 
i s possible to use this "replication" to identify scme of the 
parameters in the model. See Griliches (1979) for a survey. 
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the schooling variable may be measured with error. Second, the error 
component (i.e. "noise") in the ability measure may be correlated 
with the level of schooling due to test-wiseness. This, in turn, 
leads to correlation between the schooling variable and the 
disturbance term in the earnings equation._ Third, in the human 
capital framework at least, schooling decisions are the result of 
individuals' optimising behaviour, based on their expectations of 
future earnings. To the extent that the "errors" in the ex-post 
earnings regression were correctly anticipated by individuals at the 
time when their schooling decisions were made, the schooling variable 
and the disturbance term will, again, be correlated.lo 
Griliches (1977, p.12) points out that the literature on the 
"ability bias" has been somewhat asymmetric in the sense of focussing 
on the potential upward bias in the schooling coefficient and trying 
to guard against it by including ability and other variables in the 
equation. In the presence of measurement errors in the schooling 
variable, this practice can easily lead to the" ... kill[ing] of the 
patient in our attempts to cure what · may have been a rather minor 
disease originally". Moreover, he shows that once we allow for 
individual optimising behaviour in their schooling decision, it is 
not even clear that the schooling coefficient is biased downwards to 
begin with!ll 
In this respect, the work of Griliches (1976, 1977), based on 
the NLS Young Men data base, in which he allows for both ability and 
schooling (as · well as experience) to be endogenous, is particularly 
10. In the extreme case, individuals are assumed to be able to 
forecast their respective error terms in the ex-post earnings 
equation perfectly. See the Willis and Rosen (1979) model below. 
11. Griliches (1977) pp.14-16. 
169 
i nteresting. Using the second ability measure and fami l y background 
variables as instruments, he finds that" ... the original simple least 
s quares estimates of the schooling coefficient may have seriously 
under-estimated rather than over-estimated it". 12,13 
6.2.3 The Willis and Rosen Model of Educational Self-Selection 
The models reviewed so far are incomplete in the sense that the 
r estrictions implied by individuals' optimising behaviour in their 
educational decisions are not fully incorporated. Moreover, in almost 
all cases, ability is treated as a one-dimensional characteristic. 
That is, regardless of the type of job and the level of formal 
schooling required for that job, an individual with higher "ability" 
will always be more productive than one with less "ability". Hence, 
a n individual who does well (relative to the rest of the population) 
as a degree-holder, for instance, will also do well as a high-school 
l eaver. It follows, therefore, that if degree-holders are, as a 
group, more able than high-school leavers, a simple comparison of the 
e arnings outcomes of these groups would lead to an upwardly-biased 
e stimate of the average returns to higher education. 
In contrast, if "ability" were multi-faceted so that the types 
of talents required in one job are not necessarily the same for 
another job, then it is not clear that the simple comparison of 
12. ibid. p. 16. 
13. Hausman and Taylor (1981) have developed a method for use with 
panel data which does not require the use of excluded exogenous 
i nstruments. Based on their analysis of the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics sample, they report that using family background variables 
a s excluded instruments for schooling raises the estimated 
c oefficient of schooling, echoing the results of Griliches 
(1976,1977). More interestingly, applying the method they developed 
t o the data, increases the estimated coefficient of schoolin g by an 
e ven larger amount, implying that the original sch ool i ng coeffic i ent 
may be biased downwards even more than Griliches suggests. 
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outcomes would lead to an upward bias on the estimated returns to 
schooling. For instance, if the types of jobs associated with high-
school qualification require "mechanical ability" more than "academic 
ability", and vice-versa for the types of jobs associated with 
university qualification, then self-selection might lead to those 
endowed with more "academic ability" to pursue higher education and 
those with more "mechanical ability" to stop after high school. 14 In 
this case, a direct comparison of the actual earnings outcomes 
between the two groups (degree-holders and high-school leavers) would 
lead to an estimate of the average returns to higher education which 
is biased downwards for the individuals who have chosen to go to 
university, and upwards for those who have opted to stop at high 
school. 
Willis and Rosen (1979) consider the educational decision of 
whether to proceed beyond high school. In their model, the life-cycle 
-
earnings profile of an individual i, conditional on his or her level 
of schooling j (=A,B), is defined by two parameters: the level of 
initial earnings (Yji) and the rate at which his or her earnings grow 
(gji). Earnings at any point in time is, therefore, given by 
Yjiexp(gjiJ), where J is the number of years of labour market 
experience. 
The structural (in the sense of population) earnings equations 
in this model are: 
14. For simplicity, we assume that individuals with above-average 
"academic ability" have below-average "mechanical ability", and vice-
versa. The argument is, strictly speaking, one of comparative 
advantage, not absolute advantage. See Willis (1986). An early 
discussion of occupational self-selection between fishermen and 
hunters can be found in Roy (1951). 
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ln YAi = Xi~A + u1i ( 6. 2) 
gAi = Xi'YA + u2i ( 6. 3) 
ln Ysi = Xi~B + U3i ( 6 . 4) 
gBi = Xi'YB + u41 ( 6. 5) 
Subscript ''A" denotes the educational choice of proceeding to higher 
education (for s years) and subscript "B" the choice of stopping 
after high-school.Xis a vector of individuals' observable ability 
variables. No restrictions are placed on the variances and 
covariances of the errors u1i to u4i which are assumed to capture 
individuals' unobserved abilities. Note also that~ and y are allowed 
to differ across the two schooling alternatives. Hence, both the 
observed and the unobserved ability components may affect earnings 
quite differently depending on the educational choice. 
To allow for the opportunities to finance educational 
investments to vary across individuals, Willis and Rosen assume that 
each individual's discount rate ri is influenced by a vector of his 
or her family background variables Zi and an unobserved component 
u5i.lS That is, 
r· = Z·O + u5· l. l. l. ( 6. 6) 
Assuming an infinite horizon and ignoring the direct costs of 
schooling, the present values corresponding to alternatives A and B 
are, respectively: 
15. Although in their estimation, Willis and Rosen do not allow X and 
Z to have common elements, this is not necessary for identification. 
In fact, as they have pointed out, the earnings equations (6.2)-(6.5) 
may still be estimable even if X and z are identical. See their 
section on identification. 
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00 
VAi f YAi ( t ) exp ( - r i t ) dt YAi exp (-r i s) . and = = I r , - gA i l 
s 
00 
f y 8 i ( t ) exp ( - r it ) dt YBi exp (-ri s) VBi = = r , - gBi l 
s 
An important assumption in the Willis and Rosen model is that 
i ndividuals are completely aware of their respective unobserved 
c omponents (u1i to usi>, or at least have unbiased estimates of these 
components at the time the educational decision is made. They are 
f urther assumed to choose their level of schooling purely on 
f inancial grounds. That is, individuals will choose alternative A if 
VAi > VBi and alternative B, otherwise. Defining an index Ii as 
l n (VAi/VBi), this translates to the selection rule that individuals 
c hoose alternative A if and only if Ii> 0. 
Estimation of the model follows a two-step procedure. First, a 
r educed form of the selection rule is estimated, from which an 
e stimate of the "inverse Mills ratio'' for each educational choice is 
obtained. The second step involves the estimation of the structural 
e arnings equations (6.2)-(6.5) using OLS, with the respective inverse 
Mills ratios included in the regressions to correct for selectivity 
bias. 1 6 
Applying this model to a sample of 3,611 respondents to the 
NBER Thorndike-Hagen survey of 1968-71, Willis and Rosen found 
e vidence for positive selectivity bias in the earnings of both high-
1 6. See Heckman (1976b) for the justification of this procedure~ 
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school graduates and college-goers. 17 This ~ndicates that the average 
i ncome of a high-school leaver with given measu=ed abilities (i.e. X) 
i s higher than would have been obtained by a degree-holder with the 
same X, had the latter not attended university. It also suggests that 
the average earnings of an individual who proceeded to college are 
higher than would have been received by someone from the high-school 
group (with the same measured abilities), had the latter person 
received college training. This, they argue, is consistent with the 
view that those endowed with the types of talents (measured and 
unmeasured) useful in jobs associated with college qualification 
(intelligence?) will proceed to college, whereas those with skills 
which are more valuable in non-college jobs (strength?) will stop at 
the high-school level. They estimate that the rate of return to 
persons with the average characteristics (measured and unmeasured) of 
those who opted to proceed to university is 9.9%, compared to 9.3% 
for a person with the average characteristics of the group which 
chose not to attend higher education. 
There are a number of difficulties with the Willis and Rosen 
study. First, their estimation proceeds on the assumption that the 
structural earnings functions (6.2)-(6.6) are properly specified, 
with the errors satisfying the classical assumptions. In particular, 
the u's are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
in the same equation. In (6.2) for instance, u1i is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with Xi. This is somewhat p=oblematic since u 1i is 
17 . For high-school graduates, they report that the bias is 
statistically insignificant with respect to initial earnings, but 
significantly positive with respect to the growth rate. For college-
goers, the bias is positive with respect to initial earnings, and 
negative with respect to the growth rate. The latter, they argue, is 
due to the fact that the bias on earnings later in the careers of 
college-goers is small. 
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supposed to be a measure of the individual's unobserved abilities, 
and it is hard to believe that this would be uncorrelated with his or 
her measured ability, Xi. This statement applies equally to (6.3)-
(6.5). In the same way, it is hard to believe that the permanent 
unobserved component influencing the financial barriers to school 
choice, usi, is uncorrelated with zi which contains various measures 
of the individual's family background. 
Secondly, as we have pointed out, one of the key assumptions in 
the Willis and Rosen model is that individuals are completely aware 
of their respective unobserved components, namely u 1i-u5i· Griliches 
(1977, p.13) argues that the observed "errors" in ex-post earnings 
functions (u1i-u4i) are, in part, due to events which are random and 
probably unanticipated by the individual at the time when the 
schooling decision was made. Even if the "errors'' consist solely of 
individuals' permanent unobserved ability components, there is still 
some doubt as to whether, ex-ante, individuals are able to forecast 
them correctly. Becker (1975, p.190), for instance, points out that 
investors in college education are usually youths in their early 
twenties who are unlikely at that age to be fully aware of their 
talents. 
One must also be especially cautious about generalising from 
the results of the Willis and Rosen study. The data on which the 
study is based come from a sample of male World War II veterans who 
applied for the army air corps. The applicants had all passed a 
preliminary screening test based on physical fitness and certain 
aspects of their ability. As such, the sample is hardly 
representative of the population in general. Moreover, in attempting 
to apply the findings to Australia, one must recognize that there has 
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been, for some years now, an excess demand for college places here, 
and the limited number of places have been allocated on the basis of 
individuals' performance in high-school. Thus, depending on how well 
performance in high-school relates to individuals' true ability, the 
magnitude (and even direction) of the selection bias in Australia may 
well be quite different from that found in the United States. 
Summing up, what lessons can we learn from past ability 
studies? The first lesson is that estimation of returns to schooling 
in the light of differences in individual ability requires more than 
simply getting hold of an ability measure (such as IQ), and adding it 
to the regression. Griliches (1976, 1977) has shown that conventional 
measures of ability may be rather poor indicators of individuals' 
true underlying ability. This suggests that there is much to be 
gained from modelling ability as an unobserved latent variable. 
Unfortunately, the data demands from this approach are severe. 
The second major lesson is that once we allow for the 
possibility of the schooling variable being correlated with the error 
t erm, a priori, even the direction of the ability bias is unclear. 
Allowing for ability to be multi-dimensional complicates things even 
further. In this case, individuals who do well in jobs associated 
with, say high-school qualification, may perform badly in jobs 
associated with tertiary qualification. The magnitude and direction 
of the ability bias, therefore, depend on the relative importance of 
the different types of talents at each educational level, and 
individuals' relative endowments of these talents. 18 
18. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
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With these lessons in mind, we proceed in the next section to 
use the residuals from the earnings function as indicators of 
individuals' unobserved ability. Although data limitations preclude 
an analysis along the lines of Willis and Rosen, we can nevertheless 
use their model as a framework for our analysis. The approach we 
adopt is to compare different parts of the high-school leavers' 
i ncome distribution with different parts of the degree-holders' 
i ncome distribution. This enables the sensitivity of rates of return 
estimates to alternative assumptions regarding ability and self-
selection to be examined. For convenience, we shall continue to 
follow the notation in Willis and Rosen (1979), and use A to denote 
t he choice of attending university, and B the choice of quitting 
f ormal schooling after high-school. In some contexts, A and B refer 
t o the individuals who opted for these choices. 
6.3 Matching Simulations 
As we have seen, the validity of the conventional approach to 
e stimating returns to education relies on the absence of systematic 
d ifferences between the groups, other than in the level of schooling. 
I n the case of returns to higher education, this requires that the 
characteristics of those who stopped formal schooling after high-
s chool not be systematically different from the characteristics of 
t hose who proceeded to university. Only then will the mean income 
p rofile of the high-school group provide a reasonable estimate of 
what the average degree-holder would have received if he or she had 
not attended university. It is also only under these conditions that 
t he mean income profile of degree-holders can be used as an estimate 
of what the average high-school leaver would have obtained had he or 
s he proceeded to university. 
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If these conditions are not met, so that the average degree-
holder is expected to be in, say, the top 20% of the observed high-
school income distribution had he or she not attended university, 
t hen a simple comparison of the mean income profiles will lead to an 
upward bias in the estimated returns to higher education. In this 
case, it would be better, for purposes of comparison, to use the mean 
income profile of the top 20% (in terms of incomes) of high-school 
l eavers. The problem is, of course, that we do not know in which part 
of the high-school income distribution the average degree-holder is 
l ikely to end up. The Willis and Rosen model, however, provides us 
with a useful framework for specifying the conditions under which the 
average degree-holder would have ended up in the top or bottom ends 
of the high-school distribution if he or she had chosen not to attend 
university, and likewise for the average high-school leaver with 
r espect to the degree-holders' income distribution. 
To begin, let us assume that the observed educational outcomes 
a re the result of optimisation decisions on the part of fully-
i nformed (with respect to their respective abilities) individuals 
based, purely on financial considerations. Implicit in this, is the 
assumption that the number of university places is not supply-
constrained, so that anyone who wants to attend university is able 
to . For expositional purposes, we shall follow Willis (1986) in 
a ssuming that there are only two types of talent, intelligence (~1) 
and strength (~2), and omitting the consideration of life-cycle 
e arnings growth given in (6.3) and (6.5). To focus on the ability 
i ssue, we assume initially that individuals have the same discount 
r ate. The structural earnings equations in this simplified model are : 
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( 6 . 7) 
( 6 . 8 } 
Note that ~1 and ~2 contain both the measured and unmeasured 
c omponents in the original Willis and Rosen formulation. Without loss 
of generality, assume that the scales and units of ~1 and ~2 are 
chosen so that they each have zero mean and unitary variance. Let Pl2 
be the correlation between ~1 and ~2- Then, 
crA2 = var(ln YA) = a12 + 2a1CX2P12 + a2 2 ( 6 . 9) 
crB2 = var(ln YB} = ~12 + 2
~1~2P12 + ~2 2 (6.10) 
crAB = cov(ln YA,ln YB) 
= al~l + (a1~2 + a2~1)P12 + CX2~2 (6.11) 
PAB - crAB/crAcrB (6.12) 
Willis identifies three different types of sorting in this 
model, which he calls positive hierarchical sorting, negative 
hierarchical sorting, and non-hierarchical sorting. In addition, he 
i dentifies a fourth case where no sorting by ability occurs. We shall 
consider each in turn. 
In the discussion to follow, an important distinction to bear 
i n mind is between the population distribution of potential earnings 
co rresponding to a particular schooling level (A or B) and the actua l 
observed income distribution corresponding to that schooling leve l . 
For short, we shall refer to these simply as the popul ation 
distribution (corresponding to A or B) and the actual distribut i on 
(corresponding to A or B). The former is the hypothetical income 
distribution which would be observed if everybody in the p opulat ion 
were given that level of schooling. In contrast, the latter consists 
of only those individuals who have self-selected into this leve l of 
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schooling. As such, the underlying ability distribution in this 
latter case may be quite different to the ability distribution of the 
population. 
Positive Hierarchical Sorting 
With positive hierarchical sorting, those who opt to attend 
university tend to be drawn from the top end of the population 
distribution corresponding to A, and those who choose to quit after 
high-school tend to come from the lower portion of the population 
distribution corresponding to B. The actual mean income profile of 
high-school leavers would, therefore, under-estimate the earnings 
which the average degree-holder would have received if he or she had 
not attended university. The actual mean income profile of degree-
holders, on the other hand, would over-estimate the earnings which 
the average member of the high-school group would have received had 
he or she gone to university. Hence, conventional estimates of the 
rate of return to higher education based on the comparison of mean 
income profiles would be biased upwards. 
Positive hierarchical sorting arises when the condition 
crA/crs >pAB >crs/crA is met. This requires PAB to be sufficiently 
positive and crA > cr8 . The intuitive explanation is as follows. 
Assuming that individuals who do well as degree-holders also tend to 
do well as high-school leavers, then provided that having a degree 
offers greater scope for their talents (i.e. crA > cr8 ), the more able 
individuals will choose A. That is, they will opt to attend 
university which enables them to obtain jobs where their talents (~1, 
~2) will be well-rewarded. The less talented, however, will prefer to 
quit after high-school (alternative B) since the jobs associated with 
• 
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this level of education penalise their lack of talents to a lesser 
degree. 
Even if strength and intelligence in an individual are 
uncorrelated (i.e. P12 = 0), 19 provided that the scope for talent at 
the university level exceeds that at the high-school level 
positive hierarchical sorting may still take place. Here, individuals 
who opt for higher education tend to be well-endowed in either one or 
both of the talents. Conversely, those who are poorly-endowed with 
either one or both of the talents will opt to stop after high-school. 
Willis (1986, pp.579-580) demonstrates that in the extreme case 
where PAB = 1, if selection is based solely on ability as assumed, 
then the least talented person in the degree-holders group (A) will 
be more talented than the most talented in the high-school group (B). 
I n other words, the lowest income-earner in A would earn more than 
even the highest income-earner in B, had the former not attended 
university. Conversely, had the highest income-earner in B attended 
university, he or she would have earned less than even the lowest 
income earner in A. 
However, to the extent that PAB is less than unity, and to the 
extent that the schooling decision is also affected by individuals' 
abil ity to finance their educational investment, by non-financial 
considerations, and by institutional restrictions, there may be some 
overlap. That is, the amount which some members of A would have 
ea rned had they not attended university may be less than the income 
19 . Note from (6.13) that even if Pl2 = 0, PAB will still be positive 
a s long as a 1 ,a2,~1 ,~2 > 0 i.e. strength and intelligence are useful 
in jobs associated with both levels of education. 
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o f some existing members of B. Hence, it may still be possibl e to use 
the mean incomes of individuals i n the top end of the actual h i g h -
school distribution as an estimate of what the average degree-holder 
would have received had the educational decision been different. 
Similarly, to overcome the bias in estimat_ing the average rate of 
r eturn to individuals with the average characteristics of the high-
s chool group, we can compare the mean high-school income profile to 
that of degree-holders in the bottom end of the actual distribution. 
In this spirit, we present in row 1 of Table 6.1 the rates of 
r eturn obtained by comparing the mean income profile of degree-
holders to that corresponding to different portions of the actual 
high-school income distribution. The second row shows the rates of 
r eturn by matching the mean profile of high-school leavers with 
di fferent portions of the actual degree-holders' income distribution. 
Fo r comparison, the last column gives the rate of return obtained by 
c omparing the mean profiles of the two groups. 20 
20 . As in Chapter 3, we assume that individuals take 3.5 years t o 
complete their degrees and receive a net income of $980 per a nnum 
while studying. 
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TABLE 6.1: AVERAGE PRI VATE RATES OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATION UNDER 
POSITIVE HI ERARCHICAL SORTING 
(1 ) average 
degree-holder 
(2) average 
high-sch leaver 
portion of actual 
high-school leavers' distribution 
top 25% 
negative 
top 50% 
negative 
top 75% 
3.91% 
portion of actual 
degree-holders' distribution 
bottom 
25% 
negative 
bottom 
50% 
negative 
bottom 
75% 
3.78% 
average 
8.97 % 
average 
8.97% 
The procedure used to generate the mean profiles corresponding 
t o different portions of the distribution is a variant of that used 
i n the previous chapter. Earnings functions of the two groups are 
f irst estimated (Table 5.1). The residuals from each regression are 
t hen sorted with the largest positive value at the top, and stored as 
a vector. To obtain the mean (post-tax) income profile corresponding 
t o, say, the top 25% of the degree-holder distribution, a residual is 
r andomly selected from the top quartile of the corresponding residua l 
vector. This is then added to the predicted earnings (in logarithms) 
at each age, and the exponential of each of the sums is computed. 
Next, the marginal tax rates operating in 1985-86 are app l ied to this 
figure to give the after-tax earnings at each age. By repeated 
s ampling (with replacement) and averaging, the mean (after-tax ) 
income profile corresponding to the top 25 % of degree-holders is 
thereby obtained. 21 
21 . Note that this procedure does not give the same result s as s i mply 
using the average of the residuals in the top quartile. Th e 
difference arises because the residuals affect income 
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The figures in Table 6.1 show that the rate of return obtained 
using the conventional approach is 8.97%. 22 Not surprisingly, the 
assumption of positive hierarchical sorting leads to lower estimates 
of the returns to higher education. Our calculations show that the 
rate of return from matching the average degree-holder to the top 25% 
of high-school leavers is, in fact, negative. What is surprising is 
that even if we matched the average degree-holder to the top 50% of 
high-school leavers, the rate is still negative. Even more 
surprisingly, the rate of return is less than 4% when we compare the 
average degree-holder to the average high-school leaver in the top 
75% of the distribution. Putting it differently, if the average 
degree-holder could be certain that he would not be in the bottom 
quartile of the observed high-school income distribution had he not 
attended university, then the return to his investment in higher 
education would have been less than 4%. 
The results for the average high-school leaver are quite 
similar. Assuming that the average high-school leaver would have been 
in the bottom half (or quarter) of the observed degree-holders' 
income distribution had the individual's decision to attend higher 
education been different, the rate of return to the educational 
investment would have been negative. If, however, the average 
earnings of the bottom 75% of actual degree-holders is closer to the 
average high-school leaver's potential earnings as a university 
graduate, then the rate of return to investing in higher education 
for this individual would have been 3.78%. This is less than half the 
multiplicatively, and also because the amount of tax paid does not 
vary linearly with income. 
22. The figure in Part 1 of the thesis is 8.68%. The small difference 
is due to slightly different methodologies used to construct the mean 
profiles. 
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rate of return obtained using the conventional method, and is smal l er 
t han the rate of return typically considered to be acceptable. 
Note that the more highly correlated the two talents are (i.e. 
t he higher P12 is), the more severe is the bias, assuming that both 
t ypes of talents are useful in A and B. Consequently, the more we 
e xpect individuals who excel in one job to also excel in another job 
requiring, perhaps, different skills and educational qualifications, 
t he more we lean towards the estimates in the left end of Table 6.1. 
That is, the more extreme is the part of the alternative schooling 
income distribution which should be used for comparison. 
Negative Hierarchical Sorting 
Negative hierarchical sorting occurs when the condition crA/cr8 < 
PAB < cr8 /crA is satisfied. This condition implies that the scope for 
talent is greater in jobs associated with high-school qualifications 
than in jobs requiring degrees (i.e. cr8 > crA). Here, individuals who 
are relatively well-endowed in one or both of the talents will tend 
t o self-select into the high-school group. That is, they will tend to 
s top formal schooling after high-school since their talents will be 
more highly-valued at this level of qualification than at higher 
l evels. Conversely, those who are poorly-endowed with either one or 
both types of talents will tend to go on to university, and obtain 
j obs where talents (or lack of them) will matter less in the 
determination of earnings. 
Negative hierarchical sorting implies that if the typical high-
s chool leaver had attended college, he or she would have done better 
t han the average degree-holder. Since it is empirically well-
e stablished that, on average, degree-holders earn more than high-
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school leavers, this type of sorting appears somewhat implausible. As 
such, we shall dispense with the simulations for this case. 
Non-Hierarchical Sorting 
Willis calls the third type of sorting "non-hierarchical 
sorting". A more informative name for it might be "comparative-
advantage sorting", since, individuals are assumed to self-select on 
the basis of their comparative advantage in jobs associated with 
different educational levels. That is, those who do better in jobs 
requiring university qualification proceed to university, and those 
who are better-endowed in the type of talent required for high-school 
l evel jobs stop after high-school. 
The conditions under which non-hierarchical sorting occurs are 
crA/cr8 >pAB and cr8 /crA > PAB· These conditions are met when PAB is 
negative, or when PAB is sufficiently small (in the positive sense), 
and the scope for talent is about the same at both educational levels 
With non-hierarchical sorting, conventional estimates of higher 
education returns based on the comparison of mean income profiles 
would understate the profitability of the educational investment to 
those individuals who have chosen to attend university. The reason is 
that compared to the average high-school leaver, the average degree-
holder is relatively less well-endowed in the talent which is highly 
valued in high-school level jobs. It follows that, had the average 
degree-holder · not gone to university, he or she would have earned 
less than the average high-school leaver. 
Likewise, because the average high-school leaver is relatively 
less well-endowed in the talent which is highly valued in university-
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l evel jobs, the earnings he or she would have received as a 
university graduate would have been less than that received by the 
average degree-holder. Hence, for individuals with the average 
characteristics of B, the conventional approach would overstate the 
t rue returns to higher education. 
In Table 6.2, we match the earnings of the average degree-
holder to those corresponding to high-school leavers in the bottom 
end of the income distribution. For the average high-school leaver, 
we match the earnings to those received by individuals in the bottom 
end of the actual degree-holders' income distribution. 
TABLE 6.2: AVERAGE PRIVATE RATES OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATION UNDER 
NON-HIERARCHICAL (COMPARATIVE-ADVANTAGE) SORTING 
(1) average 
degree-holder 
(2 ) average 
high-sch leaver 
portion of actual 
high-school leavers' distribution 
bottom 
25% 
30.03% 
bottom 
50% 
20.05% 
bottom 
75% 
14.78% 
portion of actual 
degree-holders' distribution 
bottom 
25% 
negative 
bottom 
50% 
negative 
bottom 
75% 
3.78% 
average 
8.97% 
average 
8.97% 
It is interesting to note that for the average member of A, 
higher education appears to be highly profitable. In the extreme case 
presented, the rate of return is more than 30% for this individual. 
Even with less extreme assumptions, the rate of return is still wel l 
in excess of 10%, the benchmark figure typically used in assessing 
the feasibility of educational investment. 
187 
The picture for the average member of the high-school group (B) 
i s quite different. The figures suggest that even with fairly 
moderate assumptions regarding the part of the degree-holders' 
distribution this person would have been in had he or she at t ended 
university, the rate of return would still have been less than 4%. 
Hence, if we believe that the observed pattern of schooling is 
t he result of non-hierarchical sorting, then the divergence in the 
returns to higher education between those who have voluntarily opted 
not to attend university and those who have chosen to pursue higher 
education may be quite substantial. Clearly, the more negatively 
correlated individuals' endowments of the two types of talents are, 
and the more their usefulness in A and B differ, the more we will 
l ean towards the estimates using the more extreme ends of the 
a lternative schooling income distribution for comparison. 
Non-Sorting Case 
Willis identifies a special case, which he calls "equality of 
c omparative advantage", under which no sorting by ability occurs. 
This case arises when crA = cr8 and PAB = 1. Under these conditions, 
t he rate of return to higher education is identical across all 
i ndividuals. Assuming that the discount rate is the same for all 
individuals, then in equilibrium, the rate of return to higher 
education is equal to the discount rate. Individuals are, therefore, 
indifferent as to whether to attend university since their discounted 
lifetime incomes are independent of education. Willis assumes that, 
under these circumstances, the schooling decision is random. It 
188 
follows, therefore, that the rate of return estimated using the 
conventional approach will be unbiasect. 2 3 
More generally, we can perceive other circumstances under which 
no sorting by ability occurs. In the discussion so far, we have 
focussed on differential returns to investing in education due to 
differences in abilities as an explanation of why some individuals 
choose to attend university while others are content to stop after 
high-school. Even if individuals are fully informed with regards to 
their respective abilities, as assumed, there are still a number of 
other factors which affect their educational attainments. First, 
individuals' discount rates may differ, reflecting differences in 
their opportunities to finance education. Second, there may exist 
non-financial considerations in individuals' educational decisions. 
Griliches (1977), for instance, argues that such decisions are 
influenced, to a large extent, by parents, the state, teachers, and 
classmates whose motives are varied. As such, individuals' 
educational choices can only be interpreted as partly the result of 
their ex-ante optimisation based on financial incentives. Moreover, 
studies of identical twins suggest that tastes have a strong 
influence on individuals' educational attainment. Third, as we have 
stated earlier, institutional restrictions play an important role in 
Australia, at least with respect to whether individuals proceed to 
university. To the extent that these factors are not systematically 
related to individuals' true abilities, and to the extent that they 
dominate in the determination of individuals' educational 
23. Even if the discount rates across individuals are not equal, to 
the extent that the factors influencing individuals' discount rate 
are orthogonal to ~land ~2 , the conventional approach will still 
lead to unbiased estimates of the rate cf return. In this case, of 
course, the estimate is to be interpreted as the average rate of 
return. 
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attainments, the distribution of schooling outcomes will approach the 
non-sorting case. Unlike the special case of equality of comparative 
advantage, however, the rate of return to higher education may differ 
across individuals depending on their relative endowments of the 
talents (~1, ~2) and how these talents are valued across the two 
educational levels. 
In our view, a more convincing reason as to why there may be no 
sorting by abilities is that individuals may be unaware of their 
talents at the time of making the educational choice. In this case, 
too, provided the tendency to overestimate or underestimate one's 
abilities is not systematically related to one's true abilities, the 
actual income distributions of the different schooling groups will 
reflect the underlying population distribution of abilities. In other 
words, for both A and B, the actual distribution asymtotically 
approaches the population distribution. Hence, the conventional 
approach will yield the correct estimate of the average returns to 
higher education. Of course, the ex-post rate of return to -any 
particular individual may be quite different from the average rate of 
return, depending on the individual's abilities as a graduate and as 
a high-school leaver. However, since the individual is uncertain of 
his or her own abilities when deciding whether to attend university, 
ex-ante, the profitability of investing in higher education 
(unadjusted for the cost of uncertainty) to this individual is given 
by the average rate of return. 
Note that in the special case of equality in comparative 
advantage (PAB = 1; crA =crB), individuals in, say, the top 10% of the 
degree-holders' income distribution would also have been in the top 
10% of the high-school income distribution had they not gone to 
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university. 24 Likewise, high-school leavers in the top 10% of the 
high-school income distribution would have been amongst the top 10% 
of income-earners with degrees, had they chosen to attend university. 
In contrast, if the non-sorting case had arisen from individuals' 
uncertainty with regards to their abilities, PAB need not necessarily 
be equal to one. The same is true of non-sorting caused by 
differences in individuals' abilities to finance their educational 
investments, institutional restrictions, and non-financial 
considerations dominating the decision of whether to proceed to 
higher education. Hence, it is quite conceivable in these cases, for 
individuals in the top 10% of the degree-holders' income distribution 
to have finished in the bottom 10%, or any other part of the high-
school income distribution had they not gone to university. That is, 
there may not be a strong positive relationship between how well an 
individual does as a university graduate (relative to other degree-
holders) and how well he or she performs as a high-school leaver 
(relative to other high-school leavers). 
With this as background, we have divided the income 
distributions of high-school leavers and degree-holders into 
quintiles, and calculated the implied rate of return to higher 
education by matching the average incomes corresponding to different 
quintiles of the two distributions. The results are presented in 
Table 6.3. 
24. The equality of comparative advantage actually implies more than 
this. The second condition (crA = cr8 ) ensures that the dollar amount 
in excess of the mean of the corresponding distribution is the same 
whether the individual attends university. 
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TABLE 6.3: RATE OF RETURN TO HIGHER EDUCATION IMPLIED BY MATCHING 
DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE HIGH-SCHOOL AND DEGREE-HOLDERS' INCOME 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
Dl D2 D3 D4 D5 
Hl 6.99% negative negative negative negative 
H2 17.48% 8.15% 3.92% negative negative 
H3 23.12% 13.50% 9.38% 4.42% negative 
H4 29.04% 18.94% 14.63% 9.78% negative 
HS 50.83% 38.85% 33.67% 28.02% 12.51% 
Dl denotes the top quintile of degree-holders in terms of earnings, 
D2 the second quintile, and so on. Similarly, Hl to HS denote the top 
to the bottom quintiles of the high-school income distribution. 
Hence, the cell D2H3, for instance, shows that the rate of return to 
a degree-holder in the second quintile of the degree-holders' 
distribution, given that he or she would have been in the third 
quintile of the high-school income distribution had the decision to 
pursue higher education been different, is 13.50%. 
Note that depending on the magnitude of PABr not all the cells 
in Table 6.3 may be applicable. For instance, as we approach the case 
where individuals who do well as university also tend to excel as 
high-school graduates (PAB .-. 1) , the outcomes would congregate along 
the DlHl-DSHS diagonal. Conversely, if individuals who do well as 
degree-holders generally fare badly as high-school leavers and vice 
versa (PAB~ -1), then individuals' rates of return would congregate 
along the DlHS-DSHl diagonal. Of course, when there is no systematic 
relationship between an individual's performance as a university 
graduate and his or her performance as a high-school leaver, or when 
the relationship is weak (PAB ~ 0), any of the combinations is 
possible. 
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It is interesting to note that if an individual expects to be 
in the top quintile of the high-school distribution (Hl) without 
going to university, then unless he or she can be sure of being in 
the top quintile of the degree-holders' distribution (D1) as a 
university graduate, the rate of return to higher education is 
negative. Similarly, for an individual who expects to be in the 
bottom-most quintile of the degree-holders' distribution (D5) as a 
graduate, unless this person also expects to be in the bottom-most 
quintile of the high-school distribution if he or she does not attend 
university, then the rate of return to higher education is negative. 
A puzzling aspect of the figures in Table 6.3 is that if 
individuals are assumed to be aware of their respective abilities 
when the educational choice is made, so that the ex-post and ex-ante 
rates of return are the same, why would those who have very low (or 
negative) rates of return invest in higher education? There are two 
possible explanations. First, as has been suggested, individuals' 
educational decision may not be entirely the result of their ex-ante 
optimising behaviour; the influence of parents, teachers and friends 
on their decision cannot be dismissed. Second, there may be 
substantial non-pecuniary benefits of education which have been 
ignored in the calculations. Part I of the thesis suggests that the 
consumption value of higher education may be quite large. Hence, 
individuals may find the prospect of attending university attractive 
despite the monetary returns being low or even negative. 
It is perhaps more plausible to assume that individuals are not 
full y aware of their respective abilities when deciding whether to 
pursue higher education. Therefore, it is possible that ex-ante, 
higher education may appear to be profitable as an investment; ex-
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post, however, it may turn out to be quite unprofitable for some 
individuals. The figures show that individuals' ex-post rates of 
return to their investments in higher education may differ quite 
markedly. In the case where no systematic relationship exists between 
an individual's performance as a degree-holder and his or her 
performance as a high-school leaver (or if the relationship is 
negative), the rate of return for some individuals may be in excess 
of 50%, while for others, it may be negative. Even when there is a 
strong positive relationship between what an individual can earn as a 
degree-holder and what he or she can earn as a high-school leaver, 
the range of individuals' rates of return is still fairly wide. 
This, in turn, raises the questions of what is the cost of the 
uncertainty in returns, and how does it affect the ex-ante 
profitability of higher education as an investment in the risk-
adjusted sense? These questions are addressed in the next section. 
6.4 Uncertainty in Abilities 
In this section, we investigate the implications of 
individuals' uncertainty with regards to their own abilities on the 
ex-ante economic value of higher education. The two-step procedure 
developed in the previous chapter is used for this purpose. It is 
worth reiterating that in this chapter we assume that the variation 
in individual incomes around the mean income profile is due entirely 
to permanent individual-specific differences. Thus, the labour market 
income of individual i in period tis given by: 
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where the residual 8i is time invariant. Note that in this case, once 
the starting salary is revealed, the individual knows all future 
period incomes with perfect certainty. 
For comparability with the results in the previous chapter, we 
assume that the residuals from the earnings functions are normally 
distributed, and include in the calculations the risk of failure. As 
in the previous chapter, an interest rate of 5% is assumed and 
individuals' initial wealth is set at zero. 
TABLE 6.4: RISK PREMIUMS (PER ANNUM) & NPV OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
GIVEN UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO OWN ABILITY 
R 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
RISK PREMIUM 
Degree 
0 
1950 
3900 
5850 
7800 
9750 
High-School 
0 
1700 
3410 
5110 
6810 
8520 
NPV 
13180 
8880 
4570 
270 
-4040 
-8340 
The most striking feature of the figures in the table above is 
how much larger the size of the annual premiums are compared to the 
previous chapter. At R=3, for instance, assuming that the variation 
in individual incomes is caused by serially-independent random 
shocks, the estimates of the risk premium to the degree-holder income 
stream is around $700 per annum (see Table 5.4). On the other hand, 
when the variation is assumed to be the result of permanent 
individual-specific differences, the risk premium is $5,850 per 
annum, a more than eight-fold increase! This, of course, simply 
reflects the assumed permanent nature of income differences across 
individuals of the same age, sex, and educational attainment. Unlike 
the model in the previous chapter, individuals who do badly in one 
period also do badly in all other periods in their life-cycle, and 
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those who do well in one, also do well in all other periods. The 
observed variability in individual income is, therefore, a source of 
much greater concern in the present model. However, a word of caution 
is necessary. The risk-premium formula (5.5) used to compute the 
figures is strictly valid only for "small" risks. 25 Since we have 
reason to believe that the risks here may be rather "large", the 
estimates of the risk premiums should be interpreted with care. 
The figures in the last column of the table show that the 
consequences of individuals' ignorance of their own abilities on the 
ex-ante value of a degree are very serious indeed. Even for moderate 
degrees of risk-aversion (R=3), the risk-adjusted NPV is reduced so 
substantially as to make higher education only marginally attractive 
as a private investment. For individuals with higher degrees of risk 
aversion, the figures suggest that ex-ante, they are financially 
better-off not going to university. This is certainly quite different 
from the result in the previous chapter which finds that the 
adjustment for uncertainty reduces the profitability of higher 
education somewhat, but does not alter the conclusion that it is an 
attractive private investment. 
6.5 Conclusion 
It is assumed in this chapter that variation in individual 
incomes around the mean profile corresponding to their respective 
educational levels, reflects individual ability differences. Thinking 
in this way quickly leads us into complicated issues of ability bias 
in the conventional estimates of the average private rate of return 
to schooling. 
25. See the derivation in Section 5.3. 
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A simplified version of the Willis and Rosen model is used to 
distinguish between the different sorting cases which may arise, 
depending on the correlation between different types of talents in an 
individual, how these talents are valued in jobs associated with the 
different educational levels, and the individual's assumed knowledge 
regarding his or her own abilities. Three different cases of sorting 
by ability are identified. In each case, we compare the average 
income streams of high-school leavers and degree-holders with 
different parts of the corresponding alternative schooling income 
distribution. It is shown that even with quite moderate assumptions 
about the part of the distribution to use for comparison (such as, 
using the mean income of the top 75% of high-school leavers rather 
than the mean income of whole sample of high-school leavers) lead to 
estimates of the average private rate of return to higher education 
which are markedly different from that obtained using the 
conventional approach. The figures presented_ are not, in any way, 
meant to be definitive, but are to be interpreted along the lines of 
a sensitivity analysis. They serve as a warning that, in view of the 
l arge unexplained component in earnings functions, the effect of 
individuals' self-sorting by ability on conventional estimates of the 
rate of return to schooling may be quite serious. 
In the non-sorting case, the conventional estimates of the 
average rate of return are unbiased. However, the ex-post private 
rate of return to any particular individual may differ quite markedly 
from the average experience of the group. Assuming that an 
individual's performance as a degree-holder (relative to other 
degree-holders) is not systematically related to his or her 
performance as a high-school leaver (relative to other high-school 
leavers), the rate of return to this individual could be negative, or 
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i t could be more than 50%. This immediately pro~pts the question of 
how uncertainty with respect to one's own abilities affects the ex-
ante value of a degree. 
Using the framework developed in the previous chapter, we find 
t hat the riskiness from the point of the variability in consumption 
i s very much higher under the assumption that the observed 
variability in income is due to permanent individual-specific 
d ifferences. In terms of the effect on the ex-ante value of higher 
education, we find that the greater variability in consumption which 
i ndividuals will be subject to if they choose to attend university, 
r educes the private profitability of higher education to such an 
extent that higher education is only marginally attractive for the 
moderately risk averse. For those who have greater aversion towards 
r isk (R>3), the adjustment for the cost of risk completely overturns 
t he conclusion that higher education is a profitable private 
i nvestment. 
CHAPTER 7 
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF RISK AND DIFFERENTIAL ABILITY IN THE INVESTMENT 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters we studied the implications of the 
large earnings variation amongst individuals of the same age, sex, 
and educational attainment, on the private returns to higher 
education. First, it was assumed that the variation is due entirely 
to the random effects of chance (Chapter 5). The opposite assumption 
that the earnings variation is the result of differences in 
individual-specific characteristics ("ability") was then made 
(Chapter 6). Clearly, these are extreme assumptions. They have been 
made so as to enable us to focus on the complications arising from 
each of the two components of unexplained income variation 
separately. 
In this chapter we bring together the two components in order 
to draw out the implications for policy, and for individuals -
contemplating higher education. It is not possible, with our data, to 
determine the fraction of the residuals (from earnings functions) 
which is due to ability differences, and the fraction which is due to 
stochastic shocks. Therefore, we rely on Miller's (1989) finding, 
based on the Australian Longitudinal Survey, that the correlation in 
individuals' incomes (in logarithms) between adjacent years is around 
0.5 for males. Assuming that the stochastic shocks are serially 
independent, this translates into half the observed variation in 
individual incomes (in logarithms) amongst individuals of the same 
age, sex, and education, being caused by ability differences, and the 
other half being due to luck. 
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It is important to note that Miller's estimate is based on a 
sample of very young individuals, who are usually characterised by a 
high degree of income mobility. Hence, the permanent component of 
variation in individual incomes may be underestimated when applied to 
an older sample. On the other hand, by attributing the correlation in 
individual incomes between adjacent years entirely to the permanent 
component (and none to the possible serial correlation in the 
stochastic component), we tend to overestimate the fraction of the 
observed income variation which is due to ability differences. The 
results presented in this chapter should be interpreted with these 
caveats in mind. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In the next 
section, we analyse the effect of uncertainty on the ex-ante private 
profitability of higher education when the residuals from the 
earnings functions contain both stochastic and permanent individual-
specific components. Section 7.3 deals with the question of how the 
social rate of return to investment in higher education is affected 
by risk. In Section 7.4, the effects of risk and differential 
abilities across individuals on the ex-ante private profitability of 
higher education is examined in the context of the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (HECS). We focus, in particular, on the 
attractiveness of income-contingent feature of HECS vis-a-vis other 
fee-paying schemes when individuals are uncertain, and when they have 
full knowledge of their abilities. Section 7.5 concludes the chapter. 
To facilitate discussion, we define the following concepts. The 
"cost of uncertainty" refers to the present value of the stream of 
annual risk premiums associated with a particular educational 
decision. We define the "cost of risk-bearing associated with the 
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investment" as the difference in the costs of uncertainty between 
attending and not attending university. The convention used in this 
chapter is that the cost of risk-bearing is positive when the cost of 
uncertainty associated with attending university exceeds that of not 
attending. Unless otherwise stated, the cost figures are always 
expressed in present value terms. 
With reference to the discounted lifetime earnings associated 
with a particular educational choice, we use the term "adjusted" to 
indicate that this magnitude is net of the cost of uncertainty. 
Similarly, for the NPV (social or private) of higher education, the 
"adjusted" amount is that which is net of the cost of risk-bearing 
associated with the investment. Discounted lifetime earnings and NPV 
figures (adjusted and unadjusted) are always taken to be in the ex-
ante sense in this chapter. As with the cost figures, unless 
otherwise stated, these figures are always expressed in present value 
terms. The discount rate used in all calculations is 5%. 
7.2 The Effect of Uncertainty on the Ex-ante Private Profitability 
of Higher Education 
We have considered, in Chapters 5 and 6, the effect of 
uncertainty on the ex-ante private value of higher education when 
income variation is assumed to be due entirely to luck, and when it 
is assumed to be due entirely to individual ability differences. It 
is clear from the results that the importance of the uncertainty 
adj ustment depends on the source of the variation in individual 
incomes assumed. Therefore, it is of considerable interest to examine 
the effect of uncertainty when income variation contains both 
individual-specific and stochastic components. 
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We consid~r, first, the case where the individual is ignorant 
of his or her ability when deciding whether to proceed to universitv. 
The individual is, therefore, assumed to use the mean income profiles 
conditional on education in calculating the ex-ante value of higher 
education. It is further assumed that the individua1 · can distinguish 
between the permanent and stochastic components of his or her 
earnings. 1 Hence, on receipt of his or her first pay, the individual 
instantly knows the permanent component of his or her earnings in all 
future periods. Accordingly, expectations of all future period 
incomes are revised. Of course, the actual earnings in each of the 
future periods can be higher or lower than the permanent component 
depending on the outcomes of the stochastic component. However, there 
will not be any further adjustment to expectations of future incomes 
after the first period in the labour market, since, the stochastic 
shock in one period provides no information on the size of the shocks 
in future periods (given the assumption that they are serially 
independent). 
Table 7.1 presents the risk-premiums corresponding to the 
income streams of degree-holders and high-school leavers, as well as 
the adjusted private NPV of higher education for various degrees of 
risk aversion. As before, we assume an interest rate of 5%, and an 
initial wealth of zero. 
1. The permanent component of an individual's earnings includes both 
the measured and unmeasured components. In the notation of Chapter 5, 
an individual's income (in logarithms) at time tis Xit~ + Oi + Vit· 
The permanent component is given by XitP + oi. If we assume that the 
individual cannot distinguish between Oi and Yit, so that he or she 
knows only the sum of the two, the risk premiums to the income 
streams corresponding to high-school leavers and degree holders are 
both higher. However, this does not alter any of the conclusions in 
this section. 
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TABLE 7.1: RISK PREMIUMS (PER ANNUM) AND PRIVATE NPV OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION GIVEN UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO OWN ABILITY AND 
STOCHASTTC COMPONENT BY DEGREE OF RISK AVERSION 
R RISK PREMIUM NPV 
Degree High-School 
0 0 0 13180 
1 1080 880 9730 
2 2160 1760 6280 
3 3240 2640 2830 
4 4320 3530 -620 
5 5400 4410 -4080 
As we would expect, the magnitudes of the risk premiums fall 
between those in Table 5.4 (all luck) and Table 6.4 (all ability). It 
is interesting to note that at R=3, higher education is still 
attractive as an investment when the variability in individual 
incomes is caused by both ability and stochastic factors. The 
adjusted NPV is, however, less than $3,000. Put differently, a "one-
off" registration fee of $3,000 for higher education, for instance, 
is more than sufficient to discourage even moderately risk-averse 
individuals from enrolling in higher education. This is certainly 
quite different to the rosy picture presented when the cost of 
uncertainty is ignored, in which case the private NPV of higher 
education is in excess of $13,000. 2 For more risk-averse individuals, 
the adjusted NPV of higher education is negative, which suggests that 
for these individuals higher education is not attractive from a 
purely financial point of view. 
If the individual is fully aware of his or her ability when 
deciding whether to proceed to university, the riskiness of higher 
2. This figure takes into account the probabilities of dropping out 
and of taking more than the minimum time to complete the course, both 
of which lower the expected returns to higher education. Individuals 
are, however, assumed to be indifferent to these risks. If they do 
not even recognise the possibility of failing, the ex-ante value of 
higher education is more than $31,000 (see Table 5.3). 
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education as an investment and the cost of this riskiness depend on 
how much he or she can expect to earn as a graduate, and as a high-
school leaver. That is, the cost of risk-bearing associated with 
investing in higher education varies according to the individual's 
ability as a degree-holder, and his or her ability as a high-school 
leaver. 
Recall that the income of an individual i, at time t, 
conditional on schooling level j is given by: 
The stochastic term Vijt is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed across i and t, and to be independent of Oij· 
This implies that given the level of schooling j, the variance of an 
individual's income in logarithms at any time tis independent of his 
or her ability (i.e. Oij>. However, the variance of the individual's 
income in levels increases with Oij· Hence, at any age, given the 
level of education, the more able an individual is, the higher is his 
or her expected income, and the larger is the variance of that 
income. This, in turn, translates into higher consumption 
variability, and a higher cost of uncertainty. 
An individual's ability at a particular educational level also 
affects the cost of uncertainty via A(C). Since A' (C) < O, the higher 
oij is, the higher is the expected annual consumption level C and the 
lower is A(C). This has the opposite effect of lowering the cost of 
uncertainty. Hence, a priori, it is not possible to predict how the 
cost of uncertainty associated with j would vary with Oij· 
There is a further factor to consider in calculating the cost 
of uncertainty associated with attending university. In our model, we 
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allow for the possibility of the individual dropping out at the end 
of his or her first year in university, and subsequently joining the 
workforce as a high-school leaver. Hence, in addition to the 
individual's ability as a degree-holder, his or her ability as a 
high-school leaver also enters into the calculation. Ceteris paribus, 
the greater is the divergence between what an individual expects to 
earn as a university graduate and as a high-school leaver, the 
greater is the ex-ante uncertainty with respect to the income stream 
associated with the choice of attending university. 
Table 7.2 presents the cost of risk-bearing associated with 
investing in higher education, and the unadjusted private NPV of 
higher education by the percentiles of the degree-holder and high-
school leaver income distributions the individual expects to be 
in. 3 , 4 The cost of risk-bearing is calculated on the basis of a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3. 
3. Individuals' expectations are based solely on the magnitudes of 
their permanent components, since, E(Vijt)=O. 
4. We continue to assume, in this case, that individuals are 
uncertain with regards to the number of years required for completion 
of their degrees, and whether they will drop out of their courses. 
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TABLE 7.2: COST OF RISK-BEARING AND UNADJUSTED PRIVATE NPV OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (IN PARENTHESES) ASSUMING ABILITY IS KNOWN 
(1985-86 DOLLARS) 
percentile of 
deg-holders' 
distribution 
10 
25 
so 
75 
90 
10 
12250 
(37280) 
18560 
(-192030) 
86260 
(-340070) 
209100 
(-437980) 
349650 
(-492900) 
percentile of 
high-school leavers' distribution 
25 
48340 
(243030) 
5870 
(14180) 
14510 
(-134050) 
67420 
(-231630) 
145670 
(-287730) 
50 
98780 
(391100) 
29570 
(161760) 
2670 
(13440) 
9670 
(-83740) 
40770 
(-139690) 
75 
146110 
(48i380) 
64550 
(258430) 
19830 
(110620) 
2210 
. (13670) 
4080 
(-45550) 
90 
177080 
(534190) 
91170 
(311280) 
39570 
(163240) 
12440 
(66290) 
1550 
( 9 97 0) 
Since our interest is in higher education as an investment, we 
focus our attention only on those cells with positive unadjusted NPV. 
The cells with negative unadjusted NPV are presented for 
completeness. 5 The figures show that, for an individual whose 
respective abilities as a university graduate and as a high-school 
leaver are such that he or she will be placed in the tenth percentile 
of the degree-holders' ability distribution and in the bottom tenth 
percentile (or ninetieth percentile) of the high-school leavers' 
ability distribution, the expected unadjusted NPV of higher education 
is $534,190. The cost of risk-bearing from the investment in higher 
education to this individual amounts to $177,080, or 33% of the 
unadjusted NPV. In contrast, the unadjusted NPV for an individual 
whose respective abilities place him or her in the ninetieth 
percentile of both distributions is $9,970. The cost of risk-bearing 
5. Individuals represented by these cells may still proceed to 
university if they are not purely motivated by financial 
considerations. 
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to investing in higher education for this individ~al i s only $1,55 0 
which is 15.5% of the unadjusted NPV. In absolute terms, the cost of 
risk-bearing associated with the investment in higher education for 
some of the cells is even higher than the cost of risk-bearing when 
individuals are assumed to be ignorant of both their permanent and 
stochastic components at the time when the decision is made (which is 
$10,530) . 6 In percentage terms, however, the adjustment for the c ost 
of risk-bearing has a much greater effect when ability is assumed to 
be unknown at the time the educational decision is made. The NPV of 
higher education is reduced by 78.5% in Table 7.1 at R=3. In 
comp~rison, the percentage reduction in the NPV in Table 7.2 which 
ranges from 15.5% to 41.4% (for the cells with positive unadjusted 
NPV) is small, although far from trivial. 
Summing up, the analysis above suggests that if individuals are 
uncertain of their own abilities when deciding whether to attend 
university, the cost of uncertainty (arising from both the permanent 
and stochastic components) reduces the value of higher education 
quite substantially. For moderately risk-averse individuals (R=3), 
t he NPV is reduced by almost 80%. Higher education to these 
i ndividuals is still profitable as an investment, but is nowhere near 
as lucrative as is commonly thought, when the cost of risk-bearing 
associated with the investment is ignored. 
If individuals are assumed to know their respective abilities 
at the time of making the educational choice, the cost of risk-
bearing from the investment in higher education varies, depending on 
h ow well they expect to perform in the labour market as university 
6. This figure can be easily derived from Table 7.1 by subtract i ng 
the adjusted NPV (R=3) from the unadjusted NPV (R=O). 
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graduates and as high-school leavers. For the cases in which the 
unadjusted NPV of higher education is non-negative, we estimate that 
the adjustment for the cost of risk-bearing leads to a reduction in 
the NPV ranging from 15% to 40%. 
7.3 Uncertainty and Social Returns 
One of the arguments often used to justify government 
intervention in the provision of education is the alleged 
imperfection of the capital market. The argument usually runs as 
follows. Investors in human capital face uncertain returns. By and 
large, these returns are uncorrelated across individuals. Hence, if 
it is possible for individuals to buy and sell shares in each other's 
human capital, or to insure their returns, then the risk of investing 
in human capital can be eliminated. Unfortunately, a market for such 
exchanges does not exist. Because of this, assuming that individuals 
are risk-averse, they will fail to invest up to the point where the 
marginal expected return is equal to the marginal cost of financing 
the investment. It follows, therefore, that from society's point of 
view, there will be an under-investment in human capital. The 
implication of this is that, insofar as the risks faced by 
individuals are independent, they should be ignored when considering 
the social profitability of the investment. Levhari and Weiss (1974, 
p.953) argue, for instance, that: 
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"If one assumes that ... [the return to investment] is an 
independent random variable across individuals, ... then 
for a discussion of over- or underinvestmenc in human 
capital [vis-a-vis physical capital], it is the 
difference between the expected marginal rates of return 
which is relevant. If the expected rate of return to 
human capital is above l+r (or E(l+r)) 7 , then it is 
desirable from a social point of view to transfer 
resources from physical into human capital investment. 
Since the investment is performed by· many individuals, 
society will enjoy the average (expected) rate of 
return." 
This line of argument seems to suggest that "society" has an 
existence apart from its members. If this were not the case, and 
"society" is regarded simply as a collection of individuals, then 
clearly, the costs of risk-bearing borne by its members cannot be 
ignored. 8 Alternatively, the proposition that individual risks are 
irrelevant could have arisen from a confusion between the treatment 
of risks which are borne collectively, and those that are borne by 
the individuals themselves. 
In their discussion of the treatment of risk in the evaluation 
of public investment decisions, Arrow and Lind (1970) were careful to 
distinguish between these two types of risk. If all benefits and 
costs associated with an investment accrued to the goverment and were 
distributed among the tax-payers, then the risk of the investment is 
borne collectively. They showed that under these conditions, provided 
that the investment is a small fraction of the government's total 
investment portfolio, and provided that the return to this investment 
is uncorrelated with the returns to other government investments, the 
cost of risk to society would be negligible. Hence, if risks are 
7. r is the rate of return to investment in physical capital, which 
is assumed to be riskless. 
8. Fane (1984b) makes a similar point in his case against subsidised 
loans on the basis of the inability of individuals to spread risk. 
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b orne collectively, Levhari and Weiss' observation is completely 
valid. That is, in considering the social returns to h i gher 
education, individual risks are irrelevant. 
However, Arrow and Lind (p.356) went on to say that if 
" ... benefits and costs ... accrued directly to individuals so that 
t hese individuals incurred the attendant costs of risk-bearing [then ] 
i t is appropriate to discount for the risk, as would these 
i ndividuals". In other words, if risks are privately borne, then the 
cost of risk-bearing to individuals cannot be ignored in the 
evaluation of the social feasibility of the investment. 
In general, some benefits and costs of public investments will 
accrue to the government and the risks of these will be borne 
c ollectively. Other benefits and costs will accrue to individuals and 
t he attendant uncertainties related to these will be borne privately 
by the individuals. In assessing the social desirability of 
i nvestment projects, it is, therefore, crucial to distinguish between 
p rivate and public benefits and costs. In the case of investment in 
h igher education, we can think of the income tax foregone while 
individuals are studying and the cost of providing the education 
s ervice as the government's contribution to the cost of the 
i nvestment. The additional taxes collected as a result of graduates' 
higher incomes can be regarded as the benefit accruing to the 
government. The cost of risk-bearing on this part of the investment 
i s negligible since the risks are borne collectively. The private 
part of the investment consists of individuals' foregone (after-tax) 
i ncome and their expenditures on books and stationery as cos t , and 
t he increment to their after-tax incomes as benefit. Th e cost of 
r isk-bearing on this part of the investment may be signi ficant , a nd 
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must be taken into account when calculating the social returns to 
higher education. 
The risk-premiums given in the previous section provide an 
estimate of the cost of risk-bearing borne privately by individuals. 
Assuming that individuals are uncertain of· their respective 
abilities, the annual risk premiums to the degree-holders' and high-
school leavers' income streams are $3,240 and $2,640, respectively 
(at R=3). Over the lifetime, in present value terms, these figures 
translate to $56,420 and $46,060, respectively (at 5%). In other 
words, the discounted cost of uncertainty over the lifetime if the 
individual chooses to cease formal education after high-school is 
$46,060. On the other hand, if the individual decides to proceed to 
university, the cost of the uncertainty is $56,420. Hence, the cost 
of risk-bearing to the individual as a result of the investment is 
$(56,420-46,060) = $10,360. This amount should be subtracted from the 
expected social NPV to obtain a risk-adjusted measure of the social 
returns to higher education. 
Table 7.3 presents the cost of risk-bearing borne privately by 
individuals as a result of the educational investment at various 
degrees of risk aversion. The figures assume that, ex-ante, 
individuals are uncertain of their abilities. The risk-adjusted 
social NPV of higher education at a 5% discount rate is given in the 
final column of the table. We assume in these calculations that the 
selection mechanism used to allocate university places is unrelated 
to individuals' true potentials as university graduates, and as high-
school leavers. It follows, therefore, that the expected income of 
the marginal student (i.e. the last person to be admitted under the 
selection mechanism) is given by the mean income profile of degree-
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holders (adjusted for the probability of failure). Had this 
individual chosen not to pursue higher education, his or her expected 
income is given by the mean income profile of high-school leavers. We 
assume that individuals' pre-tax income reflects their respective 
productivities. 
As in Chapter 4, the marginal cost to the government (excluding 
income tax foregone) in providing an extra university place is taken 
to be $3,200 per year. The probabilities of failure and dropping out 
are as assumed in Chapter 5. We assume that these probabilities are 
unrelated to the probability of gaining admission to university. 9 The 
net income of students whilst studying is assumed to be $980 per 
annum. We assume in this section that the marginal value of 
externalities associated with higher education is zero. 
TABLE 7.3: COST OF RISK-BEARING FROM EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENT BORNE 
PRIVATELY AND SOCIAL NPV OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR VARIOUS DEGREES OF 
RISK AVERSION 
R 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Cost of 
Risk-Bearing 
0 
3450 
6900 
10350 
13800 
17260 
Social NPV 
41080 
37630 
34180 
30730 
27280 
23820 
The figures in the table show that the social profitability of 
higher education as an investment is reduced quite substantially when 
the cost of risk-bearing borne privately by individuals is taken into 
account. Assuming that the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
among those choosing to attend university is around 3, the marginal 
9. If the marginal student is more likely to drop out, or take longer 
than the minimum time to complete his or her degree, this assumption 
biases our estimates of the marginal social NPV upwards. 
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social NPV is reduced by some 25%. In spite of this, the adjusted 
social NPV (with a discount rate of 5%) still remains sizeable. 
Hence, assuming that the social discount rate is 5%, it would appear 
that there is an under-investment in higher education. This result 
is, of course, highly dependent on the ass.umptions that, a priori, 
individuals do not know their respective abilities, and that the 
selection mechanism for allocating university places are not related 
to these abilities. If either or both of these conditions do not 
hold, the mean income profiles of the alternative educational groups 
may not be appropriate as estimates of the marginal student's 
expected earnings conditional on his or her educational choice. 
Table 7.4 presents the adjusted social NPV by the percentiles 
of the degree-holders' and the high-school leavers' income 
distribution the marginal student is expected to be in. We assume in 
these calculations that individuals are fully aware of their 
respective abilities so that uncertainty in future incomes is due 
only to the effects of chance and the risk of failure in university. 
TABLE 7.4: ADJUSTED SOCIAL NPV OF HIGHER EDUCATION ASSUMING ABILITY 
IS KNOWN (1985-86 DOLLARS) 
percentile of percentile of 
deg-holders' high-school leavers' distribution 
distribution 
10 25 50 75 90 
10 145170 601890 843610 942070 984310 
25 -428870 77740 344640 456780 500420 
so -850400 -267050 35410 166400 216460 
75 -1127840 -491640 -142360 13620 73230 
90 -1345620 -650090 -253600 -68670 3560 
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If we assume that an individual's performance in Year 12 (which 
is currently used as the selection criterion for entry into 
university) is highly correlated with his or her earnings as a 
university graduate, then ex-ante, we expect the marginal graduate to 
finish in the bottom-end of the degree-holders' income 
distribution. 1 0 Using the income profile of a degree-holder in the 
ninetieth percentile as an estimate of the marginal graduate's 
expected income, it is clear that unless we expect this individual to 
do worse than at least 90% of high-school leavers had he or she not 
attended university, then the (adjusted) marginal social NPV to 
higher education is negative. Even if we were to use the income 
profile of a degree-holder in the seventy-fifth percentile as an 
estimate of the marginal graduate's expected income, unless without a 
degree, he or she is expected to finish in the bottom quartile of the 
high-school distribution, the (adjusted) .marginal social NPV is 
negative. 
If an individual's performance in Year 12 is uncorrelated with 
his or her earnings as a graduate, the mean income profile of degree-
holders may be used to estimate the marginal graduate's earnings. 
However, it may still be inappropriate to use the mean income profile 
of high-school leavers as an estimate of how much the marginal 
g raduate would have earned as a high-school leaver if individuals are 
a ssumed to have full knowledge of their abilities. The discussion in 
t he previous chapter makes it clear that in such a situation, 
depending on the type of sorting which takes place, the mean high-
s chool profile may over- or under-estimate the marginal graduate's 
e arnings as a high-school leaver. Only in the non-sorting case i s the 
10. Ex-post, because of the stochastic component, the margin a l 
graduate may actually do better than more able graduates. 
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mean high-school profile an appropriate representation of what the 
marginal graduate would have earned had he or she not attended 
university. It is obvious from the table that depending on the 
precise part of the high-school distribution used for comparison, the 
(adjusted} social NPV may be greater, or less than zero. 11 
The question of whether society, at the margin, should expand 
its investment in higher education, therefore, hinges critically on 
the relationship between the admission criterion (i.e. Year 12 
results) and individuals' true abilities. It also depends on 
individuals' knowledge of their own abilities, and the type of 
sorting which results. Unfortunately, work in this area is scarce. 
Little is known about the relationship between individuals' 
performance in Year 12 and labour market success in later years. 
Equally little is known about the relationship between individuals' 
abilities as degree-holders and as high-school leavers. Until these 
issues are resolved, we can only speculate about whether an expansion 
in higher education is desirable from the efficiency point of view. 
7.4 Ability and Uncertainty in the Context of the Tertiary Tax 
One of the attractive features in the recently introduced 
t ertiary tax scheme (HECS) from the point of individual risk-bearing, 
i s the risk-insurance aspect of the scheme. 12 In contrast to other 
f ee-paying schemes such as that proposed by the Liberal and National 
11. As an approximation, we assume that the marginal graduate's 
expected income is given by the median income profile of degree-
holders. The mean income profile of graduates is slightly higher than 
t he median profile, but this does not affect the conclusion. 
12. We shall consider only the HECS option of paying through the 
t axation system. The "up-front" payment option, which amounts to a 
charge of $1,530 per full-time year is quite similar to the Liberal-
National proposal of an "up-front" fee of $1,200. 
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Parties (LIB), HECS is income-contingent. Under HECS, in 1989, 
students are charged $1,800 for each full-time year of higher 
education they receive. The rate of repayment is set at 1% of taxable 
income when annual personal incomes are less than $24,499 but more 
than $22,000; 2% of taxable income when their personal incomes fall 
between $25,000 and $34,999 per annum; and 3% of taxable income for 
t hose earning more than $35,000 per year. Students and ex-students 
will pay at these rates in every year in which their incomes exceed 
$22,000 until their total debt (indexed only for inflation) to the 
government is completely discharged. This implies that, with a 
positive real interest rate, the more quickly individuals discharge 
t heir debt because of their higher incomes, the more they will have 
paid for their education in present value terms. 13 For individuals 
whose annual incomes never exceed the minimum threshold of $22,000, 
higher education is effectively free except for foregone earnings. 
Assuming that individuals are risk averse, uncertainty in future 
i ncomes implies that HECS would be preferred to an equivalent 
expected repayment "up-front" fee. 
Using the consumption optimisation model developed in Chapter 
5, we can compare the cost of uncertainty to individuals investing in 
h igher education under different fee-regimes. We assume, for this 
exercise, that individuals are uncertain of their abilit ies when 
making the educational choice. 14 As before, we assume that the 
r esiduals are normally distributed and contain both permanent and 
s tochastic co~ponents which have equal variances. The stochastic 
13. See the discussion in Chapter 3. 
1 4. As noted previously, this implies that ex-ante, individua l s use 
t he mean earnings profiles conditional on education to estimate their 
earnings under each educational alternative. 
216 
component is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. Individuals are 
also assumed to be able to distinguish between the permanent and 
stochastic parts of their income. 
Following the procedure described in Chapter 5, the regression 
results in Table 5.3 are used to generate the income profiles of 
individuals conditional on education. For this exercise, however, 
individuals' incomes are converted into 1988-89 dollars using the 
CPI, and subjected to the marginal tax rates applying in the 1988-89 
financial year. 
As a reminder, the LIB scheme imposes a $1,200 fee for ·each 
year of full-time education. We assume for the full-fee regime that 
students are charged $12,000 per year (based on Bond University's fee 
schedule) . 
Table 7.5 presents the cost of risk-bearing and the unadjusted 
NPV of higher education under the different fee-regimes. As usual, 
the initial wealth is set at zero, and an interest rate of 5% is 
assumed. 
TABLE 7.5: COST OF RISK-BEARING AND UNADJUSTED NPV OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION UNDER ALTERNATIVE FEE-REGIMES (1988-89 DOLLARS) 
R 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
No Fees HECS LIB 
COST OF RISK-BEARING 
8910 8910 9240 
17810 17810 18470 
26720 26720 27710 
35630 35620 36940 
44540 44530 46180 
UNADJUSTED NPV 
25500 21630 21500 
Full Fees 
12970 
25950 
38920 
51900 
64870 
-14640 
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Note that the cost of uncertainty and the expected lifetime 
income associated with not going to unversity is the same under all 
fee-regimes. Hence, the differences in the cost of risk-bearing and 
the unadjusted NPV are due solely to the differences in the cost of 
uncertainty and the expected lifetime income associated with 
attending university under the various fee-regimes. Under the no-fee 
regime, the cost of risk-bearing is $26,720 at R=3. The cost of risk-
bearing under the LIB is slightly higher, at $27,710, reflecting the 
higher cost of uncertainty associated with attending university under 
LIB. In part, this increase in the cost of uncertainty is due to the 
increase in the degree of risk aversion (as measured by A(C) the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion) as the expected annual level 
of consumption for those opting to attend university falls with the 
imposition of fees. In part, the increase in the cost of uncertainty 
reflects the increase in the variability of lifetime income to those 
choosing to proceed to university as a result of the tertiary fees. 
Under LIB, in addition to the uncertainty with regards to future 
incomes, university attendees are also unsure about the fees they 
will need to pay in total, since, at the time of enrolment, they do 
not know the number of years they will spend in university. However, 
because the amount involved is relatively small, and because 
individuals can smoothen their consumption over time by borrowing and 
lending, the cost of this additional uncertainty is minuscule. 
The cost of risk-bearing under HECS is about the same as that 
under the no-f~e regime. Note, from the last row of Table 7.5, that 
the unadjusted NPV of higher education under HECS is almost identical 
to that under LIB. This implies that risk-neutral individuals would 
be almost indifferent between the two regimes, assuming that they can 
borrow and lend at an interest rate of 5%. For risk-averse 
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individuals, however, the cost of risk-bearing under HECS is slightly 
lower than under LIB. At R=3, the difference is almost $1,000. This 
increases to $1,650 at R=S. Hence, risk-averse individuals would 
prefer HECS to LIB, even if the expected payments (in present value 
terms) under the two regimes are identical. 
It must be recognised, however, that the difference between the 
costs of risk-bearing under HECS and LIB, is not very large. This is, 
in part, due to the restriction of our sample to full-time full-year 
male workers. If individuals are uncertain about the number of hours 
they are likely to work when they leave university, or whether they 
will even participate in the workforce, then the difference in the 
cost of uncertainty under HECS and LIB will be larger. In Appendix 
7.1, we present the cost of uncertainty under the various fee-regimes 
estimated using the full sample of all males who reported positive 
earned-income in 1985-86. The probability of receiving zero income in 
any one year is assumed to be 6% for those with degrees, and 9% for 
high-school leavers. 15 The figures there show that at R=3 the 
difference in the costs of risk-bearing under the two regimes is 
$1,440. At R=S, the difference increases to $2,350. We expect the 
difference to be even larger for females who are statistically more 
likely to withdraw from the labour force at some stage of their 
careers. 
With the full-fee regime, the cost of risk-bearing is $38,920 
(at R=3), more than $12,000 higher than the no-fee case. In other 
words, the increase in the cost of risk-bearing is more than the 
equivalent of one year's fees under this regime. The higher cost of 
15. These are approximately the percentages across all ages (15-64) 
who report zero earned-income in the two educational groups. 
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risk-bearing reflects the increase in the cost of uncertainty 
associated with attending university. As in the LIB scheme, this 
increase is due to the increase in individuals' degree of risk 
aversion (as measured by A(C)) and the increase in the variability of 
the lifetime income associated with attending university. 16 Our 
calculations, therefore, show that in moving from a no-fee regime to 
one where students pay full fees, not only are those choosing to 
attend university worse off because of the reduction in their 
expected earnings (by $40,140), they are made further worse off by 
the increased cost of uncertainty (to the tune of $12,000). 
The adjusted private NPV of higher education under the various 
fee-regimes for different degrees of risk aversion can easily be 
derived from Table 7.5. For convenience, they are given in Table 7.6. 
TABLE 7.6: ADJUSTED PRIVATE NPV OF HIGHER EDUCATION {1988-89 DOLLARS} 
UNDER ALTERNATIVE FEE-REGIMES BY DEGREE OF RISK AVERSION 
R No Fees HECS LIB Full Fees 
0 25500 21630 21500 -14640 
1 16590 12730 12260 -27620 
2 7680 3820 30300 -40590 
3 -1220 -5080 -6210 -53560 
4 -10130 -13990 -15440 -66540 
5 -19040 -22890 -24680 -79510 
Interestingly, under the zero-fee regime, the expected NPV of 
higher education without adjusting for the cost of risk-bearing is 
$25,500. This is significantly higher than the NPV given in Table 7.1 
of $13,180 (in 1985-86 dollars), which is equivalent to $16,600 in 
16. Simulations holding A(C) constant across regimes reveal that the 
difference in the variability of lifetime income between the no-fee 
and the full-fee regimes is responsible only for a small fraction of 
the increase in the cost of uncertainty. In other words, it is the 
increase in A(C) as we switch from no fees to full fees which causes 
the cost of uncertainty associated with attending university to 
escalate. 
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1988-89 dollars. This discrepancy is caused by the different tax 
rates use~. Compared to the 1985-86 personal tax rates, the tax rates 
operating in 1988-89 tend to be less progressive overall. For 
instance, the highest marginal rate in 1985-86 was sixty cents in a 
dollar. This was reduced to forty-nine cents in a dollar in the 1988-
89 financial year. The change in the marginal tax rates has the 
effect of increasing the unadjusted profitability of higher education 
in real terms to individuals, as the figures clearly show. 
In addition to its effect on the unadjusted NPV of higher 
education to private individuals, the change in tax rates also 
influences the cost of risk-bearing. The lower progressivity of the 
1988-89 tax regime tends to increase the variability of individuals' 
after-tax incomes. This, in turn, raises the cost of uncertainty to 
individuals. Appendix 7.2 compares the costs of uncertainty 
associated with going, and not going to university, as well as the 
cost of risk-bearing under the two tax regimes (assuming zero fees). 
The results there show that, with the 1985-86 tax rates, the cost of 
uncertainty associated with attending university is $71,060 (1988-89 
dollars) at R=3. When the 1988-89 tax rates are used, on the other 
hand, the cost of uncertainty increases to $92,010. The cost of 
uncertainty associated with not going to unversity also increases (in 
real terms) under the 1988-89 tax regime, although not by as much. It 
follows, therefore, that the cost of risk-bearing is higher (in real 
terms) under the 1988-89 tax regime. 
The figuies in the first row of Table 7.6 echo the results 
presented in Part I of the thesis. 17 That is, ignoring the cost of 
17. Note, however, that the figures here take into account the 
probabilities of dropping out and taking longer than the minimum time 
to complete the degree. 
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risk-bearing, it is clear that in the absence of fees, ex-ante, 
higher education is a highly profitable investment to individuals. 
The profitability under the HECS and LIB regimes is reduced somewhat, 
but not by much, and higher education remains very attractive as a 
private investment. When full-fees are charged, however, it no longer 
appears attractive for individuals to pursue higher education from 
the investment point of view. 
These conclusions are altered dramatically once the cost of 
risk-bearing is taken into account. With the tax rates operating in 
1988-89, even if no fees are charged, higher education does not 
appear to be attractive to individuals who are moderately risk averse 
(R=3). The figures show that they will, in fact, be worse off by the 
equivalent of more than a thousand dollars (ex-ante) if they decide 
to pursue higher education. When fees are levied, even if the amount 
is small, such as in the HECS and LIB schemes, our figures suggest 
that from an investment point of view, risk-averse individuals (R=3) 
are clearly better off not going to university. The fact that there 
is still an excess demand for university places must reflect non-
optimisation on the part of individuals, non-pecuniary benefits of 
higher education which have not been taken into account (and which 
may be quite large as Part 1 of the thesis suggests), a substantial 
number of individuals with R < 3, or some combination of all three. 
Alternatively, it could be the result of individuals over-estimating 
their own abilities and chance of good fortune. Smith (1937, p.109), 
for instance, observed that: "The contempt of risk and the 
presumptuous hope of success are in no period of life more active 
than at the age at which young people choose their professions". 18 
18. Cited in Becker (1975, P~78). 
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Finally, in this section, we examine the attractiveness of HECS 
vis-a-vis a non-income-contingent scheme such as LIB when individuals 
are assumed to be aware of their abilities. For this exercise, we 
simulate the income and consumption streams of individuals from 
different parts of the ability distribution under both the HECS and 
LIB regimes. The cost of risk-bearing and the unadjusted NPV of 
higher education under each of these regimes are then calculated. The 
results are shown in Table 7.7 by the percentile of the degree-
holders' income distribution individuals expect to be placed if they 
decide to attend university. 19 The coefficient of relative risk 
aversion in the calculations of the cost of uncertainty associated 
with attending university is assumed to be 3. 
In comparing the attractiveness of HECS relative to LIB, the 
figures of interest are the adjusted NPV of higher education under 
~he two schemes. These are given in columns (3) and (5). 
Interestingly, for individuals with high abilities, ex-ante, LIB is 
marginally more attractive than HECS. For instance, the expected 
adjusted NPV of higher education for those in the top tenth 
percentile of the ability distribution under LIB is $19,770. Under 
HECS, this figure is $19,150. In contrast, for individuals in the 
bottom tenth percentile of the ability distribution, the adjusted NPV 
of higher education under HECS ($12,290) is higher than under LIB 
($10,710). Hence, for these individuals, HECS is preferred to LIB. 
In summary, if individuals are aware of their respective 
abilities when deciding whether to pursue higher education, ex-ante, 
19. For simplicity, we assume that an individual who expects to be in 
the tenth percentile, say, of the degree-holders' distribution also 
expects to be in the tenth percentile of the high-school leavers' 
distribution depending on his or her educational decision. · 
TABLE 7.7: COST OF RISK-BEARING AND PRIVATE NPV (ADJUSTED AND UNADJUSTED) OF HIGHER EDUCATION BY PERCENTILE OF 
DEGREE-HOLDERS' INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1988-89 DOLLARS) 
percentile 
10 
25 
50 
75 
90 
(1) 
Unadjusted 
NPV 
28180 
21580 
17670 
15970 
15270 
HECS 
(2) (3) 
Cost of Adjusted NPV 
Risk-Bearing (1)-(2) 
9030 19150 
6800 14790 
4930 12740 
3710 12260 
2980 12290 
LIB 
( 4 ) (5) (6) 
Unadjusted Cost of Adjusted NPV 
NPV Risk-Bearing (4)- (5) 
28830 9060 19770 
21990 6840 15150 
17680 5020 12660 
15370 3860 11520 
13920 3210 10710 
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those who are relatively more able will be better off under LIB than 
under HECS (if they choose to attend university). Conversely, those 
who are relatively less able will, ex-ante, prefer HECS to the LIB 
scheme. It must be recognised, however, that the differences under 
the two schemes are not very large. 
It is also interesting to note that in present value terms, the 
amount individuals in the top tenth percentile expect to repay under 
HECS amounts to $4,720 (1988-89 dollars) . 20 Individuals in the bottom 
tenth percentile, on the other hand, expect the present value of 
their repayments to be only $2,720. In contrast, under LIB, the 
present value of the fees expected to be paid in total is $4,070 for 
all individuals. In this regard, it can be said that HECS 
discriminates against the more able. Whether this is desirable from 
the social point of view is difficult to say, and involves both 
efficiency and equity considerations. From the point of social 
~ 
equity, to the extent that it is considered more equitable for 
individuals who have higher lifetime incomes to contribute more for 
their education, then the higher implicit charge HECS imposes on the 
more able may be justified. On the other hand, to the extent that the 
amount of (positive) externalities flowing from each graduate is 
larger, the higher the graduate's ability, 21 then from the efficiency 
point, the discrimination against the more able may be undesirable. 22 
20. This figure is obtained by comparing the expected lifetime 
earnings of individuals pursuing higher education under HECS and 
under the no-~ee regime (not shown). 
21. A case can be made, for instance, that graduates with higher 
abilities are more likely to make research break-throughs which have 
uncaptured benefits flowing to the rest of the community. 
22. This argument assumes that the expected marginal cost to the 
government is the same for all individuals. It also assumes that 
there are no non-price rationing of university places. 
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A number of caveats to the analysis in this section should be 
noted. First, the analysis is not meant to be taken as an overall 
assessment of HECS (vis-a-vis other schemes). Important policy 
questions such as the relative attractiveness of the various schemes 
when potential students are subject to borrowing constraints have not 
been examined. 23 Moreover, the analysis has been distinctly micro-
oriented. It does not take into account, for instance, the different 
effects that various fee-paying schemes may have on the supply of 
graduates. The question of how individuals' leisure-labour choices 
may be affected under each fee-regime has also been ignored. 
7.5 Conc1usion 
In this, the final chapter of Part II, we bring together both 
the stochastic and permanent individual-specific components of the 
residuals from the earnings function. It is found that if individuals 
are uncertain of their abilities, then allowing for the cost of risk-
bearing, higher education is no longer as profitable as commonly 
thought. We conclude that under these circumstances, higher education 
is, at best, only marginally attractive to moderately risk averse 
individuals. On the other hand, if individuals are assumed to be 
aware of their abilities, then the importance of the adjustment for 
the cost of risk-bearing to each individual's ex-ante value of higher 
education depends on both the individual's ability as a graduate, and 
his or her ability as a high-school leaver. 
From the social point of view, the question of whether society 
has over- or under-invested in higher education depends heavily on 
whether individuals are ignorant of their abilities, and whether 
23. See, however, the analysis in Chapter 3.5. 
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their Year 12 performance is related to their later years labour 
market outcomes. If we believe that individuals are uncertain of 
their abilities at the time of deciding whether to attend university, 
and that the relationship between individuals' Year 12 performance 
and their later years earnings is weak, then it would appear that 
there is an under-investment in higher education, assuming that the 
social discount rate is 5%. 
In the penultimate section of this chapter, we examined the 
attractiveness of HECS to individuals vis-a-vis other fee-paying 
regimes. The results show that if individuals are ignorant of their 
respective abilities when deciding whether to proceed to university, 
HECS is relatively more attractive than the scheme proposed by the 
Liberal-National Parties. This is because the expected repayments 
under HECS are lower. Secondly, the cost of uncertainty to risk-
averse individuals is lower under HECS because of the income-
contingent nature of its repayment arrangements. If individuals are 
aware of their abilities, then ex-ante whether they are better off 
under HECS than under LIB depends on their abilities. Ex-ante, HECS 
is less attractive, the more able the individual is. 
PART III 
ANALYSIS OF CHANGES OVER TIME 
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The analyses in both Parts I and II of the thesis are based on 
cross-sectional earnings profiles. These profiles are, of course, an 
artifact, and do not represent the true experience of any particular 
cohort, as was pointed out in Chapter 2. We argued, however, that in 
the absence of lifetime earnings data, the- reliance on cross-
sectional profiles is unavoidable. Moreover, it was suggested that in 
some cases -- such as in estimating the ex ante profitability of 
education when students are assumed to base their decisions on the 
cross-sectional evidence cross-sectional profiles may even be more 
relevant than life-cycle profiles. Notwithstanding these arguments, 
the weaknesses of using cross-sectional data are well recognised. 
Bowman (1987) has demonstrated how two completely opposite 
situations may be represented by the same cross-sectional earnings 
profile. One is where the economy is static, and an expansion in 
education leads to falling rates of return to schooling, and the 
other is where the economy is dynamic, and investments in inputs 
complementary to well-educated people keep pace with the expansion in 
schooling, so that successive cohorts receive rising rates of return. 
Yet, the policy implications in these two situations are clearly 
quite different. Moreover, as Bowman has shown, the cross-sectional 
rate of return would overstate the true rates of return to current 
and future cohorts in the first case, and understate them in the 
second case. 
With this in mind, it would be useful to complement our cross-
sectional analysis with an investigation of how the profitability of 
higher education has changed over time. In any case, the question of 
how successive cohorts of graduates fare in the labour market 
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relative to non-graduates is of considerable interest for its own 
sake. 
Part III of the thesis considers then how the value of a degree 
has changed, particularly over the last ten years. Our concern here 
is with the experience of degree-holders as a group, and as such, the 
analysis focuses on the aggregate figures. As well, to abstract from 
changes arising from differences in tax rates over time, gross 
earnings figures are used. 
CHAPTER 8 
CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF A DEGREE OVER TIME 
8 . 1 Introduction 
In 1968-69, only 3.2% of all full-time, full-year workers had 
tertiary degrees. By 1978-79, this figure rose to 7.3%. Latest data 
from the 1985-86 Income Distribution Survey indicate that 11% of all 
full-time, full-year workers now hold degrees. Hence, in a short 
span of just 15 or so years, the proportion of degree-holders in the 
work-force has increased almost three and a half times. 
Several authors have argued that this rapid increase in the 
number of graduates has led to a deterioration in the position of 
graduates in the labour market. 1 This has important policy 
implications, especially at a time when the government is planning to 
expand the higher education system substantially, and when students 
are being asked to contribute towards the cost of their education. So 
far, this view of the falling returns to higher education has gone 
unchallenged, and has been canvassed widely by both those arguing 
against the need for an expansion of the higher education system, as 
well as those who accept the aim of expansion but argue against 
students having to bear a part of the cost. 
The aims of the chapter is two-fold. First, it shows that 
analysis of the change in the economic value of a degree over time 
requires much more than a simple comparison of the rates of return 
estimated from cross-sectional data at different points in time. We 
demonstrate analytically, how such a comparison can lead to 
1. See, for instance, Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 
(1986), Graduate Careers Council of Australia (1985), Fisher (1983). 
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misleading conclusions not only with respect to the magnitude of 
change, but also with respect to the direction of change. Secondly, 
we examine critically the empirical evidence, and challenge the 
conventional wisdom that the value of a degree has been falling, 
particularly over the last ten years. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, the 
methodological problems associated with the comparison of cross-
sectional rates of return over time are discussed. In Section 8.3, we 
present Miller's (1982) estimates of the rate of return for the years 
1968/69, 1973/74 and 1978/79, and extend them to 1981/82 and 1985/86. 
Section 8.4 examines the labour market performance of successive 
cohorts of new graduates between 1977 and 1986 in terms of their 
employment statuses, starting salaries, industry of employment, and 
the kinds of work that they do. Concluding comments are given in 
Section 8.5. 
8.2 Methodological Problems with the Comparison of Cross-Sectional 
Rates of Return Over Time 
The comparison of cross-sectional rates of return2 over time 
has been used by a number of economists in their analyses of changes 
in the returns to education. 3 There are, however, some fundamental 
methodological problems with this procedure. Consider the following 
illustration. 
2. The cross-sectional rate of return is defined as the IRR estimated 
using cross-sectional earnings profiles. 
3. See, for instance, Psacharopoulos (1981), Carnoy and Marenbach 
(1975), and Willis (1986). 
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Let the cross-sectional incremental profiles 4 for 1970 and 1975 
be as shown in Figure 8.1. The cross-sectional rates calculated from 
these profiles (assumed to be X% and Y%, respectively) would suggest 
that the returns to higher education have fallen, i.e. X > Y. This is 
usually taken to mean that, as an investment, higher education is ex 
post less profitable for those who obtained their degrees in 1975 
than it is for those who obtained them in 1970. 
For the magnitudes X and Y to be meaningful, the required 
assumption is that those who obtained their degrees in 1970 have 
life-cycle earnings profiles given by the 1970 cross-sectional 
profile, and those who obtained their degrees in 1975 by the 1975 
cross-sectional profile. This assumption is clearly wrong in the case 
we have here. Note that the 21 year-old cohort in the 1970 cross-
section is also the 26 year-old cohort in the 1975 cross-section. The 
true life-cycle earnings profile for this cohort is, therefore, AC 
for the first five years of their working lives, and not AB as is 
assumed (incorrectly) in the calculation of the 1970 rate of return. 
Hence, unless the cross-sectional profiles over time are virtually 
identical5 , estimates of the ex post rate of return from other than 
the most recent cross-section would be incorrect. 6 But if the cross-
4. These give the earnings increment to degree-holders over high-
school leavers at each age. 
5. Only the incremental-earnings of the cohorts not included in the 
previous cross-section are allowed to be different. Hence, in the 
comparison of cross-sectional rates 5 years apart, only the 
incremental-earnings for the first five years can be different. 
6. Estimates of the ex post rate of return using the most recent 
cross-section may also be wrong for the same reasons. However, until 
we have even more recent data, we cannot be certain. 
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FIGURE 8.1: CROSS-SECTIONAL AND COHORT RATES OF CHANGE 
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sectional profiles were identical, there would not be a need to 
compare the rate over time! 7 
Not only can the magnitude of the change be wrong, there is 
also a danger that even the direction of change suggested by changes 
in the cross-sectional rate over time may be incorrect. Let us 
suppose that the life-cycle earnings profiles of successive cohorts 
of graduates have been displaced vertically downwards, relative to 
the life-cycle earnings profiles of high-school leavers in their 
respective cohorts, in each year from 1955 to 1975. 8 Suppose also, 
that this decline in the income increment to graduates has ceased 
since 1975 and that, the life-cycle incremental-earnings profiles 
have remained unchanged since then. Figure 8.2 shows what the 1975, 
1980 and 1985 cross-sectional profiles would look under these 
circumstances. Note, interestingly, that each successive cross-
sectional profile is lower than the previous one. Estimates of the 
returns to higher education from these cross-sections would, 
therefore, lead to the wrong conclusion that the returns have been 
falling between 1975 and 1985 when, in fact, they have remained 
unchanged.9 
7. Note, however, that if the question is how the ex ante rates of 
return have changed over time, and if individuals in each cohort are 
assumed to base their educational decisions on cross-sectional data, 
the comparison of cross-sectional rates of return over time would be 
a valid exercise. 
8. This could be due to, say, the rapid increase in the supply of 
graduates over the years, which leads to 1) the lowering of the 
quality of graduates on average; and 2) new graduates filtering 
downwards into less well-paying jobs. It could also be due to new 
graduates being less well paid compared to earlier cohorts in the 
same jobs but, in this case, it would be difficult to explain why the 
life-cycle paths of earlier cohorts are not affected. 
9. We could even have allowed the life-cycle profiles for the post-
1975 cohorts to be rising and ·still have cross-sectional estimates of 
the return falling. In this case, however, the cross-sectional 
profiles would no longer be lower everywhere. 
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In summary, the comparison of the cross-sectional rate of 
return over time appears to be a dangerous practice which could lead 
to conclusions which are wrong not only with respect to the magnitude 
of the change, but also, with respect to the direction of change. 
8.3 Results From the Income and Housing Surveys 
In this section, we examine what the cross-sectional evidence 
would have suggested about changes in the profitability of higher 
education. This aim of this exercise is to enable the cross-sectional 
evidence to be contrasted with the time series evidence to be 
presented in the next section. 
Using information on full-time full-year male workers from the 
Income and Housing Surveys, Miller (1984) estimated that the cross-
sectional rate of return to higher education fell from 24% in 1968/69 
to 22.4% in 1973/74, and to 19.4% in 1978/79. It would be of 
considerable interest to know if this decline has continued into the 
1980s. Using data from the later Income and Housing Surveys, we have 
found the rates to have fallen further to 18.3% in 1981/82 and 16.8% 
in 1985/86. 10 Hence, on the basis of these cross-sectional estimates, 
it would appear that the rate of return to higher education has been 
10. Following Miller, we assume that the number of years taken to 
complete the course is 3.3. For simplicity, however, we have assumed 
that the direct cost of education (books, stationery, union fees, 
etc.) is exactly equal to the income (from part-time work or Tertiary 
allowances) received while studying, so that the cost of education is 
equal to the· foregone income. This resulted in our estimates being 
somewhat lower than Miller's estimates. Our estimate for the years 
1978/79, 1981/82 and 1985/86 were 17.2%, 16.2% and 14.9%, 
respectively. For comparability with Miller's results, we spliced our 
estimates to his series. Note that the figure for 1985/86 is higher 
than that presented in Chapter 3. This is because of the shorter 
length of study assumed here (3.3 instead of 3.5), and the use of 
pre-tax rather than post-tax figures. 
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falling since 1968/69, and that this decline has continued into the 
1980s. 
Figure 8.3 plots the cross-sectional profiles of the income 
increment to degree-holders from which these rates of return were 
calculated. It is interesting to note the degree of similarity 
between these profiles and those hypothetical cross-sectional 
profiles constructed in Figure 8.2. In both cases, the difference 
between cross-sections lies, not in the youngest age group, but in 
the older age groups. Figure 8.3 shows that the real income increment 
to degree-holders in the 15-24 age category increased from 1968/69 to 
1973/74 but has remained about the same since then. In contrast, the 
income increment in both the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups has fallen 
with each successive cross-section, with the sole exception of that 
in 1985/86 for the 25-34 age category. It appears, therefore, that it 
is the decline in the income premium of the older graduates that has 
~ 
led to the observed fall in the cross-sectional rate of return. This 
is despite the fact that the income premiums of the older age groups 
are much more heavily discounted in the internal rate of return 
calculation. 
Notwithstanding the criticisms in the previous section, some 
useful information can, nevertheless, be extracted from cross-
sectional earnings profiles associated with different points in time. 
Using the five cross-sections in Figure 8.3, we can construct a 
number of life-cycle income profiles, albeit incomplete ones, in the 
same manner -as ln Figures 8.1 and 8.2. These are shown in Figure 8.4. 
Firm conclusions cannot be drawn from these life-cycle profiles 
because they are all incomplete (particularly those corresponding to 
the more recent cohorts), and do not overlap each other completely 
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over the same ages. Nevertheless, the constructed life-cycle profiles 
suggest that the returns to higher education appear to have fallen up 
to 1973, and perhaps, even up to 1978. Beyond that, the profiles are 
too short to form any objective judgement. Hence, for changes in the 
returns over the last ten years, we have to look elsewhere for 
evidence. 
For the more recent cohorts of graduates, all the evidence that 
we typically have of them is information on their labour market 
outcomes for the few years since graduation. Inevitably, unless we 
are willing to wait until they retire from the workforce, we have to 
make some assumptions regarding their future earnings. That their 
future earnings follow the cross-sectional profile in the year in 
which they entered the workforce is one possibility. We have argued 
in the previous section, however, that this assumption may lead to 
some serious difficulties in the comparison of changes over time. 
An alternative is to compare the labour market experiences of 
successive cohorts of new graduates in terms of their employment 
statuses, starting salaries, sectors and industries of employment, as 
well as the types of work that they do, and assume that their 
relative successes at the start of their careers would adequately 
reflect their prospects over their entire careers. There are several 
reasons why this may not be an unreasonable assumption. 
First, to the extent that the income premiums to graduates at 
the start of their careers have changed because of differences in the 
characteristics of each successive cohort, then these changes would 
be expected to persist over their entire working lives. 
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Secondly, as Freeman (1977) has argued strongly, at any one 
time there is a much greater number of new graduates seeking 
employment than there are experienced ones. Moreover, employers are 
more liable to alter the hiring wage than to change the wages of 
existing workers. 11 Hence, the performance of new entrants would be a 
sensitive indicator of the conditions in the market for their 
respective skills. The types of jobs new graduates are able to obtain 
are, undoubtedly, highly dependent on the state of the market at the 
time of their entry. To the extent that job-ladders are pervasive in 
the labour market, this would, in turn, determine their lifetime 
earnings potentials. 12 
Finally, the performance of graduates relative to non-graduates 
in the first years of their careers is important for its own sake, 
since, the income-increments to graduates for these years are most 
heavily weighted in the calculation of the internal rate of return. 
8.4. Labour Market Performance of New Graduates, 1976-1986 
8.4.1 Employment Status 
An examination of the employment status of new graduates is of 
interest for two reasons. First, part of the earnings advantage to 
the more highly educated may come from their lower incidence of 
unemployment. 1 3 As such, the difference in unemployment rates between 
graduates and non-graduates is an important element in the economic 
value of a degree. 
11. One explanation is that employers and workers have "implicit 
contracts" with each other. See, for instance, Azariadis (1975). 
12. See, for instance, Doeringer and Piore (1971). 
13. See, for instance, Nickell (1979). 
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Secondly, unemployment may have permanent "scar-ring effects" 
which affect individuals' later earnings. 14 To the extent that these 
"scarring effects" are important, the employment status in the first 
years after graduation will have an important effect on individuals' 
lifetime incomes. 
For leavers from educational institutions, the period 1976 to 
1986 is one which is characterised by an increase in the unemployment 
rates up to 1983, before a slight improvement in the final three 
years. 15 Although the employment prospects of all new entrants to the 
labour market have generally deteriorated over the period, there is 
evidence to suggest that as a group, degree-holders appear to have 
suffered relatively less. Table 8.1 presents the unemployment rates 
for young degree-holders and those with no post-school 
qualifications 16 in 1976, 1981 and 1986, derived from the Australian 
Censuses. 
Comparing the unemployment rates of the 20-24 year-old 
graduates with their peers in the same age-cohort with no post-school 
qualifications, it can be seen that the differential in the rates for 
males has widened from 2.72 percentage points in 1976 to 6.13 
percentage points in 1981, and to 12.38 percentage points in 1986. 
For females, the differentials for the three years were 2.17, 4.81 
and 8.62 percentage points, respectively. In comparison with the 15-
14. See, Miller and Volker (1987) for a discussion. 
15. See A.B.S., Transition from Education to Work, Cat. No. 6227.0 
(various issues). 
16. Ideally, we would like to compare the unemployment rates of 
degree-holders to high-school leavers instead of individuals with no 
post-school qualifications. At the time this analysis was carried 
out, however, information on high-school leavers was not available 
for the 1986 Census. 
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19 year-olds with no post-school qualifications, which roughly 
corresponds to the group which entered the market at the same time as 
the 20-24 year-old graduates, the advantage to the latter for both 
males and females has increased as well. Hence, in terms of improving 
employment prospects, the value of a degree appears to have risen 
over the last ten years . 17 
TABLE 8.1: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES OF YOUNG DEGREE-HOLDERS AND PERSONS 
WITH NO POST-SCHOOL QUALIFICATIONS 
Degree-Holders 
20-24 yr-old 
No Post-School Qual. 
15-19 yr-old 
No Post-School Qual. 
20-24 yr-old 
Degree-Holders 
20-24 yr-old 
No Post-School Qual. 
15-19 yr-old 
No Post-School Qual. 
20-24 yr-old 
1976 
4.78% 
11.63% 
7.50% 
4.36% 
14.17% 
6.53% 
SOURCES: MTX32, 1976 Census 
MTX51, 1981 Census 
CX0015, 1986 Census 
1981 1986 
MALES 
4.64% 6.17% 
13.48% 23.38% 
10.77% 18.55% 
FEMALES 
5.72% 6.79% 
18.05% 22.32% 
10.53% 15.41% 
17. Another important consideration is that the deteriorating 
unemployment situation among young school-leavers also implies that 
the opportunity cost to investing in higher education is lower. This, 
too, would increase the profitability of higher education. 
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8.4.2 Starting Salaries 
Guthrie and Coyte (1987) have examined the starting salaries o f 
graduates in Australia for the years 1977 to 1986. Their analysis 
suggests that, in this context, new graduates entering the labour 
market are becoming increasingly worse off. They reported that over 
the ten years the ratio of graduate starting salaries to average 
weekly earnings has fallen from 1.00 in 1977 to a low of 0.878 in 
1983, before recovering slightly to 0.896 in 1986 (see Figure 8.5). 
This result has been widely cited as evidence that the returns to 
higher education have been falling over the last ten years. However, 
there are several problems with the Guthrie and Coyte analysis, 
arising from their use of the average weekly earnings series as a 
bench-mark with which graduate starting salaries are compared. 
First, even if the relative incomes between workers with 
different levels of education had remained the same, the shift in the 
distribution of the work-force towards the more educated end of the 
spectrum (either as a result of the population being more educated, 
or an increasing rate of unemployment among the less educated) would, 
ceteris paribus, lead to a decline in the ratio of graduate starting 
salaries to average weekly earnings. 
Secondly, there could be shifts in the age (or experience) 
distribution of the work-force over time as well. A shift of the 
work-force towards the more experienced end (which, again, could be a 
result of demographic changes or an increasing rate of unemployment 
among the young) would, ceteris paribus, also lead co a fall in the 
ratio of graduate starting salaries to average weekly earnings. 
Figure 8.5: Starting Salary of Graduates 
as a % of A.W.E. (all ages) 
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Thirdly, the relevant comparison should be between graduate 
starting salaries and the salaries of other new labour market 
entrants, or of similarly aged individuals, and not with the average 
weekly earnings across all ages. It is certainly quite possible for 
youth wages across the entire educational _spectrum to fall relative 
to the wages of older workers, with the relativities across 
educational levels remaining unchanged. In this case, the ratio of 
graduate starting salaries to average weekly earnings would fall, but 
it would be incorrect to conclude that degree-holders have lost 
ground in the labour market. 
Our analysis reveals that the fall reported by Guthrie and 
Coyte is due mainly to the last two factors. Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show 
the changes in graduate starting salaries as a ratio of the average 
weekly earnings of 15-19 year-olds (corresponding to other new market 
entrants) and 20-24 year-olds (corresponding to similarly aged 
individuals), respectively, between 1977 and 1986. For males, these 
figures show that, by the end of the ten year period, new graduates 
are better off compared to other new market entrants, and no worse 
off compared to other similarly-aged individuals. For females, new 
graduates are not noticeably worse off compared to either group. 
Hence, insofar as starting salaries are concerned, the evidence does 
not support the view that there has been a "steady decline'' in the 
rewards to higher education. Although the position of degree-holders 
in the labour market appears to have slipped a little between 1976 
and 1981, much of the lost ground has been recovered since then, so 
that by 1986, degree-holders were in about the same position 
(relative to non-graduates of the same age or experience) as they had 
been in 1976. 
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Figure 8.6: Starting Salary of Graduates 
as a % of A.W.E. (15-19 yrs) 
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8.4.3 Industry and Occupational Mix 
Although the analysis of changes in the starting salaries of 
graduates over time is informative, it does have certain limitations. 
From an investment perspective, it is earnings over the lifetime that 
matters. Individuals might, therefore, have opted for jobs which have 
low starting salaries, but rapid wage-growth potentials. 18 On the 
other hand, starting salaries might be high simply because 
individuals have chosen jobs which are associated, for instance, with 
little on-the-job training. Hence, if the job-mix of successive 
cohorts of new graduates are significantly different, then starting 
salaries alone may not be a good indicator of the changes in the 
returns to higher education over the period. It is, therefore, 
imperative that we examine the kinds of jobs that new graduates have 
been taking up. 
To test the sensitivity of this potential problem, information 
from the 1976, 1981 and 1986 Australian Censuses was used. Our 
analysis focuses on males. 19 The wage-growth potential by industry 
and occupation is first obtained by estimating the increase in wages 
in advancing from age 20-24 to 25-29 in each industry and occupation. 
18. Several explanations for differences in the shape of the life-
cycle earnings profiles between jobs exist. One explanation is that 
jobs with greater amounts of worker-financed specific training are 
associated with lower starting salaries and steeper life-cycle 
profiles. (See Becker (1975), Chapman and Tan (1980)). Another 
explanation is that in jobs where the worker's effort cannot be 
easily monitored, the firm has an incentive to steepen the slope of 
the life-cycle profile to raise the "penalty" to workers who "cheat". 
See, for instance, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). 
19. At the time this analysis was carried out, some information on 
females were unavailable. 
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The following regression is estimated on a sample of 20-29 year-old 
male graduates: 2 0 
log (INC) = L a i INDi + L bj OCC j + L Ci AGE*IND j 
+ ~ d · AGE *OCC · + u ~ J J 
where INC is the annual income; 
INDi are industry dummies (i = 1 to 9); 
OCCj are occupational dummies (j = 2 to 5); 
AGE is a dummy which equals 1 for the age group 25-29; and 
u is a random error term. 
Bearing in mind our earlier discussion, the slopes of the 
industry earnings profiles estimated from a single cross-section may 
be biased. To overcome this difficulty, we drew on the 1976 cross-
section for the 20-24 year-olds and the 1981 cross-section for the 
25-29 year-olds. 21 In effect, we estimated the slope with AC in 
Figure 8.1, instead of AB or DC. Regression results are presented in 
Table A8.1 in Appendix 8.1. 
Table 8.2 shows the percentage of new male graduates in each 
industry/occupation for 1976, 1981 and 1986. Assuming that the wage-
growth potential by industry and occupation is constant over the 
period, it is possible to examine what the changes in the job-mix of 
new graduates over time mean in terms of the wage-growth potential of 
the jobs they are taking up. 
20. Definitions of industry and occupational variables and the method 
of estimation are given in Appendix 8.1. 
21. With income figures converted to 1976 dollars. 
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TABLE 8.2: INDUSTRY/OCCUPATIONAL MIX OF NEW MALE GRADUATES 
Industry 
1. Agric & Mining 
2. Manufacturing 
3. Elec,Gas,Water,Construc 
4. Wholesale,Retail,Trade 
5. Transpt,Stor,Communication 
6. Finan,Prpty,Busns Svcs 
7. Public Admin,Defence 
8. Health 
9. Commun & Personal Svcs 
Occupation 
1. Managers & Administrators 
2. Professionals 
3. Para-Professionals 
4. Clerks,Salespersons & 
Personal Service Workers 
5. Others 
Number of observations 
% of 20-24 yr-old Male Graduates 
1976 
1.77 
11.63 
6.84 
7.84 
3.50 
17.78 
15.23 
7.66 
27.76 
100.00 
2.64 
65.91 
5.29 
17.85 
8.30 
100.00 
population 
1981 
5.38 
15.70 
4.48 
8.97 
3.14 
22.87 
11.69 
6.73 
21.08 
100.00 
3.14 
61.88 
7.62 
19.73 
7.62 
100.00 
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1986 
5.31 
12.56 
6.28 
8.21 
4.83 
28.50 
9.66 
8.21 
20.77 
100.00 
5.80 
62.32 
7.25 
18.36 
6.28 
100.00 
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Using the estimated parameters of the regression, the predicted 
income of 20-24 year-old graduates corresponding to, say, the 1976 
job-mix can be obtained. This involves using the figures in Table 8.2 
(under the 1976 column) as specific values of the explanatory 
variables (INDi and OCCj) and calculating the predicted income. 22 The 
variable AGE is set to 0, since we are interested in the predicted 
income of 20-24 year olds. The predicted income (for 20-24 year-old 
graduates) corresponding to the 1981 and 1986 graduate job-mixes can 
be obtained in the same way. 
Similarly, the predicted incomes of 25-29 year-old graduates 
corresponding to job-mixes in 1976, 1981 and 1986 can be generated. 
For these calculations, however, the variable AGE in the regression 
22. The regression is semi-logarithmic. Hence, to obtain the 
predicted starting salary (in levels), the exponential is calculated. 
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is set to 1. From these two sets of figures, the percentage wage-
growth (as measured by the increase in earnings in advancing from the 
20-24 age group to the 25-29 age group) corresponding to the industry 
and occupational mixes in each of the three years can be calculated. 
The results are given in Table 8.3. Also reported in Table 8.3 are 
the equivalent figures for high-school leavers. 2 3 
TABLE 8.3: PREDICTED WAGE GROWTH (%) CORRESPONDING TO JOB-MTX 
Degree-Holders 
High-School Leavers 
1976 
26.53 
21.22 
1981 
32.65 
20.33 
1986 
32.60 
20.96 
The results suggest that the later cohorts of new graduates 
appear to be entering into jobs which are, on average, associated 
with higher wage-growth potentials. In contrast, applying the same 
method to high-school leavers, we found the later cohorts to be 
taking up jobs which are, on average, associated with lower wage-
growth potentials. This further reinforces our earlier findings based 
on graduate starting salaries and employment status, that relative to 
their non-graduate peers, the labour market outcomes of recent 
cohorts of graduates do not appear to have deteriorated over the last 
decade. In fact, the position of graduates may have improved 
somewhat. 
In summary, our time-series evidence suggests that contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, and what the changes in the cross-sectional 
rate over time suggest, the value of a tertiary degree does not 
23. The regression results for this group and the job-mix in the 
three years are given in Appendix 8.1. 
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appear to have fallen in the last ten years. There are several 
possible explanations. First, it might be due to the slowing down in 
the growths of both the flow and stock of graduates in the labour 
market over the last ten years. Secondly, technology over the last 
decade might have changed in such a way as to make graduates 
relatively more valuable in the labour market. Finally, it might be 
due to degrees being used primarily as screening devices in the 
labour market. The last explanation implies that an increase in the 
supply of graduates would lead to a 'filtering' down of both 
graduates and non-graduates in the job-ladder. Hence, relative to 
past cohorts, both degree-holders and non-degree-holders might, on 
average, be worse off. However, within each cohort, graduates might 
still maintain their advantage over their non-graduate peers. A 
complete analysis of these hypotheses is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, but they would provide much fertile ground for further 
research. 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, it was argued that an assessment of how the 
value of a degree has changed requires more than a simple comparison 
of cross-sectional rates of return over time. It was shown that such 
a comparison might lead to misleading conclusions with regards the 
magnitude, and even the direction of change over time. 
In the empirical part of the chapter, Miller's finding of the 
decline in the cross-sectional rates of return to higher education 
from 1968/69 to 1978/79 was shown to continue into the 1980s. These 
cross-sectional rates would, on the surface, suggest that the returns 
to higher education have been falling over the last 15 to 20 years. 
Our analysis using time series evidence on the labour market 
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performances of successive cohorts of new graduates, however, 
indicate otherwise. 
Although the unemployment rates of all leavers from educational 
institutions have generally risen over the last ten years, degree-
holders tend to have been less severely affected. It was shown that 
the differential between the unemployment rates of young 
degree-holders and those with no post-school qualifications has, in 
fact, widened over the period. This suggests that in terms of 
protecting oneself against unemployment, the value of higher 
education has increased. Moreover, the higher unemployment rates 
among young school leavers also indicate that the opportunity cost of 
investing in higher education has fallen. This would, also tend to 
increase the profitability of higher education. 
An examination of graduate starting salaries from 1977 to 1986 
reveals that relative to the wages of other new market-entrants, and 
similarly-aged persons, graduate starting salaries did not change by 
much over the period, contrary to the suggestions by some 
researchers. The possibility of successive cohorts of new graduates 
moving into industries and occupations with high starting salaries 
and low wage-growth potentials was also investigated. It was found 
that, if anything, new graduates appeared to be increasingly taking 
up jobs with greater wage-growth potentials. 
Hence, contrary to the widespread belief, and what the cross-
sectional rates indicate, these results suggest that the returns to 
higher education does not appear to have fallen over the last ten 
years. 
CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the financial returns to higher 
education in Australia from the private and social points of view. 
While some of the issues have been explored in other studies, several 
contributions are made in this thesis in areas of both methodology 
and policy analysis. Essentially, these relate to the incorporation 
of risk into conventional measures of educational profitability, and 
to the investigation of individual ability differences as 
determinants of educational profitability. The technical 
contributions allow a richer understanding of the impact of changes 
in contemporary policy approaches to the financing of higher 
education in Australia. 
Part I of the thesis focussed on the aggregate figures. The 
analysis is based on the comparison of mean earnings outcomes of 
degree-holders and high-school leavers. Using data from the 1985-86 
Income and Housing Survey, it was found that from the point of 
individuals, higher education appears to be a worthwhile investment. 
The higher earnings of graduates compared to high-school 
leavers are, in part, due to their higher participation rate, lower 
incidence of unemployment, and longer hours worked. Restricting t h e 
sample to only those who worked full-time and for the full year led 
to a reduction in the estimated rate of return, particularly, in the 
case of females. Nevertheless, higher education remains an attractive 
investment. 
It was found also that the rate of return to individuals 
pursuing their degrees on a part-time basis is extremely high. This 
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prompted the ·question of why students would pursue higher education 
on a full-time basis, given that part-time study was so much more 
profitable. One explanation is that full-time students are able to 
enjoy the consumption benefits of higher education to a greater 
extent. The difference in profitability be~ween the part- and full-
time modes of study suggests that these benefits could be valued as 
high as $5,000 to $7,000 per year of study. 
The effect of various fee-regimes on individuals' incentives to 
invest in higher education was considered. It was found that the 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), Higher Education 
Administrative Charge (HEAC), and the fee-scheme proposed by the 
National-Liberal Parties (LIB) have little impact on private rates of 
return. Under the Full-fee and the Bond University fee-regimes, 
however, it may no longer be financially profitable for individuals 
to invest in higher education. 
Consideration of whether society should, at the margin, expand 
investment in higher education has been hampered by a lack of 
consensus of what the appropriate social discount rate is. Using the 
commonly used rule-of-thumb figure of 10%, it was found that the case 
for expansion would rest on the externalities associated with higher 
education being sufficiently large. Unfortunately, there is little 
agreement among economists as to the magnitude of the externalities. 
A novel approach adopted in this thesis is to infer the 
marginal value of externalities from the fee-structure of the 
recently introduced tertiary tax, assuming that in setting the 
charge, the Government is concerned solely with allocative 
efficiency. Using a 10% social discount rate, it was estimated that 
the marginal value of externalities implied by HECS amounts to $1,4 0 0 
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to $1,500 per year. It was further found that if 10 % were indeed t he 
appropriate social discount rate, then the level of the charge in 
HECS is not consistent with an expansion of higher education from an 
efficiency view-point. At lower social discount rates, however, there 
is no inconsistency. 
In Part II of the thesis, we considered the implications of the 
dispersion in individual incomes around the mean income profile. One 
interpretation of the dispersion is that it represents the effects of 
luck. This suggests that there may be considerable risks attached to 
investing in higher education. A model was developed which enabled 
risks to be incorporated into conventional measures of educational 
profitability, such as the NPV. The empirical results showed that the 
attractiveness of higher education as an investment is reduced when 
risks are taken into account. For moderately risk averse individuals, 
however, higher education is still an attractive investment. 
Another important finding is that taking into account the risks 
of dropping out or requiring longer than the minimum time to complete 
the degree, reduces the profitability of higher education quite 
substantially. This is both because the expected returns are smaller, 
and because the uncertainty associated with attending university 
increases when the risk of failure is recognised. 
An alternative interpretation of the dispersion in individual 
incomes is that it reflects differences in individual-specific 
characteristics, such as ability. From this perspective, the 
profitability of higher education to each individual would depend on 
his or her endowment of these characteristics. If individuals are 
assumed to be aware of their abilities, educational self-selection 
may occur. It was demonstrated that under these circumstances 
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estimates of the rate of return based on the comparison of mean 
profiles may be seriously biased. 
It was argued, however, that it might be more plausible to 
assume that individuals are not aware of their abilities when 
deciding whether to pursue higher education. In this case, the mean 
earnings profiles conditional on education would be unbiased 
estimates of what individuals could expect to earn ex ante depending 
on their educational choice. Of course, the fact that individuals' ex 
post earnings could deviate substantially according to their 
abilities has to be taken into account. Using the model developed 
previously, it was found that the uncertainty in abilities reduced 
the profitability to such an extent that higher education was only 
marginally profitable to the moderately risk averse. 
In the final chapter of Part II, the two components of 
individual income variation -- stochastic and individual-specific 
were brought together. Using Miller's (1989) results, it was assumed 
that the observed variation in individual incomes is half stochastic 
and half individual-specific. The implication of the variation on 
individuals' ex ante educational profitability clearly depends on 
whether individuals are aware of their respective abilities when 
making their educational choice. Assuming that they are unaware, it 
was found that uncertainty reduces the private NPV (assuming a 
discount rate of 5%) from more than $13,000 (1985-86 dollars) to less 
than $3,000 for moderately risk averse individuals (R=3). Although 
higher education is still profitable, it is far from the lucrative 
venture it was thought to be when risks were ignored. 
If individuals are assumed to be aware of their abilities, the 
riskiness of higher education as an investment and the cost of this 
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riskiness depend on t heir income-generating abilities both as 
graduates and as high-school leavers. 
It was argued in this thesis that calculations of the social 
profitability of higher education should be adjusted for risks, to 
the extent that these risks are borne privately. As in the 
calculations of ex ante private profitability, the importance of the 
risk adjustment depends on whether individuals are aware of their 
respective abilities. An additional consideration in the social 
calculations is whether individuals' Year 12 performances are 
systematically related to their abilities. It was shown that if 
individuals are ignorant of their abilities and if the relationship 
between their Year 12 performance and later earnings in the labour 
market is weak, then even after adjustment for risk, higher education 
appears to be profitable for the marginal graduate (assuming a social 
discount rate of 5%). 
On the other hand, if individuals' Year 12 performances are 
positively related to their earnings as graduates, we would expect 
the marginal graduate to earn substantially less than the average 
graduate. It was shown that in this case the marginal social NPV 
(adjusted for risk) is likely to be negative at a 5% social discount 
rate. 
An interesting feature of HECS which distinguishes it from 
other fee-schemes, such as LIB, is that the repayment of the charge 
under HECS is income-contingent. It was shown that this feature of 
HECS makes it slightly more attractive to risk averse individuals 
relative to LIB, assuming that individuals are uncertain of their 
abilities. However, if individuals are aware of their abilities, t he n 
the more able individuals may be financially better off under LIB. 
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In Part III of the thesis, the issue of whether the returns to 
higher education have fallen was investigated. It was demonstrated 
that misleading conclusions could result from a simple comparison of 
changes in the cross-sectional rates of return over time. 
Considering, instead, the labour market pe_rformance of successive 
cohorts of new graduates, it was found that contrary to conventional 
wisdom and what cross-sectional rates suggest, the value of a degree 
does not appear to have declined over the last ten years. If 
anything, the evidence appears to suggest that there has been an 
increase in the profitability of higher education. 
The thesis suggests a number of areas where further research is 
required. First, in view of the very high returns to pursuing higher 
education on a part-time basis, a more in-depth analysis of the 
choice between part- and full-time studies is needed. In particular, 
the barriers preventing individuals from holding a full-time job and 
studying part-time should be investigated. 
A second area where further research is required is the 
progress of students through university. It was shown that the risks 
of dropping out and repeating subjects have a major influence on the 
rate of return to higher education. It is, therefore, important to 
explore the factors which may lead to failure in university. Further, 
it is important to determine how students' progress in university is 
related to both their Year 12 performances, and to their earnings 
after graduation. 
Our analysis suggests that risks play an important role in the 
profitability of higher education. The techniques developed in this 
thesis could be applied to a number of other related issues such as 
the comparison of the attractiveness between different fields of 
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study. This would then enable us to shed some light into whether the 
returns to some fields of study ara higher than others in part 
because they are associated with a higher degree of riskiness. 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
THE SEPAR-~TION THEOREM 
This appendix demonstrates the proposition that with perfect 
capital markets, the attractiveness of educational investments is 
independent of individuals' intertemporal preferences and wealth. 
Consider the investment decision of an individual deciding 
whether to undertake extra schooling. Assume that without the extra 
schooling, the individual can consume C1' in the first period, and 
C2' in the second. This is given by point A in Figure A2.l.l. 
Schooling reduces the individual's consumption in the first period by 
c1, but in return, increases consumption in period two by c2. This 
alternative consumption bundle is represented by point Bin the 
diagram. Assume that the individual is restricted to a choice of 
either A or B. That is, there are no other means of transfering 
income from one period to the next. Quite clearly, under these 
conditions, whether the additional schooling is attractive to the 
individual depends on the shape of his or her indifference curves and 
the position of A. Two sets of indifference curves are shown in the 
diagram. If the individual's preferences are represented by the 
steeper set of curves, A is preferred. In other words, the individual 
is better-off not acquiring the additional schooling. On the other 
hand, if the individual's preferences are represented by the flatter 
set of indifference curves, the option of additional schooling will 
make the individual better-off. In this case, the individual will 
choose to acquire the additional schooling. 
Hence, under the conditions set out above, the attractiveness 
of education as an investment cannot be evaluated without knowledge 
of the individual's intertemporal preferences and his or her initial 
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FIG. A2.l.l: INTERTEMPORAL CONSUMPTION CHOICE WITH NO 
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endowments. This makes the evaluation of the attractiveness of 
education a particularly daunting task. Fortunately, under certain 
conditions, the evaluation can be simplified considerably. 
Assume that individuals can freely borrow and lend at a 
constant rate of interest r. Given this assumption, any point along 
XX' (slope= -(l+r)) in Figure A2.1.2 is attainable if he or she 
chooses not to acquire the additional education. Similarly, if he or 
she chooses to acquire the additional schooling, the individual can 
choose to consume at any point along YY'. As drawn in Figure A2.1.2, 
the consumption set bound by YY' dominates the consumption set bound 
by XX'. In this case, as long as the individual's utility function is 
quasi-concave (and hence, indifference curves convex to the origin), 
the individual can attain a higher level of utility by choosing to 
acquire the additional schooling. Of course, if the interest rate is 
sufficiently high (which implies steeper XX' and YY' lines), the 
decision may be reversed. 
Hence, with the assumption of perfect capital markets, the 
decision of whether to acquire additional schooling is reduced to a 
simple comparison of the relative magnitudes of OX' and OY'. These 
are, respectively, the present values of the income (or consumption) 
streams associated with acquiring and not acquiring the additional 
schooling. The difference, (OY' - OX'), is known as the Net Present 
Value (NPV) of the investment in the additional schooling. The 
decision rule can be stated as: Invest if NPV > 0. 
Note, interestingly, that (OY' - OX') is independent of the 
individual's initial endowment point A. Therefore, the attractiveness 
of education as an investment is independent of the individual's 
initial level of wealth. Note also that knowledge of the individual's 
284 
FIG. 2.1.2: INTERTEMPORAL CONSUMPTION CHOICE WITH 
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intertemporal preferences (beyond the tact that it is "well-behaved") 
is not necessary in order to evaluate the attractiveness of the 
educational investment. Hence, provided capital markets exist, an 
individual's production decision (of whether to invest) can be made 
separately from his or her consumption decision (of how much to 
consume in each period). This is the separation theorem. 
/ 
APPENDIX 3.1 
INCOME DATA FROM 1985-86 INCOME AND HOUSING SURVEY 
TABLE A3.l.1: AVERAGE AFTER-TAX TOTAL INCOME (1985-86 DOLLARS) & 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY EDUCATION, SEX, AGE 
HIGH SCHOOL DEGREE HOLDERS 
AGE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE 
15-20 $8,420 $8,670 
( 7 9) ( 77) 
21-24 $13,060 $11,110 $14,860 $12,310 
(127) (117) (22) (2 9) 
25-29 $15,890 $8,000 $18,710 $15,130 
(157) (143) ( 10 4) ( 8 9) 
30-34 $15,750 $8,620 $19,990 $13,380 
(118) ( 116) ( 13 6) (117) 
35-39 $18,730 $7,990 $24,320 $15,710 
( 8 6) (91) (135) ( 7 5) 
40-44 $23,980 $9,980 $29,660 $18,260 
( 6 9) ( 5 9) ( 8 5) .. ( 3 9) 
45-49 $14,730 $9,330 - $30,080 $18,770 
(43) (42) ( 5 4) ( 3 0) 
50-54 $13,020 $6,250 $28,200 $20,550 
( 2 9) ( 41) ( 3 4) ( 16) 
55-59 $20,850 $9,390 $26,200 $16,480 
( 35) ( 34) ( 31) ( 1 7) 
60-64 $13,230 $6,620 $20,390 $5,500 
( 27) ( 4 6) ( 2 9) (12) 
Total Obs. ( 770) ( 7 6 6) (630) ( 419) 
() number of observations 
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TABLE A3.l.2: AVERAGE PRE-TAX EARNED-INCOME (1985-86 DOLLARS) & 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY EDUCATION, SEX, AGE 
HIGH SCHOOL DEGREE HOLDERS 
AGE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE 
15-20 $9,070 $9,080 
( 7 9) (77) 
21-24 $15,020 $12,630 $17,870 $14,110 
(127) (117) (22) ( 2 9) 
25-29 $17,520 $8,560 $24,040 $18,950 
(157) (143) ( 10 4) ( 8 9) 
30-34 $19,350 $8,550 $27,290 $15,960 
( 118) ( 116) ( 13 6) ( 11 7) 
35-39 $18,970 $7,680 $31,240 $18,020 
( 8 6) (91) (135) ( 7 5) 
40-44 $23,000 $9,560 $36,250 $21,210 
( 6 9) ( 5 9) ( 8 5) ( 3 9) 
45-49 $24,490 $9,000 $40,770 $20,510 
(43) (42) ( 5 4) (30) 
50-54 $16,150 $4,270 $34,470 $23,290 
( 2 9) (41) ( 3 4) ( 16) 
55-59 $19,390 $6,460 $31,250 $15,430 
(35) ( 3 4) ( 31) (17) 
60-64 $18,840 $3,080 $18,870 $5,910 
( 2 7) ( 4 6) ( 2 9) (12) 
Total Obs. (77 0) ( 7 6 6) (630) ( 419) 
() number of observations 
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TABLE A3.l.3: AVERAGE PRE-TAX EARNED-INCOME (1985-86 DOLLARS) & 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY EDUCATION, SEX, AGE FOR FULL-TIME FULL-YEAR 
WORKERS 
HIGH SCHOOL DEGREE HOLDERS 
AGE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE 
15-20 $11,560 $12,720 
(47) ( 4 6) 
21-24 $18,660 $16,660 $20,910 $18,630 
(82) ( 71) (18) ( 19) 
25-29 $21,520 $16,780 $27,540 $24,190 
( 12 6) ( 5 7) (83) (60) 
30-34 $22,100 $17,330 $29,000 $25,460 
( 9 4) (37) (117) (57) 
35-39 $23,660 $16,920 $32,290 $25,630 
( 7 8) ( 19) (122) (40) 
40-44 $28,260 $19,910 $38,350 $24,890 
(55) ( 16) ( 8 0) (25) 
45-49 $22,540 $13,900 $42,420 $26,180 
( 31) ( 8) ( 4 9) ( 21) 
50-54 $24,650 $12,710 $38,640 $32,050 
(21) (6) ( 2 8) (10) 
55-59 $30,060 $13,470 $36,440 $26,690 
( 21) (11) (25) ( 7) 
60-64 $24,240 $22,920 $33,320 $14,580 
( 11) ( 4) (13) ( 5) 
Total Obs. ( 5 66) (27 5) (535) (2 44) 
() number of observations 
APPENDIX 3.2 
EARNINGS OF PART-TIME STUDENTS 
Data: 1981 Census Househo l ds Sample File 
Sample: High-School Leavers aged less than 30 
Dependent Variable: Log (Income) 
Age 
Age2 
Enrolled 
Part-Time 
Enrolled 
Full-Time 
Constant 
# obs. 
Male 
0.437 
(12.96) 
-0 . 781 X 10-2 
(10.96) 
0.960 X 10-l 
(3.98) 
-1.200 
(37.47) 
-0.658 
(1.68) 
0.45 
3543 
() absolute t-statistic 
Female 
0.622 
(10.89) 
-0.134 X 10-l 
(11.00) 
0.570 X 10-l 
(1.06) 
-1.119 
(23.11) 
-2.246 
(3.42) 
0.20 
2796 
APPENDIX 3.3 
RESULTS USING THE FULL SAMPLE 
TABLE A3.3.l: PRIVATE NET PRESENT VALUE OF HIGHER EDUCATION BY MODE 
OF STUDY (1985/86 DOLLARS) FULL SAMPLE 
Discount Ful.J.-time PTl PT2 
Rate 
MALES 
IRR 13.30% 30.60% 36.46 % 
0% $224,790 $237,760 $216,660 
3% $94,110 $106,870 $92,210 
5% $53,000 $65,580 $54,080 
10% $10,060 $22,060 $15,870 
15% -$2,930 $8,440 $5,240 
FEMALES 
IRR 18.76% 40.77% 40.01% 
0% $264,470 $271,360 $232,150 
3% $121,780 $129,330 $101,160 
5% $75,180 $83,020 $60,350 
10% $23,580 $31,840 $18,550 
15% $5,910 $14,250 $6,440 
TABLE A3.3.2: VALUE OF CONSUMPTION BENEFITS TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
(1985/86 DOLLARS) -- FULL SAMPLE 
MALES FEMALES 
Discount Present Annual Present Annual 
Rate Value Value Value Value 
0% $12,970 $3,710 $6,890 $1,970 
3% $12,760 $3,890 $7,540 $2,300 
5% $12,570 $4,000 $7,840 $2,490 
10% $12,010 $4,220 $8,250 $2,900 
15% $11,370 $4,390 $8,340 $3,220 
TABLE A3.3.3: PRIVATE INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN AND NET PRESENT VALUES (1989 DOLLARS) OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
UNDER VARIOUS FEE-REGIMES --FULL SAMPLE 
Discount No Fees HEAC LIB HECSl HECS2 Full- Bond 
Rate Fees Uni. 
MALES 
IRR 11.01% 10.81% 10.25% 10.50% 10.06% 6.25% 6.57% 
0% $265,940 $264,850 $261,740 $259,640 $260,580 $223,940 $231,130 
3% $106,500 $105,490 $102,570 $101,920 $101,490 $67,230 $72,750 
5% $56,470 $55,510 $52,710 $52,730 $51,680 $18,860 $23,400 
10% $4,630 $3,770 $1,240 $2,310 $310 -$29,310 -$26,790 
15% -$10,560 -$11,330 -$13,640 -$12,050 -$14,490 -$41,380 -$40,440 
FEMALES 
IRR 14.94% 14.63% 13.78% 14.76% 13.49% 8.10% 8.34% 
0% $304,260 $303,170 $300,060 $297,960 $298,900 $262,260 $268,010 
3% $135,320 $134,300 $131,390 $132,020 $130,310 $96,040 $100,280 
5% $80,400 $79,430 $76,640 $78,190 $75,600 $42,780 $46,140 
10% $20,080 $19,220 $16,690 $19,170 $15,750 -$13,860 -$12,330 
15% -$140 -$920 -$3,220 -$580 -$4,070 -$30,970 -$30,850 
APPE?-."DIX 5 . 1 
VARIANCES OF DISCOUNTED LIFETIME INCOMES AS MEASURES OF RISK 
The purpose of this appendix is to substantiate a point made in 
Section 5.2.1 that variances of discounted lifetime incomes may be 
misleading indicators of riskiness. Using the model developed in 
Section 5.3, we demonstrate how two income streams with present 
values which have the identical means and variances may be regarded 
quite differently in terms of their relative riskiness by 
individuals. 
For simplicity, let r=O, so that the present value is just the 
sum of the income stream. Consider two 5-period income streams, as 
given in Table A5.l.l. 
TABLE A5.l.l: HYPOTHETICAL INCOME STREAMS 
STREAM 
1 
2 
1 
(0.5; 0,20) 
10 
2 
10 
10 
PERIOD 
3 
10 
10 
4 
10 
10 
5 
10 
(0.5; 0,20) 
(q; X,Y) denotes a gamble which pays X with probability q, and Y with 
probability (1-q). Hence, (0.5, 0,20) describes a binomial 
probability distribution which has equal chances of O and 20. Note 
that the means and the variances of the present values associated 
with the two income streams are exactly the same. Using the model 
developed in Section 5.3, the consumption streams associated with the 
income streams will be as given in Table A5.l.2. 
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TABLE AS.1.2: HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMPTION STREAMS 
PERIOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
STREAM 
1 ( 0 . 5; 4, 8) ( 0 . 5; 4, 8) ( 0 . 5; 4, 8) ( 0 . 5; 4, 8) ( 0 . 5; 4, 8) 
2 10 10 10 10 ( 0 . 5; 0,20) 
The variances of consumption in each period for the two streams 
are, respectively, (4, 4, 4, 4, 4) and (0, 0, 0, 0, 100). Using (5. 5), the 
cost of risk, as measured by the annual risk premium, p, which is 
associated with stream 1 is l0A, compared to S0A with stream 2. It is 
clear, therefore, that risk-averse individuals (A>0) would prefer 
income stream 1 to income stream 2, despite the present values of the 
two streams having identical means and variances. 
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APPENDIX 5.2 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This appendix examines the sensitivity of the results in Table 
5.6 of the text to the following assumptions: a) the specification of 
the utility function in (5.9); b) the spec~fication of the earnings 
function in (5.8); and c) the normality of the error term in (5.8). 
Specification of the utility function 
Two alternative specifications of the utility function are 
considered here. The first is the Constant A(C) Utility function, 
which is given by: 
U(C) 
_AC 
= -ae ~ . 
The second is the Quadratic Utility function, which is given by: 
2 
U(C) = -(a-~C) . 
In the tables that follow, to facilitate comparison, the degree of 
risk-aversion is measured by the coefficient of relative risk-
aversion evaluated, arbitrarily, at C = $20,000, i.e. R(20,000). For 
simplicity, however, this is simply denoted by R. 
Table A5.2.1 shows the risk-adjusted NPV at various degrees of 
risk-aversion, corresponding to the Constant A(C) and the Quadratic 
specifications of the utility function. For ease of comparison, the 
results corresponding to the Constant R(C) Utility function (from 
Table 5.6) are also reported in the table. 
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TABLE AS,2,1; RISK-ADJUSTED NPV OF HIGHER SDUCATION UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
UTILITY SPECIFICATIONS 
Utility Specification 
R Constant R(C} Constant A(C} Quadratic 
0 13180 13180 13180 
1 11720 11770 11840 
2 10260 10360 10630 
3 8800 8950 9560 
4 7340 7550 8600 
5 5880 6140 7750 
In general, the results under alternative utility 
specifications are not vastly different. In all cases, the adjustment 
for risk reduces the NPV somewhat, but higher education remains a 
profitable private investment. At R=3, the reduction in the NPV under 
all three specifications is around 30%. 
S 'f' ' f E ' F ' peci ication oarningsunction 
On the question of the appropriate functional form, there are 
two related issues to be considered. The first concerns the shape of 
the age-earnings profile. That is, does the quadratic function (in 
age} sufficiently capture the overall shape . of individuals' earnings 
profiles? To resolve this, we increased the power of the polynomial 
to the fourth- and sixth-orders. That is, the earnings function for 
each educational level, k is specified as: 
N 
log (Earnings} i = ak + I,, b k j AGE i j + uki 
j = l 
where ak,bkj are constants; 
Uki is a random disturbance term which is idependently 
and identically distributed across individuals within 
each educational group; 
N (=4 or 6) is the order of the polynomial. 
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FIG. A5.2.1: AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES 
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Figure A5.2.1 plots the predicted earnings profiles 
corresponding to these higher-order polynomials for degree-holders 
and high-school leavers. The number in the parenthesis indicates the 
degree of the polynomial. The predicted profiles corresponding to the 
second-order (i.e. quadratic) are also given for ease of comparison. 
On the whole, the age-earnings profiles all look quite similar, 
particularly for high-school leavers, with the higher-order profiles 
being a little more wave-like. It could be argued that given the 
limited amount of information individuals have when deciding whether 
to proceed to university, the simple quadratic may be a more 
appropriate representation of their expectations of future incomes. 
Nevertherless, it would be interesting to see how much difference the 
choice of the specific functional form makes to the final 
calculations. The NPVs corresponding to the fourth- and sixth-order 
earnings functions at various degrees of risk-aversion are presented 
in Table AS.2.2. Again, for ease of comparison, the results for the 
quadratic are given alongside. The figures presented include 
adjustments for the risk of failure. 
IAELE A5.2.2; NEV IQ tlIGtlEB EOUCAIIQN E~ EQLYNQMIAL-QRDEB QE EARNINGS 
EllNCIIQN 
Polynomial-Order 
R 2 4 6 
0 13180 15510 17150 
1 11720 13990 15620 
2 10260 12470 14080 
3 8800 10950 12550 
4 7340 9430 11010 
5 5880 7910 9480 
The calculations reveal that quantitatively, the profitability 
of higher education as an investment appears to be fairly sensitive 
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to the choice of the functional form of the earnings function. At the 
zero risk aversion level for instance, the NPV using the sixth-order 
earnings function is some 30% larger than that obtained by using the 
Quadratic. Qualitatively, however, our main conclusions remain 
unchanged. That is, accounting for risk makes higher education less 
profitable (to risk-averse individuals), but for the moderately risk-
averse, higher education is still an attractive investment. 
The second issue of importance with regards to the choice of 
the functional form is that of omitted variables. The issue of bias 
to the estimated parameters aside, omitted variables may seriously 
distort our estimates of the relative riskiness in the alternative 
income profiles. Suppose for instance, that the entire unexplained 
component in degree-holders' income is due to an omitted variable z. 
In contrast, suppose that Z is irrelevant in the determination of the 
incomes of high-school leavers, and that the unexplained component 
for this group is genuinely due to luck. In this extreme case, if 
individuals are aware of their respective values of Z, then the 
income profile corresponding to the choice of attending university is 
known with complete certainty (apart from the risks of failing). In 
other words, provided that the risk of failure is small, higher 
education is risk-reducing, and is even more attractive than in a 
world without risk, ceteris paribus. Accounting for risk would, 
therefore, increase the (risk-adjusted) NPV to higher education in 
this example. Conversely, if Z completely explains the residual in 
high-school leavers' incomes, but is irrelevant to degree-holders' 
incomes, then the risk adjustment would drive the (risk-adjusted) NPV 
to higher education down even more than the estimates in Section 5.4 
suggest. 
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In this respect, we focus our attention on a group of variabl es 
which has a long standing in the economics literature, namely, job-
. ' ' 1 l h urnb f ' h h specific variab es. T ere are an er o competing ypot eses 
regarding wage differentials across jobs. For instance, economists as 
early as Adam Smith have recognised the importance of the non-
pecuniary aspects of jobs (" .. the wages of labour vary with the ease 
or hardship, the cleanliness or the dirtiness, the honourableness or 
2 
the dishonourableness of the employment"). The pioneering work of 
Becker (1975) and Mincer (1962, 1974), emphasises the role of on-the-
job training instead . More recently, a number of economists have 
developed "efficiency wage" models which focus on monitoring and 
' 'ff ' 3 turnover costs as an explanation of wage di erentials. 
Ideally, we would like to have direct measures of the amount of 
on-the-job training individuals undertake, the non-pecuniary aspects 
and the costs of turnover and monitoring in their respective jobs. 
Unfortunately, these are not available. As proxies, we have included 
in the regressions a set of eleven industry dummy variables, a set of 
six occupational dummy variables, and a dummy for government jobs in 
the earnings functions to capture these job-specific differences. The 
dummy variables are entered in two ways. First, they are entered 
simply as intercept dummies. In the second model, they are each 
1. Individual-specific variables (such as innate ability, individual 
motivation, and family background) are explicitly assumed away in 
this chapter1 and will be considered in the chapter 6. 
2. Smith (1776) Book 1, Chapter 10, Part 1. 
3. See, for instance Salop (1973), Lazear (1979). 
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2 
interacted with AGE and AGE, and included in the regression. The 
models are referred to as A and B, respectively. 
The predicted earnings profiles corresponding to these two 
models are shown in Figure AS.2.2. For comparison, we have also 
included the profiles from the simple quadratic earnings function 
(without the job dummies). 
It is clear from Figure AS.2.2 that the predicted income 
profiles obtained using these two more complicated specifications are 
very similar to the original profiles. Therefore, we do not expect 
the unadjusted NPV to differ vastly across the three specifications. 
The NPV to higher education at various degrees of risk aversion are 
presented in Table AS.2.3 for the models A and B, as well as for the 
original model. 
TABLE AS,2.3; NPV TO HIGHER EDUCATION AT VARIOUS DEGREES OF RISK 
AVERSION BY SPECIFICATION OF EARNINGS FUNCTION 
R Original Model A Model B 
0 13180 15030 15200 
1 11720 13430 13550 
2 10260 11830 11910 
3 8800 10220 10270 
4 7340 8620 8620 
5 5880 7020 6980 
Not surprisingly, the expected NPVs in the three specifications 
are close to each other. As well, the dollar reductions in the risk-
adjusted NPVs as the degree of risk aversion increases are also very 
similar across all three specifications. For instance, the reduction 
in moving from R=0 to R=3 is $4,380 in our original specification, 
compared with $4,810 and $4,930 for Models A and B, respectively. 
Hence, our basic conclusions concerning the profitability of higher 
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education and how it is affected by adjustments for risks are not 
altered by the inclusion of job dummies. 
Finally, in this section, we consider the sensitivity of the 
results to the distributional assumption of the residuals. Recall 
that in Section 5 . 4, the income distribution of a particular 
educational group at each age is generated by first obtaining the 
2 
variance of the residuals from the OLS regression. By repeatedly 
sampling the error terms from a normal distribution with zero mean 
2 
and variances, then adding each of these errors to the OLS 
prediction of the log of earnings at that age, and finally taking the 
exponential of the sum, the income distribution is generated. This 
procedure requires the assumption that the earnings of individuals at 
each age (in logarithms) be normally distributed. An alternative non-
parametric procedure for generating the income distribution at each 
age is to save the actual residuals from the regression in a set. The 
error term is then randomly drawn from this set (with replacement), 
instead of from the normal distribution. In this way, we let the data 
dictate the shape of the distribution. Table AS.2.4 shows the risk 
premiums corresponding to the alternative income streams as well as 
the NPV to higher education calculated using this procedure. As with 
the other tables in this section, the risk of failure is included in 
the calculations. 
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TABLE A5,2,4: RISK PREMIUMS & NPV OF HIGHER EDUCAT.ON WITH 
NON-PARAMETRIC ERROR DISTRIBUTIONS 
R RISK PREMIUM NPV 
Degree High-School 
0 0 0 11430 
1 140 100 10670 
2 280 190 9900 
3 420 2 90 9140 
4 560 390 8370 
5 700 480 7610 
Three major points of interest may be noted from the figures 
presented in the above table. First, the magnitude of the risk 
premiums are notably smaller than the corresponding figures in Table 
5.6. This is probably the result of the normal distribution being 
unbounded, whereas the error distribution generated from the actual 
residuals is bounded. 
The second noteworthy point, which follows from the first, is 
that the adjustment for risk becomes relatively less important than 
with the normal distribution. Nevertheless, it is stiil true that 
higher education is less attractive as a result of the uncertainty in 
future incomes, and the risk of failure. 
Finally, we note that the expected NPV (i.e. NPV at R=O) is 
slightly lower in the non-parametric case than in the case of the 
normally-distributed errors. For the range of degrees of risk-
aversion presented here, however, higher education is still a 
profitable venture even for the most risk-averse. 
Summing up, the results in this appendix show that 
quantitatively the estimates of the risk premiums and the risk-
adjusted NPV to higher education in Section 5.4 are sensitive to the 
specifications of the utility and earnings functions, and the 
distributional assumption concerning the error term. Qualitatively, 
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however, the main conclusions appear to be quite robust. That is, 
taking into account uncertainty reduces the attractiveness of higher 
education, but for moderately risk-averse individuals, this reduction 
is small, and does not change the proposition that higher education 
is financially, a sound investment. 
APPENDIX 7.1 
COST OF RISK-BEARING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN HOURS WORKED UNDER 
ALTERNATIVE FEE-REGIMES 
TABLE A7.1.1: COST OF RISK-BEARING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN HOURS WORKED 
(1988-89 DOLLARS) 
R 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
No Fees 
7120 
14240 
21360 
28470 
35590 
HECS 
7100 
14190 
21290 
28390 
35480 
LIB 
7570 
15130 
22700 
30270 
37830 
Full Fees 
12600 
25200 
37790 
50390 
62990 
TABLE A7.1.2: COST OF UNCERTAINTY AND COST OF RISK-BEARING UNDER THE 1985-86 AND THE 1988-89 TAX-REGIMES 
(1988-89 DOLLARS) 
Coefficient 
of Relative 
Risk-Aversion 
R 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1985-86 Tax Rates 
Cost of Uncertainty 
associated with 
attending 
university 
23690 
47380 
71060 
94750 
118440 
not attending 
university 
19340 
38680 
58020 
77360 
96700 
Cost of 
Risk-Bearing 
4350 
8690 
13040 
17390 
21740 
1988-89 Tax Rates 
Cost of Uncertainty 
associated with 
attending 
university 
30670 
61430 
92010 
122680 
153350 
not attending 
university 
21760 
43520 
65290 
87050 
108810 
Cost of 
Risk-Bearing 
8910 
17810 
26720 
32630 
44540 
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APPENDIX 8.1 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND REGRESSION RESULTS 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
INDl = Agriculture, Mining 
IND2 - Manufacturing 
IND3 = Electricity, Gas, Water, Construction 
IND4 = Wholesale, Retail, Trade 
INDS = Transport, Storage, Communication 
IND6 = Finance, Property, Business Services 
IND7 = Public Administration, Defence 
INDS = Health 
IND9 = Community and Personal Services 
OCCl - Managers, Administrators 
OCC2 = Professionals 
OCC3 = Para-Professionals 
OCC4 - Clerks, Salespersons, Personal Service Workers 
aces - Other Occupations 
AGE= dummy variable which takes the value 1 for 25-29 year-olds 
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TABLE A8.1.l: PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF EARNINGS FUNCTIONS~ 
DEPENDENT VAR 
SAMPLE : 
DATA 
DESCRIPTION 
INDl 
Ind2 
Ind3 
Ind4 
Ind5 
Ind6 
Ind7 
Ind8 
Ind9 
Occ2 
Occ3 
Occ4 
Occ5 
Age*Indl 
Age*Ind2 
Log(Annual Inc9me) 
20-24 yr-old males from 1976 cross-section 
25-29 yr-old males from 1981 cross-section 
See Estimation Procedure· (below) . 
Degree-Holders High-School 
Leavers 
8.039 8.126 
(0.248) (0.112) 
9.181 8.905 
(0.197) (0.114) 
9.203 8.929 
(0 .213) (0.128) 
8.938 8.261 
(0.200) (0.107) 
9.140 8.924 
(0.239) (0.127) 
8.984 8.831 
(0 .198) (0 .119) 
9.275 8.931 
(0.201) (0.123) 
9.321 8.753 
(0 .214) (0 .190) 
8.909 8.695 
(0 .194) (0.123) 
0.061 -0.021 
(0 .189) (0.157) 
-0.160 0.002 
(0 .225) (0.128) 
-0.249 -0.019 
(0.198) 0.109 
-0.734 -0.174 
(0.205) (0.106) 
1.464 0.570 
(1.218) (1.017) 
0.180 0.227 
Age*Ind3 
Age*Ind4 
Age*Ind5 
Age*Ind6 
Age*Ind7 
Age*Ind8 
Age*Ind9 
Age*Occ2 
Age*Occ3 
Age*Occ4 
Age*Occ5 
SEE 
SD (dep var) 
n 
* 
standard errors in () 
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(0.843) 
0.132 
(1.027) 
0.473 
(0. 924) 
0.245 
(1.049) 
0.300 
(0.855) 
0.198 
(0.890) 
0.312 
(0.945) 
0.235 
(0.861) 
-0.070 
(0.796) 
-0.162 
(1.149) 
-0.050 
(0.886) 
0.295 
(1.138) 
0.631 
1.391 
510 
(1. 045) 
0.182 
(1.292) 
0.176 
(0.953) 
0.219 
(1.166) 
0.304 
(1.112) 
0.215 
(1.195) 
0.350 
(2 .211) 
0.322 
(1.133) 
0.107 
(1.432) 
0.058 
(1.285) 
-0.079 
(0.967) 
-0.114 
(0.965) 
0.627 
1.584 
734 
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Estimation Procedure 
Data from the 1976 Census were available only in the form of 
cross-classified tables. MTX32 was used in this exercise. Only 
records pertaining to male degree-holders in the 20-24 age group were 
extracted. The data were then condensed so that they were cross-
classified only by industry (9 categories), occupation (5 
categories), and income (14 categories). Records for "not stated" or 
"not applicable" in any of the three factors were eliminated. This 
gave us a total of 630 records. 
For 1981, the unit record was used. Only male graduates in the 
25-29 age category were extracted. Income figures were converted to 
1976 dollars, and the data were then transformed into a cross-
classified tabulation similar to the 1976 data. This gave us another 
630 records. 
.. 
The two data sets were then merged, with a flag identifying the 
year, and records with zero frequencies (i.e. no individuals with 
that particular combination of factors) were eliminated .. The total 
number of records after this procedure was 510. Each of these records 
was subsequently used as an observation point in the regression with 
the frequency associated with that record as the weight [see Kmenta 
(1971) Section 9.2]. 
The estimation for high-school leavers follows the same 
procedure. 
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TABLE AB.1.2: INDUSTRY/OCCUPATIONAL MIX OF MALE HIGH-SCHOOL LEAVERS 
% of 20-24 yr-old Male High-School Leavers 
1976 1981 1986 
Industry 
1 . Agric & Mining 5.74 6.89 4.79 
2. Manufacturing 16.97 21.59 16.22 
3 • Elec,Gas,Water,Construc 8.97 6.89 6.16 
4 . Wholesale,Retail,Trade 17.33 21.36 20.04 
5 . Transpt,Stor,Communication 9.21 8.90 9.31 
6. Finan,Prpty,Busns Svcs 15.65 12.54 16.84 
7 . Public Admin,Defence 13.49 8.20 7.80 
8 . Health 2.18 2.09 1.60 
9. Commun & Personal Svcs 10.47 11.53 15.25 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
Occu12ation 
1. Managers & Administrators 6.86 4.88 6.11 
2 . Professionals 4.14 4.64 6.12 
3 . Para-Professionals 10.50 6.42 7.27 
4. Clerks,Salespersons & 
Personal Service Workers 43.14 39.86 39.63 
5 . Others 35.36 44.20 40.87 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
Number of observations population 223 207 
